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Against Instrumental Reason: Neo-Marxism and Spirituality in the Thought of José Luis L. Aranguren and Jesús Aguirre
A mi padrino, que me enseñó a preguntar por qué
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1 Introduction

Opposition within Spain to the Francoist dictatorship (1939-1975) grew undoubtedly stronger during the last two decades of the regime. However, little attention has been paid to the role and impact that Critical Theory –as developed by the Frankfurt School– had in Spain during the last stages of the regime and during the ensuing Transition to democracy. It is only recently, with the 2009 launch of the Spanish journal Constelaciones, that the introduction and impact of Critical Theory in Spain are being acknowledged and analysed. This book goes one step further; its purpose is to readdress the question of the existence Critical Theory in Spanish thought during this period. Its main argument is that, contrary to general belief, Critical Theory was introduced and developed in Spain during the second half of the twentieth

1 «Mere intellect produces no philosophy, for philosophy is more than the limited perception of what is» (Hölderlin, 1965: 95).
century influenced by and parallel to the Frankfurt School’s own research. Specifically, Against Instrumental Reason draws attention to thought of two leading Spanish thinkers, namely, José Luis López Aranguren (1909-1996) and Jesús Aguirre y Ortiz de Zárate (1934-2001) –better known as Duque de Alba (1978-2001)–, both of whom were instrumental figures in the introduction of the Frankfurt School’s thought into Spain. More importantly, this book explores their criticism of instrumental reason and argues that their own work constitutes an attempt to overcome the coordinates set by instrumental reason, by developing an alternative reason that would challenge the official framework of rationality. By analysing the work of Aranguren and Aguirre, I aim to show that their thought shares to a large extent the key elements at the core of Critical Theory, including its methodology, style, and aim, while these authors also maintain their originality by introducing spirituality and faith as a key aspect of their argument.

Both thinkers played a pivotal role in the development of Spanish thought and culture during much of the Francoist regime and the ensuing Transition. They also displayed a keen interest in post-war European thought, particularly Aranguren, who made
numerous references to phenomenology, irrationalism, existentialism, structuralism, and other currents of thought (see Soldevilla, 2004: 129). In the case of Aguirre, his frequent references to Heidegger, but also Sartre, and Kierkegaard, are evidence of his interest in existentialism. Moreover, I contend that their work provides evidence of the existence of attempts to liberate reason from its instrumentalization as part of a wider European current, opening the door to finding other such attempts in other authors whose work, although beyond the scope of this book, may be analysed in subsequent research.

Aranguren’s personal experience in the United States and his sparse but direct contact with Marcuse put him in a privileged position to discuss, evaluate, and even develop neo-Marxist thought. In addition, Aranguren contributed, as did


Aguirre, to newspapers with a diversity of regular articles which introduced Spanish readers to different currents of thought – including the Frankfurt School– while encouraging a critical outlook towards domestic affairs. All in all, Aranguren exercised a considerable influence on Spanish intellectual life; in fact, Elías Díaz describes Aranguren, alongside Enrique Tierno Galván, as «los dos intelectuales con mayor seguimiento en esos años en nuestro país» (1994: 77). In fact, the scope of Aranguren’s influence is such that –despite considering his philosophical work minor–, Francisco Vázquez García identifies an important cluster of Spanish philosophers, intellectuals, and artists whom he labels as «el nódulo de Aranguren» (2009: 157-219). As a result of his frequent newspaper articles and his television appearances during the Transition, he boasts a wide readership that –not without controversy– holds him in high esteem as the number of awards received and the events held in his honour bear witness to. On

4 Vázquez García understands «Aranguren’s cluster» in the following terms: «Alude más bien a la marca o ‘carisma’ que ésta va a representar, gracias en parte al trabajo simbólico y al capital social acumulado por sus seguidores – en particular por Javier Muguerza–, especialmente tras los sucesos de 1965, que consagraron a Aranguren como icono de los profesores universitarios represaliados» (2009: 158).

5 For a detailed account of these awards, see Blázquez, 1994, 1: 17-20.
the other hand, Aranguren’s actions became under scrutiny as a result of the polemic aroused by Javier Marías’s posthumous veiled reference to Aranguren as a Francoist collaborator (Javier Marías, 1999). This prompted a heated exchange of public letters published in *El País* between Javier Marías and Aranguren’s family and friends regarding Aranguren’s role and sympathies during the Francoist regime. The public nature, length, number, and variety of people involved in the debate not only bears testimony to Aranguren’s high public profile and the depth of feeling aroused by his memory, but also to the Manichean perspective often adopted towards people’s relationship with the regime. Whereas it is undeniable that thinkers such as Pedro Laín Entralgo, José Antonio Maravall, Dionisio Ridruejo, Luis Rosales, Gonzalo Torrente Ballester, Antonio Tovar, and Aranguren were supporters –some even ideologues– of the regime, it is equally true that from the late 1940s and 1950s they become disillusioned with the regime, exercising an increasing amount of criticism towards it; a point strongly made by Jordi Gracia in his *Resistencia Silenciosa* (2004).

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6 These letters have been collected in the online *Projecto Filosofía en español* under the heading «Aranguren como delator franquista» and are available there (see Javier Marías, 1999).
Thus, one of aims of this book is to elucidate the complexities involved in the evolution of the thought of Aranguren and Aguirre, both of whom first worked within the regime and, later, against it.

Numerous scholars interested in history, philosophy, and cultural studies have analysed Aranguren’s work, although he is best remembered for his work on religion and morality. In particular, Feliciano Blázquez, having compiled Aranguren’s most significant publications in the six volumes which constitute his *Obras completas*, has also offered a comprehensive overview of Aranguren’s prolific publications as well as of the research others have written about him. In addition, several scholars have explored the political dimension of Aranguren’s work. In her article «La política como moral (Aranguren)», Victoria Camps explores Aranguren’s guiding premise regarding the relationship between morality and politics, that is, that a merely personal morality is insufficient unless it becomes a social morality, that is, unless it acquires a political dimensional, arguing that only exercise of...

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7 For a comprehensive bibliography of publications by Aranguren (including books, newspaper articles, journal contributions, and even prologues and epilogues) please see Blázquez (see 1997b, 6: 657-671). Blázquez also provides an extensive bibliography listing publications about Aranguren (see 1997b, 6: 671-683).
morality constitutes an authentic morality (1997: 181-89). Elías Díaz has also analysed Aranguren’s relationship to politics, the close relationship he envisaged between ethics and politics, as well as Aranguren’s views on democracy. Like Camps, Díaz also emphasizes that morality, ethics, and politics are all intertwined in Aranguren’s thought. In his essays, most notably in «La democracia como moral» (1996: 109-15) and in «Aranguren: Ética y política» (2006: 1-18), he argues that for Aranguren democracy is rooted in the tension which exists between ethics and politics, precisely because it requires the dynamic interaction between these two spheres, but also insofar as it requires the active political engagement of individuals as well as of institutions. Cristina Hermida del Llano has drawn attention to Aranguren’s political impact as an opposition thinker during the second half of the Francoist regime in her essay «Oposición intelectual al franquismo: Aranguren y Tierno Galván», arguing that Aranguren and Tierno Galván both of them came to represent independent thought and intellectual opposition to the regime during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, she convincingly contends that from 1965 onwards they both can be considered to have spearheaded the intellectual
transition which took place prior to the political transition to democracy (2008: 29-41).

However, despite being an important key to understanding Aranguren’s work from the 1960s onwards, little has been done to elucidate the extent, influence, and nature of his relationship to the thought of the members of School. Exploring Aranguren and Aguirre’s relationship to Critical Theory constitutes the main focus of *Against Instrumental Reason*. What I argue throughout this book is that Aranguren showed a clear interest in the Frankfurt School –Marcuse in particular–, disseminating their thought and developing many of the key questions posed by the members of the School.

A close friend of Aranguren’s, Aguirre also played a pivotal role in the introduction of the Frankfurt School’s thought into Spain, as he translated and published a significant number of the works of the members of the School, encouraging the dissemination of their thought, as well as being influenced by it himself.

Aguirre exercised a considerable weight on Spanish intellectual and public life under many different guises, such as those of priest, translator, editor, aristocrat, writer, patron of the arts, and
socialite. His influence—both under and after Franco—has been considerable, not only because of his prominent social position or his pre-eminent connections, but also because of his contact with the general public through his translations and his regular contributions to *El País*. An example of his influence is that, as Aguirre himself recounts in *Casi ayer noche*, it was Aguirre who hosted the social event which introduced Felipe González, the future Spanish president (1982-1996), to public life as the head of the PSOE, the Spanish Socialist party (see 1985: 46). More evidence of his social connections and his prominent position is the fact that he frequented the *Palacio de la Zarzuela*, the residence of the Spanish royal family (see Gullón, 1989: 12-13). Little attention, however, has been paid to Aguirre’s intellectual contribution, with the possible exception of Aranguren, who acknowledges Aguirre’s contribution to philosophy and theology (Aranguren, 1996, 5: 376). It was only in 2011 that Manuel Vicent published a loose biography of Aguirre, full of anecdotes and interspersed with the author’s own memories. Nevertheless, it is necessary to bear in mind that rather than a rigorous account of Aguirre’s life, there is a considerable literary license instead, to the point that it has been described as
being somewhere between a biography and a novel. For this reason, it has provoked some controversy regarding the veracity of many aspects of Aguirre’s profile described in the book, as evidenced by the open letter written by the Duchess of Alba published in *El País*, which, borrowing the author’s own words, describes the biography as «esperpento literario» (2011: n.p.).

Despite this rekindled interest in Aguirre’s persona, to the best of my knowledge, Aguirre’s work has not been the focus of any previous academic publications. Consequently, there is every indication that his intellectual contribution, although extremely valuable, has been overshadowed by the immense interest generated by his own charisma and his other roles. Hence, one of the aims of this book is to rediscover and reassess Aguirre’s work and his relationship to the Frankfurt School.

Although it is true that these two thinkers have been well-known public figures in one way or another, their thought tends to be understood and interpreted within the co-ordinates of the historical moment they shared and, to a certain extent, shaped;

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8 With the sole exception of an article entitled «Neo-Marxist Trends in Franco’s Spain: Jesús Aguirre and the Frankfurt School», which I published on 2006 while developing the research for this book.
that is, their reaction towards the Franco regime and their position during the Spanish Transition. What I suggest here, however, is that there is an important subversive element in their thought which, although concerned with their historical circumstances, aims to transcend those in order to address the issue of rationality itself. Thus, I contend that the study of Aranguren and Aguirre from this perspective is, therefore, of interest because, first, it constitutes a recuperation of a crucial aspect of their thought which has passed largely unnoticed and, second, because it unveils evidence of the existence of a current of Critical Theory in the Frankfurtian sense in Spain, despite having typically been considered inexistent.
1.1 The Introduction of the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory in Spain

The Frankfurt School, originally integrated by the members of the Institut für Sozialforschung or Institute for Social Research, developed—from a Marxist and Freudian platform—what it has become known as Critical Theory. Although the Institut was affiliated with the University of Frankfurt am Main when founded in 1923—hence the name of the School—, as a result of the threat of Nazism, most of its members emigrated to the United States, where the Institut was relocated until 1951, when it re-opened in Frankfurt. It was precisely in exile, where the School gained notoriety and developed its Critical Theory.

Frankfurtian Critical Theory provides a critical framework from which to understand neo-capitalist societies, by drawing attention to and criticising the then new forms of alienation brought about by the consumer society, mass culture, mass art, and

9 As Candice L. Bosse observes, «the term "consumption" emerged in the Middle Ages and it meant "devouring" or "eating up". Specifically, in that time period, the word referred to diseases such as syphilis and tuberculosis» (2007: 38). In this same vein, the word also refers to the process of ingesting and metabolising food. In reference to material culture, this latter meaning expands to be applied to a particular behaviour in the market place. There has been an evolution of the meaning of the words «consumption» and
the manipulation of the mass media, and false consciousness.\footnote{The term «false consciousness» was first introduced by Engels, although it is the Frankfurt School who make it a central point to their critique. Its relevance lies in that the neo-Marxist critique of manipulation—particularly manipulation of the mass media in the context of political propaganda and commercial advertising— is primarily based on the concept of false consciousness or voluntary servitude, as Marcuse also refers to it. As Michael Rosen explains, for the Frankfurt School «it [false consciousness] registers the central idea that societies have a systematic character and that they are maintained, apparently irrationally in many cases, by virtue of the attitudes and beliefs of those who live in them» (1996: 30). False consciousness stands on an extremely elusive ground due to its reliance on attitudes and beliefs which the individual who holds them is unaware of. For this reason, it remains a problematic concept. For a comprehensive discussion of this concept, see Rosen’s \textit{On Voluntary Servitude} (1996).}

Needless to say that the position of its members as cultural critics encountered copious attacks; their often elitist approach, as well as their pessimistic conclusions remain to this day problematic aspects of their work. Nevertheless, it is also true that they must be credited with having been the first ones to articulate a critique of neo-capitalist modes of consumption, culture, and mass society. «Consumer» which, in a socio-historical and economic context, have become linked to the dynamics of late capitalism and market economy. As result of the changing manufacturing practices in the early twentieth century, which no longer supply just for the needs of their market, but expand to determine production according to the speculated wants, the words «customer» or «user» become inadequate; as Raymond Williams, the term «consumer» provides a more suitable description of the relationship of this agent with the market place and its products, reflecting its wasteful nature (1983: 78-79).
as well as of the form of rationality associated with it\textsuperscript{11}. No less important is the fact that they did so incorporating Marxist, Freudian, existentialist, socio-economic, political, and aesthetic theories into their thought. That is why, despite the unresolved problems present in their critique, the influence of their work on sociological, philosophical, cultural, and even political thought has been considerable, going far beyond the United States and Germany. Spain is no exception.

Aranguren was well aware of the work of what are generally considered to be the core members of the \textit{Institut}, as well as of other thinkers often referred to as the periphery\textsuperscript{12}. In \textit{La cultura}

\textsuperscript{11} Nevertheless, as Jesús Cruz convincingly argues in \textit{Gentlemen, bourgeois, and revolutionaries} (1996), the causes, reach and depth of political change must not be taken at face value. Instead, political, economic, social, moral, and religious factors must be analysed individually,—although not separately—in an effort to elucidate how they affect this change. This is also applicable to the case of the Transition, which—despite the fact that, politically, it did not start until the death of the dictator—, one of the factors which made it possible was that, as Hermida del Llano argues, there is a strong continuity and a relationship of causality between the cultural opposition to the regime spearheaded by Aranguren and Enrique Tierno Galván and the Transition (2008: 37). Aranguren himself explicitly refers to this: «Para hablar con rigor hay que decir que la salida cultural del franquismo se adelantó en mucho a su salida política y que, por tanto, culturalmente, se vivía ya, desde 1970 desde luego y, sin exageración, desde 1965, en un régimen en transición» (cited by Hermida del Llano, 2008: 37; originally in 1987: 90, 92).

\textsuperscript{12} References to these authors are scatter throughout Aranguren’s later
española y la cultura establecida (1975), Aranguren argues against the perception that there was a late reception of Critical Theory in Spain (1996, 4: 427). In fact, he concludes that access to the Frankfurt School in Spain cannot be considered as having been restricted to his generation, because the Institut did not immediately acquire a real social existence. In addition, Aranguren points out the availability of key secondary literature on the School, like Martin Jay’s *Dialectic Imagination* (1973), whose first translation, according to Aranguren, was into Spanish (1974) (Aranguren, 1994, 4: 542). The fact is that the Frankfurt School was first published in Spain in 1962 with Manuel Sacristán’s translations of two of Adorno’s works: *Notas de literatura* and *Prismas*, both published by Ariel\(^\text{13}\). Considering that the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* first appeared in 1932, their introduction in Spain in the early sixties may, indeed, seem late. Nonetheless, the changes in work (see references to Gramsci, 1994, 2: 700; 1995, 3: 185, 203, 215, 560, 708; 1996, 5: 416, 418; to Lukács, 1994, 2: 553, 700; 1996, 5: 221; 1997, 6: 498; to Korsch, 1996, 5: 361; and to Pollock, 1996, 5: 125. For Aranguren’s discussions of Adorno, Horkheimer Benjamin, and Marcuse see Chapter Four).

\(^{13}\) Earlier translations of the works of the Frankfurt School into Spanish were made in Hispano-America. These, however, were not as readily available to Spanish readers as those published in Spain and, thus, had very little impact on the introduction of their thought in the country.
focus, location, and even membership of the School account for what Aranguren regards as a delayed social existence. It is from this perspective that Aranguren argues against the perception of the introduction of the Frankfurt School in Spain as late. This argument is supported by the research of contemporary scholars, who contend that, far from a late reception, their introduction—contrary to what one might expect given the context of the Francoist dictatorship—happened earlier and was more extensive than in other European countries such as Italy or France due to, as Fernando F. Savater argues, the keenness of Spanish editors and readers on the Frankfurt School’s thought (2006: n.p.). Nevertheless, the introduction of the Frankfurt School in Spain was complex and far from balanced and comprehensive. As Vicente Gómez indicates, interest in the School was strongly marked by the socio-political situation Spain was going through at the time, as evidenced by the political resonances present in the selection of books to be translated and published, unlike those published in Hispano-America, which were more focused on aesthetics (2009: 8).

Aranguren himself can be credited with being one the
introducers of the Frankfurt School’s thought in Spain, for in the early 1960s, he organized—at the insistence of Aguirre—a seminar on ethics to discuss Adorno’s *Minima Moralia*, which—according to his own recollection—made him one of the first people to discuss the thought of a member of the School in a Spanish University (1996, 4: 544). It should also be noted that a translation of this book had not yet been published in Spain. Hence, running the seminar required the translation assistance provided by Victor Sánchez Zavala, who became one of the first people in publishing a translation of one of Adorno’s—and, effectively, also the School’s—books, which he did in 1964.

Aranguren points on various occasions to Aguirre as the person chiefly responsible for having introduced the Frankfurt School into Spain (see 1996, 5: 376). Juan García Hortelano, in his prologue to Aguirre’s *Casi ayer noche*, refers to Aguirre as the «importer» of works of the Frankfurt School (1985: 12). In fact, he is often credited with being the introducer of their books into Spain (see also Savater, 2006; and Gullón, 1989: 11). However, although Aguirre did perform an important task by editing and translating a number of the works of the Frankfurt School, thus making them
accessible to a Spanish readership, it would be unfair to credit any one person with its introduction. Gracia provides a more balanced account of the process of translation and edition in Spain of the work of the members of the Frankfurt School:

So several publishing houses, different editors, and translators were all involved in the publication of the Frankfurt School in Spain. Nevertheless, out of the 43 books by the Frankfurt School published in Spain since its introduction in 1962 until 1981, Taurus published at total thirteen. The publications by Taurus of these

14 Although Seix Barral did translate and edit two of Marcuse’s books during the period this author was being introduced to a Spanish readership, it cannot be said that it had a leading role in this task, for Ariel, and Alianza also translated and published two of his books. Hence, there is not sufficient evidence to indicate that the role it plays in relation to Marcuse is comparable to that of Taurus in relation to Adorno, Horkheimer, and Benjamin.
books by Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Benjamin took place largely at Aguirre’s instance, which had different degrees of involvement, including prologuing, translating, revising, or editing such publications. This constitutes the most consistent and prolific effort to introduce the work of the School into Spain. Hence, it is in this sense that Aguirre can be credited with being its introducer.

Regarding its influence, it is widely assumed that Critical Theory as developed by the Frankfurt School has had little impact on the direction of Spanish intellectual development. This view can be illustrated by the opinion of Ignacio Romero de Solís:

tanto una como otra corriente filosófica [estructuralismo y Escuela de Frankfurt], que ambicionaban renovar el pensamiento marxista europeo, fueron flor de un día. La desorientada y radicalizada izquierda española pretendía sustituir las toscas y oxidadas herramientas filosóficas del marxismo–leninismo por instrumentos más sutiles y en concordancia con las tareas con que se enfrentaba en el ocaso de la dictadura de Franco. [...] también opino que aquellos cultos y brillantes epígonos de Marx, como Adorno o Benjamin, traducidos a instancias de Jesús Aguirre, tampoco contribuyeron a la renovación del panorama filosófico y político de una España que se aprestaba a vivir la Transición (2002: 295-96).
Furthermore, it is generally thought that no Critical Theory, other than in a literary sense, was ever produced in Spain. Such a view can be observed in the fact that there is no mention of a possible Spanish Critical Theory which follows the tradition of the Frankfurt School in the entry on Critical Theory in Barry Jordan’s *Spanish Culture and Society; The Essential Glossary*: «neither Republican exiles nor oppositional intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s in Spain managed to develop a serious and coherent body of Critical Theory» (2002: 57). This is echoed by Eamonn Rodger’s *Encyclopedia of Contemporary Spanish Culture*, whose entry on Critical Theory focuses exclusively on Critical Theory in the context of the literary criticism produced by academic authors or the mass media, but makes no mention of Critical Theory in Spain in the Frankfurtian sense (1999: 129-30). In contrast, *Constelaciones*, whose first volume assesses the currency of Critical Theory, also explores the introduction and reception of Critical Theory in Spain and other countries —namely, Brazil and Portugal—. This is part of the renewed academic interest that Critical Theory has aroused and evidence of the current engagement in Spain with Critical Theory. In the course of the book, through the analysis of Aranguren and
Aguirre’s thought, I provide evidence showing that Critical Theory did contribute to the renovation of Spanish intellectual life and to shaping the socio-cultural and political direction of Spain during the later years of the Francoist dictatorship and its Transition to democracy. More importantly, I argue that Aranguren and Aguirre both developed their own thought in a manner consistent with the core principles of Critical Theory, to the point that it is possible to refer to it as such.

Against Instrumental Reason highlights the significance of re-assessing the impact of Critical Theory and of the Frankfurt School itself on Spanish thought and culture. This re-assessment gains relevance today in the context of the current atmosphere of nostalgia and the endeavour to re-evaluate Spain’s recent past. Moreover, the end of the Franco regime and the early years of the Transition cannot be fully understood without reference to the role that the introduction of Critical Theory played in Spanish intellectual development. Consequently, by drawing attention to the much overlooked issue of Critical Theory in Spain, this research also contributes to the re-contextualization of Spanish thought during the second half of the twentieth century in the broader
sociological and philosophical discussions which were taking place in post-war Europe and the United States.
1.2 The methodology

This research has been undertaken from the perspective of the history of ideas. Therefore, this is reflected in the premises and methodology adopted, which are largely informed by Quentin Skinner’s work.

The methodology of the history of ideas originally developed two distinct approaches. Arthur O. Lovejoy and his followers focused closely on the text, arguing that research must be interdisciplinary and must take into account an expanded literary cannon which may extend to different countries, even incorporating linguistic research. As a reaction against the excessive stress this approach put on formal thought and written texts, another approach lead by Wilhelm Dilthey adopted a more historical perspective, arguing that social history is essential in the hermeneutical process of the history of ideas. Skinner, however, is critical of both approaches. For him, the term history of ideas refers to «as wide as possible a variety of historical inquiries into intellectual problems» (1969: 3). Whereas the two main –and conflicting– currents within the history of ideas insist, respectively, on the autonomy of the text
to yield its own meaning and on interpreting the text according to its context, Skinner argues that both approaches are insufficient and that, instead, the history of ideas should interpret a text by interpreting the illocutionary intentions of its writer, considering the context in which a text is written and to interpret what the author intends to convey by writing such a text.

In his *Visions of Politics*, Skinner states: «it is I think nothing less than fatal to good historical practice to introduce the question of truth into social explanation» (2002: 31). In making this comment, Skinner argues that it is not the role of the historian, even in the area of the history of ideas, to engage in an analysis of the truth content of the past, but rather in its interpretation. Consequently, the aim of this book is not to evaluate the philosophical, political, or intellectual value of Critical Theory, but to draw attention to the impact of Critical Theory on Spain and on the two authors object of this research. In other words, this research is more concerned with establishing the inner coherence—or lack thereof—of Aguirre’s and Aranguren’s work and their belief system and how they relate, or not, to Critical Theory than to assess the rationality of their positions from an external and anachronistic
framework of rationality.

According to this approach to the history of ideas, contextual information is used, not to interpret the text directly, but to contribute to elucidate the intentionality of its author. Heavily influenced by the theory of speech acts developed by John L. Austin and John R. Searle, Skinner led a shift of perspective known as «linguistic turn»; moving from focusing on the meaning of words and sentences, to focusing on the realm of linguistic action, that is, what speakers are doing in using them (Skinner, 1996: 7-8).

Studying texts in the light of illocutionary speech acts has important political implications. As Austin defended in *How to Do Things with Words*, some utterances have a performative value; that is why, for Skinner when it comes to the social realm and politics in particular, saying something is *doing* something. By means of his perspective of linguistic action, for Skinner, thinking politically goes far beyond thinking about politics. As Kari Palonen explains in relation to Skinner’s thought, «thinking politically is an aspect of the activity of politics itself» (2003: 3; see also 29). Thus, the sphere of what politics is, and more importantly, of who makes politics, widens considerably to include not only the researcher,
but also the author who is researched, whose political voice is, thus, revealed. What this perspective accomplishes is more than a shift in perspective; it accomplishes the political empowerment of the author, to use Palonen’s terminology, the rehabilitation of the political agents. Thus, this rehabilitation of Aranguren and Aguirre as political agents becomes simultaneously one of the aims of this research and one of the consequences of its methodology.

This shift in focus from what it is said to how and why it is said not only renders an analytical approach to exegesis unnecessary, even insufficient, but, crucially, also unsuitable. It implies the desirability for interpretation to go beyond what is already said, beyond the text. Far from imposing a foreign framework of rationality as the guiding reference for the analysis of the work of Critical Theorists, which may result in the distortion of their thought, this approach is in line with the methodology of Critical Theory itself, which also strives to go beyond that which is. Following Skinner’s application of the performative value of speech acts, I have also applied this methodological principle to Aranguren and Aguirre’s work; the result is that this research goes beyond heuristic analysis in order to incorporate a considerable
component of re-construction. That is why, although there is a lot of emphasis on the analysis of primary sources, quotations are often provided whose value to this research lies not in the main point which that text makes, but in the seemingly marginal information which it provides and which often reveals the premises and beliefs underlying these authors’ thought. Following Skinner’s methodology, the emphasis is not always on what it is said, as much as on the implications of how and why a certain idea is put forward – an analysis which takes place in the light of historical contextualization and intentionality; hence, the element of re-construction.

For this reason, this research explores the role that intentionality and biography play in shaping the language, style, and content of Aranguren and Aguirre’s writings. Thus, it provides a more comprehensive understanding of these authors’ work and it reveals aspects of their thought which may otherwise go unnoticed. What is more, I argue that this is precisely what has happened in relation to the thought of Aranguren and Aguirre, whose subversive and political content and their possible relation to Critical Theory have been largely overlooked until now.
1.3 The implications of intentionality and style

Intentionality is doubly relevant in this research because not only is it a key element of the present hermeneutic approach, but it is also a defining aspect of the work of the authors here studied. Intentionality is envisaged by the members of the Frankfurt School as well as by Aranguren and Aguirre as playing a crucial role in their own writing; this is so, partly, as a result of Heidegger’s influence and, partly, as a necessary requirement for the cohesion of their rationality and their project as a whole. Clarifying the nature of this cohesion in the thought of Aranguren and Aguirre is of paramount importance, because the analysis, reconstruction, and interpretation of these authors’ thought rests on such cohesion. That is why I must emphasize that this is not a case of what Skinner refers to as the «mythology of coherence»; that is, cohesion is not an external construct or structure imposed a posteriori by the exegete on the groups of texts analysed with the objective of conferring these texts a sense of coherence that was not there in the first place (see Skinner, 1988: 38-43; see also Skinner, 2002: 67-72). Far from this, the thought of Aranguren and
Aguirre exhibits an inherent coherence that is the result of the intention to set out a project of criticism and a rationality, which—although in different forms—expands throughout their work and even their own lives. This is why the link between biography and work is crucial in the analysis of these authors. The most immediate consequence of this position which insists on the link between text and author is the interconnectedness of the various levels of their work, such as biography, content, form, and style. Because of the relevance of intentionality, form and style are just as important as content, since these are not coincidental features of their work, but the result of deliberate decisions which shape it.

Intentionality is at the very core of their writings, for they are clearly concerned with the effect they would have on their readers. Their writings pursue two primary aims: first, to communicate—as opposed to lecturing or indoctrinating—and, second, to motivate the reader into action, into questioning or simply to engage with the text. An example of the centrality of communication can be found in the topicality—for their contemporary readers—of the content of their work, their frequent use of the newspaper article and the essay to establish a more direct and intimate connection
with the reader, as well as the stylistic features used. The newspaper contribution plays a double role, that of reflecting the writer’s concerns and echoing those of many of the readers, as well as opening their thought to new possibilities. As for the connotations of essay writing, Mary Lee Bretz’s conclusion regarding the use of the footnote (or lack thereof), is useful in shedding light on these authors’ approach to communication. As Bretz explains, «footnotes and source identification invest the writer with specialized authority that allows him to impart information rather than enter into exchange with the reader or antecedent texts» (2001: 201). What emerges from Aranguren and Aguirre’s minimal use of footnotes is their effort to avoid standing in a position of intellectual authority, deliberately stripping the text of those features which may provide such authority and create a further distance between reader and text. At the same time, they emphasize the humanistic rather than scientific nature of their writings, which is also aimed at becoming closer to their readers. Although it can be argued that the mere fact of being published and being read may already, and perhaps unavoidably, put the author and the text in a position of authority, what remains true is that these authors are clearly
concerned with the reception of their work; that they share the intention to create a closer relationship between reader, text, and writer; and that they develop certain strategies in the attempt to do so.
1.4 The role of biography

The fact that intentionality is a key methodological tool in the interpretation of these authors’ thought is unquestionably problematic. The first and perhaps most serious problem arising from the concept of «intentionality» is its subjective, unmeasurable, and unverifiable nature, which may put the researcher in an uncomfortable situation; uncomfortable, indeed, if this hypothetical researcher’s methodology, in line with scientific practices, demands direct evidence of these claims of intentionality. Instead, indirect evidence, that is, biographical and contextual information is used in this research in order to attempt to elucidate the authors’ intentionality. Its conclusions are, of course, not entirely verifiable. Nevertheless, the inferences made are supported by existing material testimonies and are, therefore, falsifiable, thus avoiding the trap of relativism. Furthermore, as with intentionality itself, such a rejection of verifiability –of the aspiration of certainty– is very much in line with the stand taken by Critical Theory.

There are other reasons for incorporating biography as an
important aspect of this research. First, the work of both authors has been noticeably influenced and shaped by their psychological profile –or, to use Ortegan terminology, their actitudes vitales– and by key biographical events, at least as much as by their socio-historical background. Second, the fact that the analysis of Aguirre’s work and, to a lesser extent, also Aranguren’s, constitutes an exercise of reconstruction makes considering their psychological profile and the key events of their biography crucial in contextualizing and understanding the content and scope of their work. Finally, there is unwillingness on the part of these authors to separate author from work, life from theory, because of its impact on the content of their writing, but, more importantly, on the framework of the rationality they adopt. It is the biographical choices and the intentionality behind their work that reveals the unity and coherence within Aranguren and Aguirre’s diverse intellectual production; due to these authors’ search for an overarching and conciliatory rationality, the division between biography and oeuvre is perceived as artificial. The possibility and desirability to establish different and distinct fields of research and experience is questioned. This is why one of my main theses is that
they make a conscious effort to integrate the two, thus blurring their boundaries and differences.

Although there are important formal and stylistic differences between them, their work shares a substantial emphasis on a traditionally autobiographic topic: selfhood, which is almost ever-present. An example of this is the fact that a good number of autobiographical testimonies are found in their texts. Moreover, it is consistent with these authors’ methodology to conclude that they have deliberately introduced these autobiographical incursions in their texts as a trail, the purpose of which is to complete the text providing it with a wider context, more profound content, and greater significance. Consequently, it must be emphasised that one of the key characteristics of their contributions is the existence of this deliberate autobiographical element whose implications and significance have to be acknowledged and explored.

Undoubtedly, including (auto-)biography as part of an academic argument presents a number of difficulties. Even stating that their work includes a strong autobiographical component is itself problematic, for as Linda Anderson points out at the outset of *Autobiography* (2001), if the author is always implicated in his
or her own work, then everything written could be considered autobiography. Paradoxically, this *reductio ad absurdum*, instead of proving the impossibility of this genre, states the importance of it and the implicit dangers of refusing to acknowledge the reach of the ever-present author. As Anderson argues, despite the efforts to relegate the personal to some clearly signposted and separated sections of the text, there are traces of the author throughout the text in the form of specific words or rhetorical constructions that modify several aspects of the discourse, thus conferring the personal a certain visibility (2001: 122). The autobiographical is an inherent aspect to any text, although in varying degrees. Acknowledging it, both as a critic and as a writer is, therefore, not so much a practice which should be at odds with the standards of an acceptable argument, as the act of positioning oneself on a particular side of the discussion.

Having discussed the reasons for this approach, it should be noted once more that the emphasis of this analysis is placed not so much on the truth content of this markedly autobiographic material as on the implications and repercussions that arise from it. Nevertheless, this autobiographical content performs a
testimonial function. The personal account of the writer bears witness to a certain part of history, a part of history which in all likelihood has been shared by others. The existing connection between biography and history effectively extends a bridge over the distance that separates the writer from the reader, the self from the other. Regardless whether or not the reader is part a particular historical event, the autobiographical text creates a set of two co-ordinates, personal experience and subjectivity on the one hand, and a socio-historical context, historicity, on the other, thus, making it easier for the reader to relate to it. Autobiographical texts contain an element of reality, even if this element simply means that it has been experienced as real, which may resonate with the reader’s own experiences and circumstances. Autobiography not only contributes to closing the gap between the self and the other, but insofar as a silent other may find representation in that biography, s/he also finds empowerment; the individual is released from his/her isolation, finds a voice, and gains a degree of visibility (see Anderson, 2001: 104).

However, this connection between autobiography and history is not without problems. It is often argued that testimonies
can never provide a full picture, a totalizable account of events. This is, of course, true. However, it does not automatically dismiss the value of an autobiographical account as testimony; it only reminds us that, as human beings, we often experience a need or, at least, a desire for totalizing, explanatory accounts, despite the fact that there are a number of epistemological difficulties which make any claims for such knowledge highly suspicious.

Autobiography as testimony also raises the issue of the role of subjectivity. Theoretical and methodological importance has been awarded to experience and subjectivity in the autobiographical text because, in this context, it constitutes a subversive genre; because, by welcoming other –experiential– forms of discourse, it questions and destabilizes the structure of instrumental rationality. However, as Anderson puts it, «our story cannot be ‘self-present’ to us, cannot be under the conscious control of the subject» (2001: 126). The question of control is a very relevant one; to what extent can anything actually be under the conscious control of the subject? Is control, on the contrary, an illusion, a working concept that allows the individual to gain a sense of safety and direction so as to go about his daily life? It seems reasonable to suggest that
the actions of any individual are influenced by intentionality on the one hand, and the unconscious mind on the other; and also by the atmosphere, the socio-historical situation, the actions of others, as well as our perception of them, and a long list of endogenic and exogenic factors. Determining the extent of this influence and how this may affect the issue of control is a complex matter which deserves close attention, and although it cannot be resolved here, its complexity should not be underestimated. Netheless, it must be emphasized that whether the individual is the agent of his/her own life story or whether s/he just bears witness to it does not affect an individual’s capability of perception and the potential for expression. Autobiography is, then, an exercise which results in the representation and expression of the self and its circumstances, although, granted, it is a biased and partial one.

Despite the key role of the biographical component in reconstructing and analysing the work of these intellectuals, it is just as important to emphasize that biographical data can only ever provide *ad hoc* explanations, because not doing so would result in an unsupportable deterministic view of personal choice and history. Therefore, throughout this research, the biography of a given
author is only considered as a contributing factor—not a determining one—in accounting for his production and choices.
1.5 Structure

This book, which comprises of a total of six chapters, has been structured in two parts which are quite distinct in focus and style.

The first part, more theoretical and historical in nature, consists of three chapters whose aim is to establish the framework for the rest of the book. These chapters introduce Critical Theory as developed by the Frankfurt School and discuss the socio-historical and political background against which the thought of Aranguren and Aguirre developed. Thus, after having discussed the aim and methodology of this research in Chapter One, Chapter Two is devoted to identifying the core and defining features of Critical Theory, so as to create a point of reference for the comparative study between Critical Theory and the thought of Aranguren and Aguirre. Chapter Three provides a short introduction to twentieth-century Spain with an emphasis on Aranguren and Aguirre’s socio-cultural background.

The second part, the main body of this book, is more critical and it focuses on these thinkers’ individual evolution: Aranguren
and Aguirre’s thought and the development of their critical stance towards the different expressions of instrumental reason.

Chapters Four and Five explore the personal and intellectual relationship that Aranguren and Aguirre, respectively, maintained with some of the members of the Frankfurt School and their position towards Critical Theory. In Chapter Four, Aranguren’s relationship to neo-Marxism and the influence that Marcuse’s ideas, in particular, bear on his thought are brought to light. This chapter argues that Aranguren explicitly takes up and develops some of the key topics first identified by the Frankfurt School, which are central to the critique of instrumental reason, specifically, Aranguren’s criticism of consumerism and his denunciation of the manipulation exercised by the culture industry, term coined by Adorno and Horkheimer in their *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1972). The implications of this critique and Aranguren’s defence of the role of faith and of democratic values are explored in relation to what constitutes the core of Critical Theory’s concerns: the analysis and critique of rationality.

Chapter Five focuses on Aguirre who, despite being a very well-known intellectual and public figure, has not been the
object of any previous scholarly work. Although particular attention is paid to the role he played in introducing the Frankfurt School in Spain, this chapter evaluates the role and influence of the different positions that this charismatic intellectual held throughout his life. More importantly, this chapter specifically aims to clarify his controversial relationship to Critical Theory by also analysing his contribution as a writer. Chapter Five contends that, as a result of the influence of the School, Aguirre’s own methodology, style, and even more crucially, his aim, are consistent with those of the Frankfurt School and, consequently, his work should be considered Critical Theory.

The sixth and final chapter assesses the role of biography, fragmentation, exile, art, the subject, psychoanalysis, and spirituality in the work of Aranguren and Aguirre. It examines, by way of conclusion, which aspects of their approaches account for their work to be considered Critical Theory, arguing that the introduction of the elements of spirituality, faith, and the role of choice, and transcendentality becomes a key aspect of Aranguren and Aguirre’s alternative to instrumental reason.

Finally, there are also three appendixes, which provide
—respectively— a succinct chronology of Aguirre’s life, a list of the first Spanish translations of books by members of the Frankfurt School, and a list of books translated, revised, edited, and written by Aguirre.
Part I
2 Critical Theory

What is Critical Theory? The term Critical Theory was coined by the members of the Frankfurt School while in exile at Columbia University in New York (see Kellner, 1989: 43). At first, as Douglas Kellner points out, this term was partly used as a form of code «in order to cover over its commitment to Marxism in an environment that is quite hostile to a theory associated with socialist revolution and the Soviet Union» (1989: 44). Despite the fact that initially «critical theory» denoted the work of the Institut and it is still closely associated with it, the use of this label has expanded to describe work of a critical nature, although quite varied in character, intention, and substance. It is with its original meaning, in reference to the Frankfurt School, that this term is employed throughout this book, which is why capitals are used.

It is no coincidence that the term «Critical Theory» is the result of the group’s stay in the United States. Following Kellner, Critical Theory can be understood as theory of exile (1989: 80-81). As Fred Rush observes, «Critical Theory was born in the trauma of the Weimar Republic, grew to maturity in expatriation, and
achieved cultural currency on its return from exile» (2004: 6). Exile is central to the development of Critical Theory not because it developed in exile, but—most importantly—because the content of their thought was shaped in no small measure by their experience of exile. As Kellner argues, one of the elements of Critical Theory that distinguishes it from other social theories is «their exile in the United States and ability to experience both the rise of fascism and the transition to a new stage of capitalism in the United States at first hand» (1989: 76-77). It was this exile—the condition of outsiders that the members of the School shared— and their experience of the socio-political, economic and cultural differences between Germany and the United States that provided them with the critical distance to develop a fierce critique of the advanced capitalist society, as well as of the rationality which supports it.

This, however, should not be taken as an indication of the cohesion and homogeneity of Critical Theory or of the Frankfurt School itself. Although Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Löwenthal, Henryk Grossmann, and Friedrich Pollock form the core of the Institut, this is not to say that there were no internal tensions or disagreements regarding the direction the School should take. This is reflected in the loose
membership of other thinkers generally referred to as the periphery, such as Walter Benjamin, Erich Fromm, Franz Leopold Neumann, and Otto Kirchheimer, or even Jürgen Habermas, who heads the second wave of this current of thought. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Horkheimer –then its director– and Adorno represent the ideological centre of the School. Hence, the first feature of Critical Theory which needs to be highlighted is its diversity. As Rush explains, «while it is characterized by certain shared core philosophical concerns, Critical Theory exhibits a diversity among its proponents that both contributes to its richness and poses substantial barriers to understanding its significance» (2004: 6). Despite this diversity, Rush stresses that there are some core concepts which are shared by all Critical Theorists.

The first point of cohesion for Critical Theorists is what Simone Chambers refers to as their «normative agenda», that is their stated aim of instigating social change, as opposite to simply being content with providing a merely descriptive critique (2004: 221). The influence of Marxism in the School’s interpretation of history and its relation to theory constitutes another significant point of cohesion. Critical Theorists maintain that there is a causal
relationship between the existing socio-economic conditions and the development of history. As Axel Honneth –the current director of the Institut– argues, Critical Theory «insists on a mediation of theory and history in a concept of socially effective rationality. [...] It is this working model of the intertwining of theory and history that grounds the unity of Critical Theory despite its variety of voices» (2004: 337). In addition, the interrelation of its elements –the intrinsic link between content and style, theory and praxis– constitutes another core characteristic of Critical Theory. Thus, given the existence of these core –and shared– features, the idiosyncratic and, sometimes, substantial differences between the work of the individual members of the Institut should be understood as different manifestations of Critical Theory.
2.1 The struggle against instrumental reason

Critical Theory is first and foremost a critique of advanced capitalist society. The most salient of the elements which Critical Theorists share is their aim; the aim to transform society as opposed to uncritically reproducing it. Its target is the critique of instrumental reason and the denunciation of the new forms of alienation developed by neo-capitalist society in particular.

Grounded on the Marxist tradition, as Terry Eagleton explains, for the members of the Frankfurt School, «ideology, in short, is a ‘totalitarian’ system which has managed and processed all social conflict out of existence» (1991: 127)\(^\text{15}\). That is why the study of

\(^\text{15}\) Nevertheless, as Jesús Cruz convincingly argues in *Gentlemen, bourgeois, and revolutionaries* (1996), the causes, reach and depth of political change must not be taken at face value. Instead, political, economic, social, moral, and religious factors must be analysed individually,–although not separately– in an effort to elucidate how they affect this change. This is also applicable to the case of the Transition, which –despite the fact that, politically, it did not start until the death of the dictator–, one of the factors which made it possible was that, as Hermida del Llano argues, there is a strong continuity and a relationship of causality between the cultural opposition to the regime spearheaded by Aranguren and Enrique Tierno Galván and the Transition (2008: 37). Aranguren himself explicitly refers to this: «Para hablar con rigor hay que decir que la salida cultural del franquismo se adelantó en mucho a su salida política y que, por tanto, culturalmente, se vivía ya, desde 1970 desde luego y, sin exageración, desde 1965, en un régimen en transición» (cited by Hermida del Llano, 2008: 37; originally in 1987: 90, 92).
ideology, for the Frankfurt School, is linked to a project of liberation, in contrast with what Paul Ricoeur describes as empirical sociology which professes a liberal and capitalistic ideology (1986: 6). Thus, it attempts to provide criticism and alternatives to traditional or mainstream social theory, as well as a critique of a full range of ideologies. Consequently, the concept of reason becomes crucial to their critique, for –as Honneth indicates– all members of the School «assume that the cause of the negative state of society is to be found in a deficit in social rationality» (2004: 339). Instead of targeting specific socio-economic and political problems only, their critique is directed against the specific rationality upon which Western society is based: instrumental reason. In fact, the critique of instrumental reason —which is most clearly developed in Horkheimer’s *Eclipse of Reason* (1947b) and Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man* (1964)— plays a pivotal role in Critical Theory.

The term «instrumental reason» is grounded on Max Weber’s concept of the «iron cage» to refer to the dead-end of modern reason, a reason which focuses only on the means and loses sight of the ends. As David Rasmussen points out, «Weber coined the term *Zweckrationalität*, purposive-rational action. Reason, devoid
of its redemptive and reconciliatory possibilities, could only be purposive, useful and calculating» (2006: 266). This notion forms the bases for Horkheimer’s concept of instrumental reason, which refers to a framework of rationality according to which each object and each action is conceived and treated as a means and not as an end in itself. Although this idea was already developed in Horkheimer’s *Eclipse of Reason* (1947b), the phrase «instrumental reason» first appeared in *Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft* (1967), that is, the German translation of Horkheimer’s English original. There, Horkheimer argued that reason, as has been known and exercised since the Enlightenment, is ruled by exploitation, productivity, and profitability criteria which have become ends in themselves. That is why, far from being the kind of interpersonal, critical, and reflexive reason which would encourage the development of the individual and of the society she or he inhabits, it constitutes an instrumental form of rationality which equates utility with rationality. So much so that, such reason ultimately proves to be irrational insofar as it leads to destructive –rather than constructive or creative– paths. The clearest example of the destructive consequences of instrumental reason can be found in
the moral atrocities of Auschwitz, famously denounced by Adorno (2003: 19-36). This constitutes an assessment of rationality and society made on moral grounds; Critical Theory—as Honneth argues—considers instrumental reason as a socially deficient rationality because of the ethical core which informs and drives Critical Theory itself (2004: 338).

As Honneth observes, despite the different vocabulary used by its various members, they all refer to a deformed rationality: «irrational organization» (Horkheimer); «administered world» (Adorno); «one-dimensional society» (Marcuse), «repressive tolerance»; and «colonization of the social life-world» (Habermas) (Honneth, 2004: 338-39). They denounce this deficient rationality as guided by self-interested criteria, resulting in the subjugation of nature and the individual. This does not mean that the Frankfurt School advocates renouncing reason altogether. This distinction, as Peter U. Hohendahl indicates, becomes clear in Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964), where he established the difference «between reason as ‘Vernunft’ [reason as common sense] and ‘instrumental reason’, yet he continued to link reason and liberation—thereby also insisting on the revolutionary potential of reason»
What this analysis suggests is that what Critical Theory does is to establish a contrast between instrumental reason and a presupposed «intact» rationality which would provide individuals the opportunity for self-actualization. As Alan How explains, «for them Reason proper was an altogether bigger and more significant concept than mere reason. Part of their aim was to challenge what currently passed for reason, and extend it into something more comprehensive» (2003: 6). The specific nature and characteristics of this «intact» rationality, is either not very elaborate or changes substantially from author to author, sharing only the core premise that it should allow for the self-actualization of the individual, whatever that may actually mean in practical terms. Influenced by Hegel, the only characteristic of this self-actualization shared by the members of the Institut is that the criterion for a successful individual self-actualization is linked to the self-actualization of the rest of members of society. This premise is consistent not only with their concern with social justice, but –more primarily– with the undefined ethical premises guiding their thought.
2.1.1 The background

Phenomenology, Heideggerian thought, Marxism, and psychoanalysis have all contributed decisively to shaping to a large extent post-war European thought; more to the point, these currents of thought have also exercised a substantial influence on Critical Theory.

In the case of phenomenology and Heideggerian philosophy in particular, not only did they inspire and influence the development of French existentialism, and were they at the very heart of postmodernism, but they also must be counted amongst the early influences on the Frankfurt School’s thought. As Dermot Moran points out, «the Frankfurt School of Social Criticism [...] developed largely in reaction to Heidegger, often juxtaposing the young Marx’s view of human alienation and domination by ideology against Heidegger’s account of man and the domination of technicity» (2000: 245).

Marxism played a key role in the development of socio-political and economic policies and behaviours in Western and

16 For a more detailed account of Heidegger’s influence see Moran, 2000: 245-47.
Eastern societies throughout the twentieth century. Critical Theory, although interdisciplinary in nature, must be understood within the framework of the renovation of the principles of Classical Marxism which, by the mid-twentieth century, faced with the dynamics of neo-capitalism, had long been dated. That is why, although heavily influenced by Hegel and Marx—and to a lesser degree by Karl Korsch—, the Frankfurt School’s theoretical platform goes beyond Marxism, which they consider obsolete and inadequate to confront the new challenges brought about by advanced capitalism. As Marcuse states: «Marx’s image of the realm of necessity does not correspond to today’s highly developed industrial nations» (1968: xvii). Old Marxist economic models are found to be in need of revision; they do not expect the proletariat to gain class-consciousness and overthrow the capitalist government, for they consider the proletariat and the class struggle as obsolete concepts. Whereas the concept of the proletariat becomes inapplicable, the social force which needs to be analysed, instead, is the mass. Influenced by Georg Luckács and the economists Grossmann and Pollock, the School adopts more action-oriented theories. Critical Theory focuses on the critique
of the existing rationality and the socio-economic conditions it generates.

Economic movements and interests are no longer thought to fully represent or reflect society and, influenced by Antonio Gramsci and psychoanalysis the School explores and highlights the relationship amongst subjectivity, culture, and economic systems. As Kellner explains:

Although Marcuse and his colleagues would accept the Marxian position that the economy is the crucial determining factor for all social life, they reject all forms of economic reductionism and attempt to describe the complex set of mediations connecting the economy, social and political institutions, culture, everyday life, and individual consciousness as parts of a reciprocally interacting social system (2001b: 11).

In doing so, as Kellner argues, Critical Theory goes beyond interdisciplinarity and becomes supradisciplinary, for not only does it cross over several disciplines, but it questions the very idea of having boundaries between competing disciplines as a counter-productive and arbitrary division (1989: 7-8, 36). It stresses the interconnections between philosophy, economics, politics,
culture, and society, integrating these different dimensions of social reality into a social theory. The result, in the case of the Frankfurt School, is a highly critical and complex theory which targets instrumental reason, consumerism, mass society, and the culture industry. This can be observed in Adorno’s use his musical insights in the analysis and critique of society (1999: 1-14). Another instance of this supradisciplinarity can be found in Fromm and Marcuse, who influenced by Freudian psychoanalysis, critically incorporate the study of psychological and cultural forces into their social analysis because as Marcuse puts it in *Eros and Civilization* (1955), «psychological problems therefore turn into political problems» (1970a: 21; see also Fromm, 1994: 31-38). It must not be forgotten that the work of the Frankfurt School is, to a large extent, a response to the rise of fascism in Europe; given the irrationality of the latter, the School considered psychoanalysis to be necessary for the analysis of Fascist society itself, but also of the society which created the conditions for Fascist ideology to emerge and thrive. Moreover, they claim that there are important connections between liberal capitalism and fascism. In fact, the *Institut’s* conception of mass culture, particularly in relation to
the use of communication and manipulation as forms of control and domination, was first shaped by how these had been used by Hitler, although their analysis extends to their use in democratic societies.
2.1.2 Understanding Critical Theory as its aims and methodology

The aims and methodology of Critical Theory are first put forward by Horkheimer in his essay «Traditional and Critical Theory» (1937) and Marcuse’s «Philosophy and Critical Theory» (1937). Horkheimer’s essay constitutes a statement of the structure and aims of Critical Theory; whereas Marcuse’s establishes the difference between philosophy and Critical Theory in that while the former, being concerned with pure reason alone, can never conclude anything that was not already present in essence, the latter is anchored in different aspects of the material conditions for thought and perception, allegedly providing a genuine platform for social transformations. However, as Rush argues, focusing on Horkheimer’s 1937 essay alone provides an oversimplified view of what constitutes Critical Theory (2004: 11). Similarly, the goals and methodology put forward by Marcuse that same year are subject to change and evolution, for as Marcuse himself explains: «That most of this was written before Auschwitz deeply separates it from the present» (1968: xv). He also highlights that,
at that time [1934-1938], it was not yet clear that the powers that had defeated fascism by virtue of their technical and economic superiority would strengthen and streamline the social structure which had produced fascism. [...] Capitalist society had not yet revealed all its strength and all its rationality, and the fate of the labor movement was still “uncertain” (1968: xi).

Thus, it becomes evident that Critical Theory is not only diverse in its manifestations, but also flexible, for it aims to address the problems associated with the ideology and rationality prevalent at the time that is being exercised. Understanding this is crucial because Critical Theory’s methodology is not simply intimately linked to its aims, but it is to a large extent dictated by them.

So what are these aims? Ultimately, creating the social conditions for the empowerment and self-actualization of the individual by triggering a process of enlightenment which may eventually achieve the liberation of the individual’s consciousness from the all-encompassing ideology in which s/he is embedded. This is obviously a problematic and paradoxical position, for stating such a critique results in its own negation. How can anyone be free from an ideology that is perceived as all-encompassing? Is this an error in judgement on Critical Theorists’ part? Even though, as critics
agree, making such a totalising statement about ideology from a Marxist background is self-disqualifying, if we shift our focus from the logical coherence of the argument to what Critical Theory does—not just what it argues—, it is then possible to contend that Critical Theory’s very occurrence, its own existence, suggests its possibility. Adorno and Horkheimer, however, do not pursue this line of reasoning and their critique remains essentially negative. Even Marcuse, who does not state the impossibility to liberate consciousness from the limitations imposed by instrumental reason, remains in the sphere of negative critique and admits not knowing who the agents of change may be (1970b: 69).

Does this mean that Critical Theory has no politics, as is often argued? For Adorno and Horkheimer, getting involved in politics, in the sense of actively participating in the established democratic process, would involve being trapped by its limitations, by the very rationality object of their critique. Despite the lack of affiliation of Critical Theorists to party politics and their focus on cultural and aesthetic issues, this is no evidence of their lack of political commitment. As Chamber argues, their non-engagement with party

17 For a succinct summary of the ways in which it is often argued that Critical Theory has no politics see Chambers, 2004: 219.
politics is more the result of their attempt to redefine the nature and dynamics of political practice than evidence of their apolitical attitude (2004: 220). Evidence of this can be found in Marcuse’s position known as «Great Refusal»:

Marcuse [...] constantly advocated the “Great Refusal” as the proper political response to any form of irrational repression, and indeed this seems to be at least the starting point for political activism in the contemporary era: refusal of all forms of oppression and domination, relentless criticism of all of all [sic] policies that impact negatively on working people and progressive social programs, and militant opposition to any and all acts of aggression against Third World countries. Indeed, in an era of “positive thinking”, [...] Marcuse’s emphasis on negative thinking, refusal, and opposition provides at least a starting point and part of a renewal of radical politics in the contemporary era (Kellner, n.d.: n.p.)\(^\text{18}\).

Hence, this non-engagement with party politics, far from being the result of political apathy or a sign of giving up, constitutes a strategy to prevent the digestion of dissent and critical thought.

into the prevalent instrumental rationality. What is more, this position—as Kellner indicates—has significant practical, even political, implications.

The realization of the impossibility of escaping the existing co-ordinates of rationality, however, does not mean that the work of Critical Theorists is not political, but that our concept of politics—if it is limited to party politics—needs to be revised. Considering the normative agenda present at its root, Critical Theory must be inextricably linked to politics. To put it differently, Critical Theory is political in as far as it stems from the desire to instil socio-cultural and economic change. As Chambers states: «Critical Theory is envisioned as political in the sense of embracing the unavoidably political nature of all theory in attempting to direct it towards rationally chosen ends» (2004: 221). Critical Theorists choose to reframe the concept of politics in Socratic terms. What they do is to shift the focus from the prescriptive social sphere to the more immediate personal realm; replacing the question «what is to be done?» with «how should one live one’s life». This is not to be understood as an inner withdrawal, but as an empowering and fully political stand. Adorno’s answer to this question is «teaching
the good life» (1978: 15). That is to say that for Critical Theorists, as Chamber argues, politics is ultimately understood as *paideia* (2004: 223); in the view of the Frankfurt School, it is only by means of the exercise of truth seeking that liberation from the constraints of ideology can be achieved.

This search for truth has important consequences for the methodology of Critical Theory. The critique of instrumental reason itself already suggests the need to develop a more comprehensive alternative reason, upon which to base any truly transformative research. Moreover, as a result of their premises and their aims, Critical Theory must adopt a different rationality itself in order to avoid being prey to its own criticism. Thus, Critical Theory must be essentially different not just in its theoretical content but, more radically, also in its methodology, effectively constituting a different rationality of its own right.

Critical Theory is concerned with the interpretations of what there is in such a way that reason may reach conclusions which go beyond its initial premises; failing to do this would not only be a sign of being caught in the dominant ideology, but it would also entail the acceptance of what there is. Adorno’s approach, as Rush
explains, constitutes another example of this, as for him Critical Theory does not seek to study an object in order to reveal pre-existing meaning, but to interpret and re-interpret the object of study beyond the object itself (2004: 34). Similarly, in *Reason and Revolution* (1941) Marcuse argues that «the real field of knowledge is not the given facts about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form» (1955: 145). This is achieved by incorporating into their theoretical analysis elements traditionally excluded from the realm of reason such as, the value of speculation, experience, subjectivity, and, ultimately, *praxis*.\(^{19}\) Moreover, Critical Theory reclaims the value of fragmentary, contradictory, even experiential accounts of reality, for only by embracing these aspects can the complexities of existence be grasped.

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\(^{19}\) In stark contrast with the Anglophone empiric, analytic, and positivist traditions, for Critical Theory, an essential element of reason and, consequently, of its methodology is speculation. The word «speculation», however, carries substantial negative implications in popular language and, particularly, in academic discourse. In a subversive manoeuvre against the established framework of rationality, Critical Theory sheds a new, positive light onto the concept of speculation, by reassessing its role and implications (for a more detailed analysis of the role of speculation in Critical Theory see How, 2003: 2-3).
2.1.3 The role of praxis, subjectivity, and experience

The concept of experience—which is intimately linked to subjectivity—is central to Critical Theory. As Chambers states, the aims of Critical Theory are: «to show the internal relationship between knowledge and experience [...], and to use the interconnectedness of knowledge and experience to break out of the given and project normative goals and ends» (2004: 221). This can be observed in Adorno’s work, for whom the concept of experience is embedded in and shaped by the socio-historical matrix where it takes place. That is why he claims that genuine experience has disappeared. For this reason, one of the purposes of Critical Theory is recovering the value and the possibility of genuine experience, which is essential for a coherent rationality.

By adopting a supradisciplinary approach, Critical Theory endeavours to integrate subjectivity, experience, and praxis into its theoretical analysis in an effort to construct a comprehensive social theory which can confront the key social and political problems that result from advanced capitalism. The methodology of Critical Theory establishes an inextricable connection to praxis,
which is necessary when the goal is to overcome the social suffering caused by a deficient rationality, a causality relationship which, as Honneth explains, is the result of the incorporation of Freudian psychoanalysis into their thought (2004: 351, 354). Critical Theory suggests that the actualization of individual freedom requires adopting a common *praxis* that is more than the result of the mere coordination of individual interests. Despite this ethical motivation, Critical Theorists reject the possibility of a universal moral theory; they are suspicious of totalizing solutions. From Critical Theory’s perspective, the intrinsic link between theory and *praxis* becomes effective once the existing distorted rationality has been overcome; because their aim is precisely overcoming this distorted rationality, their work requires the reincorporation of this link.

*Praxis* can be observed from different perspectives in the work of the members of the Frankfurt School. On the one hand, although Critical Theory is not prescriptive, the ultimate goal of their critique is the liberation and the self-actualization of the individual. Because of this guiding goal, their thought has political implications which, as such, belong to the realm of *praxis*. On the other hand, in so far as *praxis* is human *praxis*, it becomes
intimately linked to biography. Such link can be observed in the presence of (semi) auto-biographical texts, such as Adorno’s *Minima Moralia*, but also in the coherence between theory and biography. This is most visible in the case of Marcuse, who not only was a source of influence, but also of support, for the New Left in the United States during the 1960s. Other examples of the biographical commitment to their thought can be found in Adorno, who provided dozens of radio interviews in an effort to reach the public and make his views clear, and in Fromm, who was a consistent supporter of social justice and campaigned for international human rights and the abolition of nuclear weapons; this is less so in the case of Horkheimer.
2.1.4 The role of style

Critical Theory can be characterized as a critical supradisciplinary discourse expressed in a challenging language and style that require the active involvement of the reader. This is not accidental, since the different elements which form Critical Theory are part of a holistic effort to subtract Critical Theorists themselves and their readers from the dominant ideology of advanced capitalist society enough to make this criticism, but also to open up the possibility of the liberation of the individual from such ideology. For this reason, the style which Critical Theorists use to communicate is a deliberate consequence of their aims and their own ideology, and can be considered the materialization of their methodology.

This style, although idiosyncratic to each one of them, shares the same aims, namely, the expression and communication of complex and interrelated trains of thought, but also the destabilisation of instrumental reason. Furthermore, this style of expression, the subversive language used, demands the engagement of the reader with the text; the reader no longer is a passive recipient of information, but an active agent who strives to make sense of
The role of style

the text and of the society and ideology it discusses. That is why some critics, such as How, express their surprise at the description of Critical Theory as popular and, even, populist. In relation to reading Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man*, he explains that

the style of language was the plainest obstacle. Marcuse mostly did not write in short, easily absorbable sentences, but in long, roving, muscular phrases where a sentence could last a whole paragraph and where the subject and object of the sentence seemed only distant cousins. [...] In dialectical fashion each clause reciprocally (re)defined the one that went before while simultaneously adding meaning to the one that came after. [...] It forced the reader to hold a variety of inter-related ideas together and allowed them to co-mingle and influence each other (2003: 2).

This challenging language is by no means exclusive to Marcuse, for other members of the School also defy the linguistic limitations of lineal expression and demand the engagement of the reader with the text.

Another instance of this is Edward Said’s remarks regarding the difficulty involved in reading Adorno’s texts, be they translated or in the original German. He adds that «Jameson [in *Late Marxism*:}
Adorno, or, the Persistence of Dialectic (1990)] speaks very well about the sheer intelligence of his sentences, their incomparable refinement, their programmatically complex internal movement» (2002: 201). It must be stressed that the choice of this style is deliberate and obeys methodological reasons. As a result, many of Adorno’s works are, as Rush puts it, «self-conscious exercises in embodying the movement of ideas in negative dialectic in a style of philosophical writing» (2004: 35). This becomes even more palpable in his later work which is characterized by his aphoristic and poetic expression, in the hope that it «might resist instrumental demands by stubborn insistence upon nonpurposive activity» (Honneth, 2004: 342). As Holger Brier indicates:

Adorno was no poet. [...] But his texts are informed by a poetic, itself informed, and not only historically, by a certain kind of music and poetry. Invariably, this does have implications for his style. [...] message and medium have to collapse into each other (2001: 113).

By integrating this poetic expression into his thought, Adorno is hoping to access and convey concepts which would otherwise be
beyond the reach of the traditional philosophical, sociological or aesthetic discourse.

Upon elucidating that style plays a crucial role in allowing the possibility of exercising Critical Theory as a rationality on its own right, it becomes clear that one of the key features of Critical Theory is the strong interrelationship between aim, methodology, and style. It is an inherent feature to Critical Theory, which must be shared by any other thinkers beyond the Frankfurt School, in order for them to be considered Critical Theorists. This is precisely what I argue to be the case for Aranguren and Aguirre, as discussed below.
2.2 The presence of Critical Theory in Spanish thought

Critical Theory is not limited to the Frankfurt School, even though the work of the members of the School shall be used as a frame of reference for what constitutes Critical Theory. As Kellner puts it, «a critical theory of society is always a project underway, it is always partial, historical, and subject to revision. Thus, one is always moving toward a critical theory, open to new historical experiences, phenomena, and discourses» (2001b: 32). It is based on this understanding of Critical Theory that I argue that it is possible to conceive that, in response to the specific socio-political circumstances of twentieth-century Spain, a form of Critical Theory has been developed by some Spanish thinkers. Thus, this book aims to provide evidence that Aguirre and Aranguren, although idiosyncratically, both develop their thought in ways consistent with Critical Theory. Further research may show that other Spanish thinkers may also be considered Critical Theorists.

I contend that, as a result of Aguirre and Aranguren’s approach towards content, style, and methodology, they can be considered Critical Theorists. I do not, however, suggest that Aguirre
The presence of Critical Theory in Spanish thought and Aranguren develop a co-ordinated line of research or form a cohesive school of thought. In fact, their interests, the specific focus of their thought, their form, and style are diverse. Nevertheless, it can be said that Aranguren and, although differently, also Aguirre develop a neo-Marxist critique of neo-capitalist society and its effect on the individual. What both of them have in common is the elaboration of a critique of instrumental reason which, as discussed above, lies at the very core of Critical Theory as developed by the Frankfurt School. What is more, this critique forms the basis from which Aguirre and Aranguren develop the rest of their thought.

It is not my intention either to suggest that Aguirre and Aranguren deliberately follow the patterns of thought described above in order to accommodate their work within the parameters of Critical Theory. Nonetheless, it remains true that a parallel development to that of the Frankfurt School can be observed. After the unreason involved in any war, especially in a civil war, after the incongruities and the injustices of Francoist ideology, a new form of reason had to be sought. As Díaz explains, «opposition culture during the dictatorship was importantly engaged in what one
could term the reconstruction of "reason" (i.e. rational discourse/thought) » (1995: 285). This is precisely one of the key characteristics of the decade of the 1960s in Spain. In this sense, the thought of Aranguren and Aguirre –particularly from this decade onwards– is a reaction against the ideology of the regime. More importantly, it is the rejection of the rationality exercised by the regime as well as an attempt to develop a questioning, yet coherent, reason. They are, of course, not alone in this quest. What is specific about them, in contrast with Díaz’s statement, is that they consider the reconstruction of reason a counter-productive exercise, for it was reason —instrumental reason— that allowed for such irrational development of events and ideology in the first place. Hence, what they advocate is a much more radical project, not the reconstruction of instrumental reason, but its rejection in favour of a more humane and holistic alternative: experiential reason. Despite the fact that they do not develop a co-ordinated or systematized approach to their intellectual production, they do, however, share the defining characteristics of Critical Theory: besides offering a poignant critique of modern society and the rationality on which it is founded, their theoretical work is shaped by an interactive critique which is
expected to exercise an emancipating effect. In turn, this is hoped to spark a qualitative process of transformation of society.

Their work, however, does not constitute a mere replication or reiteration of Critical Theory as developed by the School. Their divergence from the Frankfurt School is particularly significant in relation to their conclusions. The School is often described as pessimistic because they do not clearly identify who the agent to bring about social change and personal emancipation would be. Moreover, without such an agent, the possibility of bringing this emancipation to fruition comes into question and the possibilities which they sketch in their writings remain confined to the realm of utopia. In contrast with them, these Spanish thinkers offer a more hopeful vision. Partly informed by their highly developed sense of spirituality, partly enthused by the possibilities the end of Francoism and the Transition into democracy seem to open, Arangueren and Aguirre place their hopes for emancipation in a cyclical process of multi-levelled change which can only start with the individual. For this reason, it is important to emphasize that both of them share an interest in spirituality which they incorporate into their critique, and which becomes their distinctive contribution.
Aranguren and Aguirre both shared an increasingly defiant intellectual and political stance which seems to arise from their spiritual beliefs and strong sense of social justice. These positions were reflected in their writings, but what was their impact? How do their publications relate to the changes in the socio-political and cultural atmosphere they lived in? Despite the regime’s efforts to control cultural expression, as Sebastiaan Faber explains, «with the exception of the years immediately following the Civil War, Francoism never really succeeded in wielding full cultural hegemony» (2002: 37). Nonetheless, it did try to impose its hegemony indirectly through illiteracy and directly through censorship, the control of cultural expressions and public discourse. In addition to this, the regime’s use of a deficient language and an equally deficient rationality must be considered part of the effort to gain hegemony, and also legitimacy.
3.1 The regime’s struggle for cultural hegemony

The struggle for cultural hegemony was inevitably linked to cultural policy, which at the same time was dictated by political interests. This relationship and the roots of the regime’s cultural policy can be traced to the Second Republic and its political stand for a liberal education.

The illiteracy rate in 1930 is estimated to have been somewhere between 30 and 40 percent. In response to this situation, there were various initiatives amongst Republicans to spread culture throughout Spain, although not without controversy; as Faber indicates, bread and tools to work seemed more urgent (2002: 78). This can be observed in the misiones pedagógicas, which were created in 1931 as a project which, although criticized for its paternalist and utopian attitude, still brought libraries, lectures, films, and plays to the remotest rural areas. The Republican government set out to combat the high illiteracy levels by creating new schools. Jaume Claret Miranda indicates that they created «siete mil nuevas escuelas durante el primer bienio y, a pesar del proceso de involución, dos mil más durante el bienio de
las derechas. De 1931 a 1936 se crearon 13.850 plazas y 3.400 más entre 1934 y 1935» (2006: 9). The period of involution mentioned, refers to the overt opposition of the rightwing biennium, whose conservative policy opposed any attempts to secularize education. Moreover, as Jordi Mones i Pujol-Busquets argues, in an effort to prevent the adoption of new ideas and preserve their position, they were also clearly hostile to scientific and cultural development (1977: 221-22). The marked interest and heavy investment in education during the reformist biennium on the one hand, the opposition to educational and cultural development on the part of the conservative forces on the other, as well as the awareness by all sides of the impact that education may have on politics, led to this conflict of interest being branded as «guerra escolar».

This belligerent attitude towards education had serious consequences. During the Republic, it propitiated verbal abuse against educators and intellectuals, which, after the Civil War broke out, turned to physical violence. They were accused of having introduced in Spain subversive ideas which were in detriment of home-grown principles and customs, and were, ultimately, blamed for leading the country to its alleged decadence. Nevertheless,
As Claret Miranda argues, the accusation that educators had Republican loyalties seems to be based more on the efforts of the Republican government in fostering education, particularly primary education, and on the threat that Falangists perceived from it than in an accurate reflection of the educators’ affiliations (2006: 10, 25).

During the first years of the Civil War, the Republican educational effort intensified. As Rafael Abella explains, «la incautación de todos los grandes colegios regentados por las órdenes religiosas significó el acceso de una infancia postergada a instalaciones que hasta julio de 1936 habían sido coto de unas clases privilegiadas» (1975: 285). In addition, many unoccupied houses were transformed into schools. Regarding higher education, Abella indicates that during the year 1937-1938 alone, over four thousand grants were awarded (1975: 294). The Republic was also concerned with adult illiteracy and, in an effort to combat it, in January 1937, it created the Milicias de la Cultura, which taught basic reading and writing skills to voluntary military recruits and combatants. The faith and hope deposited in culture were such that, in spite of the difficult and dangerous circumstances of war,
the Congreso Internacional de Escritores para la Defensa de la Cultura was celebrated in Valencia in 1937. However, this eagerness also meant that the boundaries between culture and propaganda were often blurred.

Faber explains how, during the Civil War, «‘culture’, or more precisely ‘the defence of culture’, becomes the common cause in the name of which antifascist intellectuals of all different political backgrounds are able to unite» (2002: 73). In contrast, Pío Moa argues that «entre los intelectuales españoles hubo equilibrio, y no responde a la realidad el tópico de que casi todos los escritores y artistas defendieron la ‘república’» (2001: 347). However, most historians agree that, at least initially, the Republic received the support of most prominent Spanish intellectuals and artists, whereas the support of high calibre intellectuals for the Nationalist side was scarce. Rafael Alberti, Max Aub, Arturo Barea, Corpus Barga, José Bergamín, Luis Buñuel, Pau Casals, Luis Cernuda, Rosa Chacel, León Felipe, Miguel Hernández, Antonio Machado, Pablo Picasso, Ramón J. Sender, and María Zambrano are amongst the Spanish intellectuals who supported the Republic. Numerous renowned intellectuals from abroad also expressed their support
for the Republic; some of the best known figures amongst them include Ernest Hemingway, Joris Ivens, Egon Kisch, Arthur Koestler, André Malraux, Pablo Neruda, George Orwell, and César Vallejo, whose support contributed to a certain romantic image of the Spanish Civil War. Such romanticism was also present in Marcuse, who said that «the last time that freedom, solidarity, and humanity were the goals of a revolutionary struggle was on the battlefields of the Spanish civil war» (1968: xv). By contrast, the intellectual support received by Nationalists was comprised by Joseantonian followers and conservative traditionalists thinkers such as Ramiro de Maeztu and Fernando Luca de Tena. In addition, as Gracia explains, Azorín, Pio Baroja, Gregorio Marañón, and Francisco Pérez de Ayala should also be added to this list, because they were engaged with war propaganda on the Nationalist side after leaving Spain in 1937 (2004: 51-53); Paul Claudel and Igor Stravinski were amongst the most renowned international Nationalist supporters.

Both Republicans and Nationalists strongly believed in cultural nationalism, an idea originating in German Romanticism which claims that a nation’s essence emanates from the idiosyncrasies of its geographical location and its cultural-historical heritage.
However, despite Nationalists’ belief in cultural nationalism and their defence of culture understood as identity, culture as knowledge and thought was perceived as a threat. The reasons for this are that, on the one hand, the concept of culture was soon equated with left-wing thought and, on the other, that the empowerment that knowledge may confer could turn culture as a source of opposition. As a result, Nationalists sought cultural hegemony. Very much aware of the political power of education, in September 1938, the first Francoist government approved a law for the reform of secondary education, motivated by the belief that, as Claret Miranda argues, it was in secondary education where the ruling classes were formed; shaping them according to Francoist principles was a priority (2006: 30).

Culture in Spain during the regime was used as an instrument of legitimation and perpetuation of power, an instrument of domination. The Francoist regime made numerous efforts to obtain cultural hegemony which expanded across a wide range of cultural practices and institutional intervention, from the purging of teachers and of textbooks at schools to political indoctrination by means of children’s toys, from censorship to torture to mention
just a few. One of the consequences of using education as a political instrument was the clear separation between education and culture. As Claret Miranda indicates, this can be observed in the distrust of the regime towards educators, whose loyalty to the regime had to be confirmed before they were allowed to teach (2006: 27). Libraries and learning were often regarded as left-wing propaganda. Educators, researchers, as well as research and teaching materials were all under scrutiny and, consequently, purged by the regime, particularly at the beginning. This means that an important number of titles deemed pernicious or not suitable, particularly foreign books, were destroyed or locked away. Paradoxically, as Jordan indicates, some of the books confiscated have ended up in the National Library, thus ensuring their survival (2002: 129).

Francoism sought to control all forms of cultural expression, which it attempted to do by means of the instrumentalization of the media to serve political purposes. In addition to its overtly political uses, press, radio, television, and cinema were also used to exercise certain control on the masses; as Jordan indicates, the potential for escapism of popular culture—which also included
football and bullfighting—was actively encouraged by the regime (2002: 243). However, the regime’s means of control, far from being limited to more or less subtle manipulation, also included more direct infringements on personal liberties such as bugged phone lines, controlled correspondence, incarceration, and the use of violence and torture.

Despite the efforts of the Republic, at the end of the Civil War Spain still was a country with low levels of schooling, high levels of illiteracy, and insufficient educational infrastructure. The high levels of illiteracy prevented a large portion of the population from accessing reading materials, effectively contributing to the regime’s endeavour to impose its cultural hegemony, for as Jordan explains, «the regime had no desire to promote reading since readers tend to have inquiring minds and may well criticize or oppose official views» (2002: 188). In addition, although active efforts to promote and expand access to education were not made by the regime until the 1960s, whatever education there was, was used for the political purposes of the regime. From 1963, literacy campaigns were progressively launched, resulting in the average illiteracy rate to drop to some 15 percent by the end of this decade,
still a high rate. Only by 1993, well after the introduction of democracy, illiteracy was reduced to 3.5 percent, being largely confined to those over 45 years of age.

After the Civil War, state funding for the clergy was restored. The Spanish Church regained its former spheres of power and influence, such as education and marriage, and gained others, such as censorship. Thus, the Church was heavily involved in teaching and in cultural life, an example of which can be found in the considerable presence of the Opus Dei in Spanish universities. The result was a return to a scholastic style and focusing education on the production of technicians who would be needed by the structure of capitalism. As Frances Lannon explains, «the Church found itself given a position of ideological hegemony, untroubled by its erstwhile enemies [...]. These enemies had been killed, imprisoned, forced into exile, or effectively silenced» (1995: 276). In 1945, the *Ley de Enseñanza Primaria* confirmed that primary education should conform to the ideological and political principles of the regime and granted educational privileges to the Church, who in turn exercised ideological control over the education it imparted, promoting the regime alongside its religious dogma. This
law, however, did not entail substantive changes in the direction of education, which was already conforming largely to these principles since the end of the Civil War. In addition to this, public libraries did not enjoy the support of the regime, while the production of new material and the delivery of education were also closely controlled, making for largely stifled University classrooms which were reminiscent of the scholastic style. It was not until the 1960s that some movements of educational reform, such as the Basque ikastolas, were allowed to develop (see Mones i Pujol-Busquets, 1977: 233). Also during the 1960s, student protests proliferated, signalling the new generation’s quest for freedom, but also the impossibility to maintain the same rigidity regarding education and culture.

Censorship played a key role in the regime’s efforts to gain cultural hegemony and control of individual expression. Censorship was present in different forms through the restriction of access to published material, including works published by intellectuals in exile, the confiscation of reading or visual material, the intervention in the publishing process with partial or total suppression of published materials, fines and even closure of publishing houses,
ultimately, often instigating a considerable measure of self-censorship. Regarding the voices of intellectuals in exile, they were virtually shut out until the early 1950s when there is a «hesitant beginning of a dialogue between dissident intellectuals in Spain and their colleagues in exile» (Faber, 2002: 37). Aranguren’s article «La evolución espiritual de los intelectuales españoles en la emigración» (1953) plays a vital role in starting this dialogue. On the other hand, those dissident writers who remained in Spain, forced to work within the constraints of the regime, often developed alternative ways of expression while readers cultivated the art of reading between the lines.

Censorship, however, was inconsistent. Although established by the draconian Press Law of 1938, there were no clear guidelines to define which contents were allowed and which were not, reliance being placed to a great extent on the subjective opinions of the censors. Whereas this subjective factor offered some leeway, on the other hand, this lack of clarity contributed to promoting insecurity, instability, and, ultimately, fear reminiscent of the projected effect of Bentham’s Panopticon. Thus, although authority and repression were not continuously imposed in an active way, their
power rested rather on its possibility. Nevertheless, this inconsistent censorship was more the result of disorganization, the lack of specific directives, and the different interests of the people and institutions involved in the censoring process, rather than being the result of a carefully developed strategy.

Spain’s economic and political interests also had an influence on the implementation of censorship. The regime was trying to gain acceptance, both at home and abroad, particularly between 1945, the beginning of a period of international isolation, and the early 1950s, with the entrance of Spain into UNESCO (1952) and the signing of the Pact of Madrid with the US (1953), which signalled the end of such isolation. Consequently, the regime was keen on promoting an appearance of open-mindedness and tolerance, while pushing for its own moral code and cultural hegemony. These double standards meant that the regime would allow the publication of some intellectual works and accept modest criticism. It is paradoxical, however, that one of the side-effects of this pact was that, despite Spain’s unequal relationship with the USA, American culture became fashionable, because it was often at the cost of Spain’s traditional values and customs, as portrayed by Luis García
Berlanga and Juan Antonio Bardem in their well-known piercing satire *Bienvenido Mister Marshall* (1952).

In 1966, official censorship was arguably relaxed by the introduction of a new Press and Printing Law devised by Franco’s Information Minister, Manuel Fraga. Its effects, however, have been debated, because although prior censorship was abolished, post-publication censorship still existed, which effectively encouraged a greater degree of self-censorship. This proved to be a successful strategy for the regime; by allowing some degree of dissidence to be voiced, the regime hoped to gain a wider degree of international acceptance and to promote a misleading national sense of *relative freedom* and Europeanization. Thus, this dissidence was assimilated by the regime, rendering it innocuous. Nevertheless, it did allow for previously silenced topics to be openly discussed in print, as is the case with the Christian-Marxist debate which marked the late 1960s.
3.1.1 Publication and reception of Aranguren and Aguirre’s works during Francoism

Aranguren was a fertile writer who wrote on a variety of topics, especially religion, ethics, and socio-political issues. He started his trajectory with a largely descriptive style, which Gracia, in relation to his analysis of d’Ors work, describes as «prosa científica de las humanidades» (1996: 27). As he matured intellectually and politically, his expression changed accordingly into a more inquisitive, digressive, personal, dialogical, even, transgressive style. His style is transgressive in as far as there is an element of crossing or blurring standard separations, divisions, and borders of temporal and intellectual nature, hence his supradisciplinarity. Amando de Miguel argues that the difficulty in assigning Aranguren’s work to one discipline lies in the richness of his thought for it integrates philosophy, theology, morality, literary criticism, and so on, without being restricted by any of them (1997: 25-28). This supradisciplinarity becomes necessary, as a result of the issues he dealt with, which are diverse and, in many ways, closely intertwined. The adjective transgressive also alludes to the provocative
nature of Aranguren’s work. His provocation lies in crossing such boundaries, in voicing what others dare not think and, above all, in his thought-provoking, tireless defence of the function of the intellectual, which he so keenly performed. The intellectual should, according to Aranguren, «criticar el sistema y luchar contra él desde relativamente dentro de él, con un pie dentro y otro fuera de él, desde la base, apoyándose sobre ella» (1994, 5: 419). Aranguren adopted this role, thus emphasizing the correspondence between his theoretical and biographical stands. This also means that the time-span and the main subject of discussion of each phase are not rigorously clear-cut. As a whole, Aranguren valued the teachings of the past and integrated them into a critical view of the present, developing an intellectual path whose progression –far from being lineal–, often gives the impression of going back to a former phase. As Hermida del Llano indicates, he always strived to establish a link between «la moral pensada» and «la moral vivida» (1997: 389). This is in line with Aranguren’s perception of the evolution of his own work, as he explains in the epilogue to Enrique Bonete’s essay about Aranguren’s ethics, his thought «comenzó por la moral vivida para, tras pasar a la moral pensada, volver de nuevo a la...

All in all, his style is clear, coherent, and communicative. In this sense, Aranguren’s style—more direct and transparent than Aguirre’s—lacks the complexity of expression—not necessarily of ideas—typical of Critical Theory. Nevertheless, his choice of style is also deliberate and coherent with the content of his thought, as it reflects the effort to reach the greatest number of readers possible and to instil political participation and cultivate a critical attitude. Numerous lectures in both the academic and the public domain also bear witness to his vocation as teacher and to his proximity with his public and readers.

Books, journals, and newspaper articles were his preferred means of expression. This has important implications. As Eamonn Rodgers argues, Censorship during Francoism was typically harsher on those forms of expression which reached the wider public, press and cinema in particular (1999: 98). Consequently, some dissidence was tolerated, counting on the assumption that highbrow publications would enjoy little distribution and an even smaller readership, and hence the perceived threat to the regime was considered to be negligible. In the case of Aranguren, given that
the readership of his early books and journals was mainly limited to the academic arena, coupled with the fact that, during the first years of his career, the main subject of his publications was religion, he was not initially under the attentive eye of the censors quite so much as those who produced films or newspapers. Nevertheless, he still became the object of some attacks from within the Church, such as Jose Ricart Torrens’ *En torno a Aranguren y la autocrítica* (1956), insofar as he exercised a moderate self-criticism of Catholicism (see Aranguren, 1994, 1: 540).

In time, Aranguren’s thought became more critical and his focus shifted from religion to ethics and socio-economic and political issues, to the point that in 1965 he was removed from his Chair in the *Universidad de Madrid* and became a lecturer in the University of California. Nevertheless, he continued to have a wide readership and to publish prolifically in Spain. An explanation for this is that, by the time that the mass divulgence of Aranguren’s thought may have been considered to be potentially dangerous for the regime’s efforts to gain cultural hegemony, the dynamics of censorship were already in the process of changing –first, with the 1966 Press Law and, later, with the advent of democracy–. An
example of Aranguren’s mass reach is that he became a regular contributor to Spanish newspapers – particularly *La Vanguardia* and *El País* – during the final years of the dictatorship and the early Transition. Aranguren’s presence in newspapers is of great significance, because, as Alexis Grohmann explains, the Spanish press plays a momentous political role during the Transition; in the absence of political parties, the newspapers, by initiating a political debate, create a point of reference at the same time as they inform the public (2006: 15). This is no coincidence, as Aranguren himself was aware of the political role of newspapers, which confirms the intentionality of his contributions (1996, 5: 496).

Aguirre’s trajectory, although clearly different, also had an important impact on the Spanish socio-cultural and political arena. Aguirre’s published books are few. Except for some smaller contributions to the debate on religion during his role as priest, no literary work of his own is produced until after the end of the regime and, even then, the quantity remains modest. This probably accounts for the fact that, despite his importance as an influential intellectual and as a socialite, there are hardly any materials analysing his intellectual contributions.
Despite the limited amount of publications of his own during the Franco regime, his rebellious position towards the regime is visible in his sermons (collected in *Sermones de España*, 1971), which were famously progressive and even provocative. His status as a priest, however, provided him with certain privileges, whose boundaries he pushed on numerous occasions and in various inventive ways, as exemplified in this anecdote recounted by Fernando F. Savater:

> en el año 68, en una de las grandes algaradas [...] se organizó un lio tremendo y entraron [los alborotadores] en la iglesia. [...] Uno, en un momento determinado, salió por la ventana con el crucifijo que había cogido de la pared y se lo tiró a los guardias. [De] Todo esto, la prensa franquista [decía] “¡oh, pecado! ¡tiran el crucifijo...!” Y entonces salió Jesús [diciendo]: un crucifijo, es un objeto sagrado, que en un caso de apuro, pues puede ser simplemente un objeto más (2006: n.p.).

Aguirre, being younger that Aranguren and having spent a crucial formative period –the latter part of the 1950s– in Germany, did not show (public) disconformity with the regime until the early 1960s, a time when dissidence and many of the existing concerns
were voiced, alternatives explored, and change demanded. Thus, he took upon himself the task of the dissemination of culture, which he carried out extensively while working at Taurus, a publishing house located in Madrid (1962-1977). There, his progressiveness became evident, first, when he was a religious editor, later, when he took charge of the series *Cuadernos Taurus* and, even more so, when, in the end, he became editor-in-chief. His choice of authors and the nature of the texts selected to be translated and published during this time are highly significant of Aguirre’s vision of what the Spanish socio-cultural atmosphere was and should be; similarly, his prologues —when available— give the reader a revealing insight into his motives and personal perspective.
3.1.2 Francoism’s failed attempt at cultural hegemony

Despite its many efforts, scholars agree that Francoism failed to impose an official culture. As José María Castellet explains, «los intentos de llenar de contenido teórico la actividad ‘cultural’ del Nuevo orden, se estrellaron sucesivamente por la inviabilidad de sus propuestas» (1977: 13). Thus, one of the central reasons it failed is the weakness of the theoretical construct these attempts stood on, which Manuel Vázquez Montalbán describes as «desfachatez teórica del poder» (1977: 73). To borrow Carlos París’ expression, the thought the regime generated was «concebido de espaldas a la historia» (1977: 49). The apparent paradox of the failure of Francoist cultural hegemony in the face of its continuous hold on power until the natural death of the dictator is succinctly explained by Castellet: «la única fuerza del mismo [del franquismo], desde sus orígenes hasta el final, no estuvo en la evolución de las ideas, sino en la capacidad de represión» (1977: 14). This was particularly patent during the final years of the regime, which were marked by the tension between what Spain was and what it aspired to be.
Even religion ultimately failed the regime as a bastion of ideological power and legitimation. As a result of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), the Church underwent a profound transformation. During the 1960s, the Spanish Church no longer presented a common front of support for the regime; an instance of this is the appointment by Pope Paul VI of the liberal Enrique Tarancón as Cardinal Primate in 1969. There was a division between the Church’s official line and the position of its hierarchy on the one hand, and the lower ranks within the Church on the other. Many priests questioned the Church’s regime-legitimating discourse, to the point that priests and parishes frequently became a shelter for the opposition. The Church became increasingly interested in distancing itself from the position and from the actions that it had taken in earlier years. So much so that, in 1971, an assembly of bishops and priests issued a letter preaching reconciliation and begging for the forgiveness of the Spanish people for its role during the Civil War, paving the way for the bishops’ vote in 1973 in favour of formal separation from the State, as well as the abandonment of their political role.
3.2 Publication and Reception of Aranguren and Aguirre’s Works during the Transition

Politically, the fall of the Portuguese and Greek dictatorships in 1974 demonstrated the fragility of regimes previously considered to be impregnable; moreover, it marked Spain as the last authoritarian regime in Western Europe. With Franco’s death in 1975, the process of the so-called peaceful Transition into a democratic society was set into motion. This process crucially involved a general political amnesty and a silent agreement for political amnesia widely known as Pacto del Olvido and Pacto de Silencio respectively. As Teresa Vilarós explains, «la política de reforma de aquellos años, ratificada en diciembre de 1976 en un referéndum político que recogió el 94,2% de los votos emitidos, fue claramente una política de borradura, de no cuestionamiento del pasado» (1998: 9). The culmination of this process can be observed in the advent of democracy (1976) and the Constitution of 1978. However, this seemingly smooth Transition did not shelter factors must be analysed individually, although not separately—in an effort to elucidate how they affect this change. This is also applicable
most members of society from the disorienting changes that took place after Franco’s death in 1975. An example can be found in the composition of the government; there were rapid political changes, but also some –perhaps disorienting– continuity, as is the case with a number of Ministers and the King himself who, despite having served under Franco, soon adapted to –many even promoted– the democratic framework.

In addition to these political changes, the advent of democracy and the new freedom it offered also meant rapid moral changes, both within and outside the realm of religion. Consequently, a moral crisis—or an intensification of an already existing moral crisis—ensued. Although, as the victor of the Spanish Civil War, the regime did its best to impose its view of a united and homogeneous Spain legitimised by the Francoist victory and by National Catholicism. The asphyxiating limitations on individual and public to the case of the Transition, which –despite the fact that, politically, it did not start until the death of the dictator–, one of the factors which made it possible was that, as Hermida del Llano argues, there is a strong continuity and a relationship of causality between the cultural opposition to the regime spearheaded by Aranguren and Enrique Tierno Galván and the Transition (2008: 37). Aranguren himself explicitly refers to this: «Para hablar con rigor hay que decir que la salida cultural del franquismo se adelantó en mucho a su salida política y que, por tanto, culturalmente, se vivía ya, desde 1970 desde luego y, sin exageración, desde 1965, en un régimen en transición» (cited by Hermida del Llano, 2008: 37; originally in 1987: 90, 92).
freedom imposed by this dictatorial regime, as well as the artificiality of this marriage of convenience between Church and State made this regime a morally unsustainable model and it resulted in the growing discontent and dissidence which became more visible towards the later stages of the regime. Another reason why the regime had limited success in instilling their moral values is that, as Sebastian Balfour observes «social and economic change both stimulated and was accompanied by a revolution in values» (2000: 277). This revolution was not without disorientation or confusion, for the rapid changes that took place during the apertura years of the regime brought about a moral crisis, perhaps individual in nature, although of social proportions, since these newly acquired values conflicted with those defended by the regime. A similar phenomenon took place during the Transition, when the possibility of exercising the citizen’s recently acquired political and moral freedom conflicted with the learnt values and behaviours of their recent past.

There was disorientation and there was also disillusionment. The boom of the counter-culture during the last phase of the Francoist regime strongly contrasted with the subsequent
disenchantment that came about with the advent of democracy. According to Vilarós, «desencanto, como bien sabemos, es el término aplicado al peculiar efecto político-cultural causado en España más que por la transición a un régimen democrático-liberal, por el mismo hecho del fin de la dictadura franquista. Fue la película de Jaime Chávarri, *El desencanto* (1976), la que le dio al término carta de naturaleza» (1998: 23)²¹. Undoubtedly, this disenchantment and disorientation were produced when the long-established attitude of «being against» ceased to be a meaningful practice, but they were also the result of the difficult materialization or disappearance altogether of many of the hopes and expectations so dearly embraced by those who opposed the regime and longed for democracy. Aranguren was well-aware of this process and of its moral repercussions which was one of the reasons why he took upon himself the task of the moralist, embodied in the figure of the intellectual. From this platform, always with a conciliatory agenda, he acted as a critic of society, while emphasizing the value of education, particularly education for communication and political education.

²¹ See also Díaz, who claims that this *desencanto* is often misrepresented (1995: 289).
The end of the regime resulted in a proliferation of articles, books, and films, which lead to the cultural explosion of the 1980s. For Aranguren, it meant that, not only could he write in a bolder manner about socio-political issues –by then the main focus of his work– but also that these works enjoyed a considerable readership, fuelled by Aranguren’s significant popularity22; his reputation as an engaging orator, his regular newspaper articles, his relation with and against the regime and his television appearances all contributed to making him a well-known intellectual. Moreover, since 1994 the availability of his intellectual production has increased with Blázquez’s publication of his *Obras Completas*. There are also numerous publications of secondary literature which introduce, discuss, and analyse Aranguren’s work; a particularly comprehensive such text is Hermida del Llano’s *J.L.L. Aranguren. Estudio sobre su vida, obra y pensamiento* (1997). Most secondary literature, however, focuses on Aranguren’s thought on religion, morality and ethics, which is why more attention needs to be devoted to the political aspects of this work.

22 However, it must be borne in mind that during the 1980s and even until the present day, the levels of readership in Spain are low by European standards (see Jordan, 2002: 130, 177, 188).
The Transition also marked a significant new period for Aguirre, for it was not until the end of the regime that Aguirre became a writer in his own right. During the late 1970s, Aguirre tried his hand at journalism frequently writing for *El País* and, eventually, becoming part of its editorial board. In fact, Aguirre had a very strong presence in the press, as Ricardo Gullón confirms «aparece *El País*, con signo liberal, Jesús Aguirre muda de oficio: el periodismo le atrae, escribe y hace escribir; sugiere temas, apunta posibilidades» (1989: 13). As in the case of Aranguren, it is of great significance that many of his writings were first published as newspaper articles, not least because *El País* was the first newspaper to be created in the context of the Transition to democracy and had a considerable readership23.

This presence in the press means that Aguirre established a close relationship with the public; his name, his contributions, and opinions became familiar, expected. He crucially became a mediator; Aguirre engaged in the socio-cultural and political debate, maintaining contact and discussions with cultural figures and

23 Created in 1976, its readership grew from just over 700 thousand readers to becoming one of the most read general newspapers in Spain—with nearly 850 thousand readers—, second only to *La Vanguardia* (El País.es, 2007: n.p).
politicians, contributing to shaping the socio-cultural and political landscape of his time; ultimately, this is evidence of Aguirre’s desire to maintain contact with the wider public in an attempt to shape their opinions and attitudes, as he had already started doing from the pulpit years earlier. Nevertheless, despite his cultivation of the journalistic genre and, in contrast with Aranguren, his language is often obscure; its goal is to demand the engagement from the willing reader who, through this exercise, would develop a critical ability and practice independent thinking, which is hoped it could be extrapolated to other contexts.

After becoming Duke of Alba through his marriage with Cayetana Fitz-James Stuart, Duchess of Alba, in 1978, Aguirre continued to devote most of his live to the endeavour of cultural dissemination, be it by means of his direct involvement in the promotion of the arts, as he became a member of several prestigious academies during the 1980s, such as the Royal Spanish Academy of Language and the Royal Academy of Fine Arts, or be it by means of his publications. In 1985, Aguirre published *Casi ayer noche*, the first of several short semi-autobiographical essays and even a collection of poems, which are interspersed with cultural commentary.
The boundaries between the private and public tone and content of Aguirre’s writings are often blurred, because he often borrows traits from other genres, so it is not unusual to encounter an essay—or part of it—in the tone of a public speech, of an autobiographical confession or, at times, it may even adopt an epistolary aura. The borderlines between genres, as between disciplines, become blurred, conferring his expression a sense of fluidity on the one hand, and a sense of confusion and disorientation on the other. This is emphasized by Aguirre’s use of language, which is markedly idiosyncratic and deliberately obscure.

Despite being a charismatic and influential public figure in Spain during this time, and despite having produced a variety of publications, Aguirre has never been received scholarly attention as a thinker of his own right before. Several reasons may account for this: Aguirre’s writings are scarce; elusiveness and obscurity are key features of his style; and Aguirre’s modest and later contribution as a writer is often overshadowed by his role as translator and editor, and even more so by his fame and role as Duke. Nevertheless, and despite the lack of scholarly publications examining Aguirre’s intellectual contribution, there is a resurgence of interest
in his persona and his work, as a result of the recent publication of Manuel Vicent’s *Aguirre, el magnífico*; a loosely biographical account of Aguirre’s life, interspersed with Vicent’s own anecdotes and historical reflections.

In conclusion, elucidating the socio-cultural background against which these authors develop their thought, namely, the regime’s struggle for cultural hegemony, is essential in order to understand the privileged position that Aranguren and Aguirre award education and culture in their thought and in their actions. The separation between education and culture decisively contributed to shaping Aranguren and Aguirre’s interest in and promotion of education; the former promoted it practically—through teaching—and theoretically—through the publication of essays on this topic and on the relationship between education and political participation--; the latter’s engagement with education and culture is expressed through his continued commitment to disseminating ideas and his support and promotion of the arts. In addition, both of them participated directly in the process of informing and shaping public opinion through their journalistic endeavours.

Censorship plays an important role in the analysis of the
work of any author who wrote under the constrains of the Franco regime. This is the case with Aranguren, since there are indications to conclude that in the early stages of his career, his choice of subject matter was influenced by his awareness of the restrictions placed upon public expression by the regime. Similarly, the expansion of his focus of interest and of his media of publication—from books to newspapers and even television appearances—as well as the increasingly critical tone of his work is linked, on the one hand, to his extended stays in the United States where he was not subjected to this type of censorship and, on the other, to the 1966 the Press Law and to the abolition of censorship which followed the end of the dictatorship. The impact of censorship on the work of Aguirre is even more apparent. Aguirre practically limits his publications during the regime to translations and editions and these are mostly of a religious nature until the mid-sixties. It is not until the Transition—when state censorship has been abolished—that he starts writing and publishing his own manuscripts.

Finally, the problematic situation of the Church in relation to the State, to its own followers, and, ultimately, to faith has an important bearing on shaping the experience of religion, morality,
and thought of Spanish citizens during the regime and well into the Transition, but also on Aranguren and Aguirre in particular. As discussed in the following chapters, religion and spirituality played a pivotal role in the evolution of these authors’ thought, to the extent that their motivations were rooted in no small part in their religious beliefs, first, and, later, in their spiritual commitment.

All in all, although it is true that Aranguren and Aguirre have been well-known public figures, their thought tends to be understood and interpreted within the co-ordinates of the historical moment they shared and, to a certain extent, shaped, that is, their reaction towards the Francoist regime and their position during the Spanish Transition. Although their thought undoubtedly bears the influence of their socio-cultural and political context, what I would like to suggest here is that there is an important subversive element in their work which, although concerned with their historical circumstances, aims to transcend them in order to address the issue of rationality itself. Against instrumental reason unveils evidence of the existence of a current of Critical Theory in Spain, which has typically been considered inexistent. Providing this evidence shall be the focus of the following chapters.
Part II
4 The presence of Marcuse and neo-Marxism in Aranguren’s thought

Aranguren’s views on the Frankfurt School were first published in a newspaper article entitled «Marxismo e imaginación» later compiled in La cultura española y la cultura establecida (1975) (1996, 4: 541-44). There, Aranguren states that «hoy mismo seguimos moviéndonos en torno a los grandes problemas planteados por la Escuela» (1996, 4: 543). This assessment is certainly true of Aranguren’s own thought, who engaged with the Frankfurt School discussing and commenting on their work. Throughout this article, Aranguren provides a review of their thought and, in that process, the admiration that he feels for the Frankfurt School becomes apparent. There, he praises what he considers to be the key achievements of the School, starting with having created what he describes as the first independent, heterodox Marxist circle (1996, 4: 543).

Miguel de la Fuente González explains that this article was first sent to the newspaper called Informaciones, however, it was rejected on account of its positive use of the word «Marxism» in its title (2001-2002: 182). Then, the article was then sent to La Vanguardia, which only agreed to publish it after modifying the title to «Imaginación dialéctica» (1974).
Aranguren also highlights their merit in having identified and analysed the new forms of alienation produced by neo-capitalist societies and the deficient kind of reason associated with them. He observes that

la conciencia de nuevas alienaciones, la de la cultura de masas –en principio, para la Escuela, la cultura popular que sus miembros vivieron en América–, así como la del consumismo (y tanto, o más, contra el ascetismo puritano), se la debemos a este grupo. Y tantas cosas más, entre las cuales es imprescindible citar, frente a la “razón tecnológica” o reducción de la razón a “razón instrumental”, su voluntad de distinguir entre la técnica y la praxis (1996, 4: 544).

Mass culture, consumerism, and the new forms of alienation – all by-products of neo-capitalism and the reduction of reason to instrumental reason – become, in fact, some of the very topics to which Aranguren devotes his attention during the most socio-politically oriented phase of his career. He applauds the attitude of the members of the Institut who, in his view, live out their theory as a form of praxis. By doing so, Aranguren acknowledges not only the relevance of their thought, but he also demonstrates his
admiration towards the members of the Institut. In Aranguren’s words, «No, ciertamente yo no reprocharé a esta Escuela que haya vivido la teoría, de acuerdo con Aristóteles, como una forma de praxis.» (1994, 4: 543). By drawing attention in this manner to the element of praxis implicit in the rationality they propound, Aranguren reveals the value that he himself ascribes to praxis. All in all, the School exercised a considerable influence on Aranguren’s thought, not only on its socio-cultural aspects, but more primordially on his attitude and his philosophy as essentially and necessarily critical. As Aranguren puts it: «Todos los que pensamos hemos aprendido de ellos la lección, [...] que la filosofía ya no puede ser más que crítica y más crítica.» (1994, 4: 543).

However, it would be contradictory for Aranguren –and it would also go against the very spirit of the Frankfurt School– not to exercise his critical attitude; the Institut is no exception. Although, on the one hand, Aranguren recognises the importance and impact of their thought, on the other hand, he points to their source of income –which at one point included the United States’ State Department– and questions its possible impact on their work, finally conceding that «en cualquier caso, la Escuela de Francfort es
una prueba más de la imposibilidad de la pureza absoluta. Siempre ‘usamos’ o ‘somos usados’ y, con frecuencia, ambas cosas a la vez» (1996, 4: 543). At the same time, Aranguren is also well aware that the financial backing received by the Institut, conferred their members a certain privileged situation in relation to other refugee scholars of the same period, which allowed them to maintain a critical distance from American culture thanks to its economic independence; thus, he concludes that they owe the United States the great reputation and recognition the School acquires (1996, 4: 542).

One year later, in La cultura española y la cultura establecida (1975), Aranguren returns to the topic of the Frankfurt School and reflects about the significance of the title of his first article on this matter, saying: «el marxismo con imaginación –‘imaginación dialéctica’, buen lema de lo que la Escuela ha querido ser con su gran sensibilidad para el arte y la literatura– por nadie ha estado mejor representado que por ellos durante años» (1996, 4: 589). Thus, he expresses his admiration for these aspects of the work of the School. But more than that, the fact that, after one year, Aranguren was still reflecting about the significance and topicality of the
work of the Frankfurt School –and of his own reflections on this matter– is evidence of the importance he placed on their thought. Moreover, Aranguren is interested in underlying the possibilities that the work of the Frankfurt School opens up. That is why Aranguren finds the component of imagination to be pivotal for their thought, for as he explains further down:

Me importa mucho subrayar, frente a la opacidad acrítica y dogmática de las morales establecidas –cristiana convencional, burguesa, de la sociedad de consumo, del marxismo ortodoxo–, el carácter de «acción simbólica» y modelo para la acción real de toda creación que, en sentido muy amplio, podemos llamar literaria [...]. La literatura verdaderamente creadora es en sí misma revolucionaria, desvelación y revelación de la realidad (1994, 4: 589).

The implication is that this is precisely what the Frankfurt School does. Because of the imaginative component that his title alludes to, Aranguren explains how the School is able to step away from established socio-economic and political patterns. The School steps away from the dominant rationality to function within a different framework of thought and possibility, a framework of their own in
which critique figures prominently: Critical Theory (see Caballero, 2011: 32-52).

Nevertheless, Aranguren is well aware that although there is an element of cohesion to the Frankfurt School’s thought, there are also important differences amongst their members. This can be observed in Aranguren’s reflections regarding Benjamin.
4.1 Aranguren’s views on Benjamin

Aranguren devotes three articles to Walter Benjamin, «Actualidad de Walter Benjamin» (1972), «Viajero sin equipaje» (1973), and «Un alto en la lectura» (1973) –although the focus of the latter is not limited to Benjamin– (1996, 4: 474-83).25

In «Actualidad de Walter Benjamin», Aranguren provides the reader with some biographical and intellectual background on Benjamin, whose approach towards Marxism he describes as non-doctrinary. Then, he praises Benjamin’s thought on art and its relationship to technology, and discusses his critique of violence and his philosophy of culture. Here, Aranguren also explains that he had been reading Benjamin for ten years prior to the publication of this article —since 1962— and proceeds to provide an overview of the publication of Benjamin’s thought in Spain. Thus, this article serves as an indication of Aranguren’s interest and familiarity with Benjamin’s work.

«Viajero sin equipaje», which partly functions as a review

25 These articles, which were later compiled in La cultura española y la cultura establecida (1975), first appeared in the journals Cuadernos para el diálogo and Triunfo.
of Aguirre’s edition of –and prologue to– *Discursos interrumpidos* (1973), constitutes a reflection upon Benjamin’s intellectual contributions and the continued relevance of his thought. There, Aranguren explains how he considers many of Benjamin’s attitudes and views to be ahead of his time, citing the green movement as an example of this and even referring to Benjamin as the harbinger of the New Left. In this article, Aranguren also assesses what is probably Benjamin’s most famous work –«The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction» (1936)– in the light of contemporary attitudes towards art, concluding that regardless of the reproduction possibilities opened up by technological advancements, original works of art continue to have an aura –value and prestige– which is lacking in reproductions. However, it is clear from his comments that Aranguren longs for the democratization of the work of art envisaged by Benjamin. He explains that «el circuito de Mercado artístico, inserto de lleno en el neocapitalismo, no podía consentir tal democratización. El “aura” de las obras de arte ha sido preservada» (1996, 4: 479). Aranguren perceives this preservation of the aura of the work of art as a wasted opportunity, for he does not seem to think that there is always much intrinsic value
to this aura or, at least, as this quotation shows, that the aura is not always justified: «La gente invierte cada vez más dinero en las ya famosas ‘subastas’ de obras de arte, el ‘aura’ de muchas de las cuales es difícil de percibir, por muy místico estético que se sea» (1996, 4: 479). Thus, Aranguren reasserts the contemporary relevance of understanding the possibilities and implications within Benjamin’s essay, not because his expectations regarding the political consequences for art of the role of mechanical reproduction were fulfilled, but precisely because they were not. It is significant that Aranguren chose to close this article referring to Benjamin as «‘nuestro contemporáneo’ Walter Benjamin», which he does partly as a form of endearment, but also, in no small measure, as a direct way of summarizing the main point of this article and his previous one on Benjamin: the continued actuality of his thought.

Finally, in «Un alto en la lectura», Aranguren reiterates and reflects upon the heterodoxy which surrounds Benjamin’s life and thoughts. There, Aranguren discusses Benjamin’s role as a heterodox member of the Frankfurt School, an asystematic thinker, who left behind what Aranguren refers to as various intuitions or anticipations –gestated thoughts which he did not fully develop.
In this context, Aranguren describes Benjamin as *excomunicado*, *excomulgado*, and, even *requетеexcomulgado*, as he refers to Benjamin later on in *La cultura española y la cultura establecida* (see 1996, 4: 481-82, 595-96). By describing Benjamin as an *excomunicado*, Aranguren emphasizes his condition of outcast, that is, his heterodoxy within the Frankfurt School and his subsequent isolation from it. These terms highlight the isolation and rejection suffered as a consequence of his dissent. Furthermore, Aranguren’s deliberate use of this religious terminology suggests an analogy between Benjamin’s peripheric position in reference to the School and the situation that many independent thinkers faced in Spain –where the influence of the Church was ever-present as a result of National Catholicism–. In addition, the literal interpretation of the term *excomunicado*, understood as «no longer in communication», closely relates to the concept of inner exile, which stresses isolation in its different forms: from the self, from other possible interlocutors, from mainstream culture and society, and, ultimately, from the nation-state. On the other hand, there is also a positive reading of this position of *excomunicado* as an independent thinker; in this sense, it is precisely this separation
from the community, this isolation, what may provide a sort of inner retreat which—as in the case of Benjamin and many Spanish thinkers of this period, including Aranguren himself—makes a critical attitude truly possible, effectively becoming a prerequisite for critical thought (see Caballero, 2012: 668-70). Because of this, Aranguren wonders whether the adoption of this excommunication or internal exile has become the only fate of the intellectual: «¿Es la excomunicación, es el exilio –expatriación o exilio interior– el destino de todo auténtico intelectual de nuestro tiempo?» (1996, 4: 482). Although this question insinuates itself as the answer, Aranguren does not provide a straight forward answer here and the tension between separation and intervention is present throughout his reflections regarding his understanding of the task the intellectual.
4.2 Adorno and Horkheimer in Aranguren’s work

There are significant connections between Aranguren’s life and thought, and those of Adorno and Horkheimer. As Pedro Cerezo argues, there are strong parallelisms between Aranguren and Horkheimer in as far as they moved away from their Catholic and Marxist positions respectively, to produce influential socio-cultural and political critiques and develop a contestary attitude based on an autonomous morality (1991: 104). Cerezo also indicates that Aranguren shares with Adorno the tendency to exercise his critique as negative dialectics. Most notable still is Aranguren’s affinity for Adorno’s *Minima Moralia*, which scholars such as Cerezo and Carlos Soldevilla coincide in pointing out, forms the bases for Aranguren’s ethical position (1991: 104; 2004: 136, respectively).

There are multiple references to Adorno and Horkheimer’s thought scattered throughout Aranguren’s work making his awareness and continued interest in their work clear. In *El marxismo como moral* (1968), Aranguren acknowledges Adorno’s and

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Horkheimer’s pioneering role in denouncing the culture industry and the manipulation of consciousness, issues which Aranguren dwells on himself (see 1995, 3: 220). In addition to this, Aranguren refers to Adorno –along with Marcuse, Gramsci, Korsch, Habermas, Ernst Bloch, Schaff, and Garaudy– as one of the Marxist thinkers of greatest interest of his time for tackling the moral issues of Marxism (see 1995, 3: 185, 203).

Later on, in La cultura española y la cultura establecida (1975), where Aranguren recommends Adorno’s The Authoritarian Personality (1950), arguing that although some years have passed since it was published, it is still –at the time of Aranguren’s writing– a topical book, not least because it sheds light onto fanatical behaviour –so common in relation to religion, which is the focus of the article– and because it reveals «una correlación biunívoca entre liberalismo e inteligencia, fanatismo y pobreza intelectual» (1996, 4: 439). It is no coincidence that in the few lines that Aranguren devoted to this book, he chose to highlight this co-relationship; its relevance becomes clear by remembering that it was published at the gates of the political Transition. Its political context suggests that, through Adorno’s work, Aranguren
encourages the development of liberal thought and warns against fanaticism. Aranguren uses this article as a platform for advocating the flexibility of its readers’ values and, ultimately, for the cultivation of intellectual freedom. He precedes this brief review of Adorno’s book by saying that «hay una porción de cuestiones a las que sólo los fanáticos pueden contestar, rotundamente, con un ‘sí’ o un ‘no’» (1996, 4: 439). Hence, Aranguren makes use of Adorno’s conclusions –while appealing to his readers’ intelligence– in order to call for tolerance and moderation in religious matters, but also, by way of this exercise, in political matters as well. The importance Aranguren awards to Adorno and Horkheimer’s thought can also be observed in his article «Marxismo e imaginación», where he refers to their *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as «libro capital» (1996, 4: 544)²⁷.

Thus, the recurrent references to Adorno and Horkheimer in

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²⁷ Although *Dialektik der Aufklärung* was published in German in 1947 –the earliest version was published under the title *Philosophische Fragmente* in 1944–, it was not until 1972 that an English translation was published. It is unclear whether Aranguren read the English or Spanish translation published by Sur in Argentina three years earlier (1969). It is, however, reasonable to assume that he read the English version, because, although he refers to the title in Spanish, he says *Dialéctica de la Ilustración*, instead of *Dialéctica del Iluminismo* –the title as it appeared in the Sur edition. It was not until 1994 that a translation was published in Spain, by Trotta.
this and other publications are evidence not only of Aranguren’s interest, but also of the importance that he awarded to their thought.
4.3 Aranguren and Marcuse

The strongest connection between Aranguren and a member of the Frankfurt School can be found in reference to Aranguren’s personal friend, Marcuse. There are significant parallels at a biographical and intellectual level between both thinkers. Having established that one of the paradigmatic features of neo-Marxism is the correspondence between theory and *praxis*, it is essential to pay close attention to the relationship between Aranguren’s biography and his work so that it can be determined whether or not they are the expression of a holistic project, as is the case with Critical Theorists, particularly Marcuse. While providing an overview of their thought, the purpose of this comparison is to illustrate how Marcuse’s work strongly influences Aranguren’s and to demonstrate that there was a convergence in the interests, approach, and conclusions of both authors before they met in the 1960s, and even more so after this date, when Aranguren dealt with and developed many of the same issues Marcuse did: a critique of consumerist society and the new forms of alienation it brings about.
4.3.1 Early life

In 1909, Aranguren was born in Ávila in an increasingly tense socio-political climate which culminated in the *Semana Trágica* that same year. His family, who enjoyed a comfortable financial situation, was on the right-wing of the political spectrum. Consequently, Aranguren received a traditional religious education. At the age of nine, he was sent to a Jesuit boarding school in Madrid and continued studying with the Jesuits until he left for University. Although this young Aranguren bore few traits of the critical political writer he would later become, the seeds for his strong religious convictions which would shape his entire existence had already been firmly planted. Some eleven years earlier, in 1898, Marcuse was born in Berlin to a well-off Jewish family and raised during a period of economic prosperity. Marcuse, unlike Aranguren who often meditated on the role of his received religion, did not possess a special interest in further exploring and asserting his Jewish background.

After finishing secondary school, Aranguren’s health

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28 For a detailed account of Aranguren’s biography see Pastor García, 2000: 665-76.
deteriorated and University had to wait for one year, which he spent learning French in Angulème. When he finally attended University, he chose to do his first degree in Law, which he finished in 1931. In 1932, he decided to register at University again to study philosophy. During this time—during Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship (1923-1930) and the Spanish Second Republic which followed—Aranguren was not particularly interested in the socio-political situation of the country, assuming a moderate position. Thus, it is hardly surprising that when the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, Aranguren did not manifest any special inclination for either side. However, when offered the chance to escape the conflict by going to France, he declined. Although, a man of peace, initially more interested in books than politics, Aranguren was compelled by the circumstances to go to the front in Aragón, where he joined a regiment of artillery on the Nationalist side, serving as the driver of the vehicle of his battery. Later, in 1969, when looking retrospectively over his life in Memorias y esperanzas españolas, Aranguren discussed his decision to pass up the opportunity of becoming an alférez, second lieutenant. He explained that it was based on the fact that his status as an university graduate and even
more so as alférez would have required participating more aggressively in the war effort. As he puts it, «esta situación militar [la de conductor] me daba la seguridad que en otro puesto, y menos en el de alférez, no habría podido tener, de no participar en la matanza general, de no haber dado muerte a ningún compatriota mío» (1997, 6: 187). His involvement in the war, however, was short-lived due—allegedly—to health reasons; he soon claimed to suffer from tuberculosis, thus gaining military permission to go back home. Similarly, when the Great War broke out in 1914, two weeks after Marcuse’s sixteenth birthday, Marcuse’s sheltered upbringing also contributed to the fact that he adopted a rather neutral attitude towards it. It was in 1916, when there was little prospect of a military victory, that Marcuse was summoned into the Imperial German Reichswehr and was consequently forced to conclude his Gymnasium studies. At this point—as with Aranguren—Marcuse also manifested health problems; due to his weak eyesight, he was assigned to a relatively safe position in Berlin, where he was even allowed to attend Berlin University on an irregular basis.
4.3.2 War as the catalyst for a socio-political awakening

The Great War, which lasted a total of four years, provoked a great deal of discontent. It was in these circumstances, as Barry Katz explains, that Herbert Marcuse began to develop his political consciousness (1982: 26). A decisive factor in awakening his political consciousness was the violence involved in war, which evoked in him feelings of revulsion. This rejection of violence can also be observed in his early political behaviour. Marcuse joined the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1917, a time of crisis and fragmentation for German socialism. As Katz points out,

he remained a Social Democrat until the end of the war, and although he never became a party activist, he recalled that it is at this time that he began to explore the theoretical underpinnings of the socialist opposition in the writings of Marx (1982: 28).

In 1918, in the face of the murders of the socialist Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, as Marcuse himself recalls, he withdrew from the SDP, showing his disgust towards such actions (2005: 71). It was then, as Katz indicates, when Marcuse started to study
Marx, although he did so while retaining his political independence. Aranguren’s interest in Marxism, however, developed considerably later. As a result of his Catholic background, the demonization of Marxism, and the restrictive intellectual climate instigated by Franco’s regime, Aranguren did not substantially engage with Marxism until the late 1960s. Indeed, *El marxismo como moral*, his first full-length book in which he openly engaged in a discussion with Marxism was published in 1968. Nevertheless, although arguably late, he entered into a dialogue with Marxism, which is crucial for understanding his socio-economic positions and his later engagement with neo-Marxism.

The experience of war also had a transforming effect on Aranguren, as he explained in *Memorias y esperanzas españolas* (1969): «Para mí también, aunque me duela, fue la guerra civil un acontecimiento decisivo: produjo en mí un fervor que nunca más he vuelto a sentir con tal intensidad. No precisamente fervor bélico, sino fervor religioso» (1997, 6: 185). In 1938, Aranguren married María del Pilar in San Sebastián, where both families, his and hers, were residing during the conflict. From this date, and until 1941, Aranguren led a life of reclusion and study which shaped his
intellectual personality. Although the war ended in 1939, the post-war climate, along with his own self-reflective tendencies, contributed to a phase of social isolation but of intellectual fruition.

The Civil War also had longer term consequences for Aranguren’s thought. According to his recollection, it is a consequence of his experience of the Civil War that his personal attitude and his view of politics changed considerably (1997, 6: 184). Thus, a clear evolution in Aranguren’s position on politics can be observed. The nature of his interests clearly widened; whereas he was initially interested in religion, apparently not concerning himself with politics, his critical attitude eventually made him consider politics to be at the very core of his interests.

In Memorias y esperanzas españolas (1969b), Aranguren recalls that «la primera autoliberación que hube de llevar a cabo lo fue del medio familiar y colegial, de la educación conformista y conservadora, estrecha de miras, de todo o casi todo lo que me había rodeado» (1997, 6: 183). This, he continues, took place before going into secondary school under the guidance of his first maestro, Don Luis, whom he considered a non-conformist. At this stage, he still described himself as apolitical, mainly due to his own
conformist nature and as a result of the profound respect he felt for his father. Nevertheless, the Spanish Civil War had a profound impact on Aranguren, who despite feeling very close to his father, decided to allow himself to go beyond imitation or repetition of learnt behaviour. Aranguren described this change in attitude as a *segundo alumbramiento* or rebirth, which resulted in a commitment to being himself, to independence (1997, 6: 184). As a result of these experiences and decisions, he turned to religion and his awareness of his political responsibilities began to awaken.

After the war, in 1919, Marcuse studied *Germanistik* at the Humboldt University in Berlin. During this period, when he considered himself an existentialist, he became friends with some of then promising young intellectuals, such as Walter Benjamin and Georg Lukàcs. Soon thereafter, he transferred to Freiburg, where he studied Philosophy and Political Economy. As in the case of Aranguren, Marcuse only became interested in philosophy after having already spent some time at University studying other subjects, thus providing the basis for the supradisciplinary perspective that is so fundamental to Critical Theorists and which also forms part of Aranguren’s approach. Marcuse obtained his PhD in 1922
and returned to Berlin at the end of this year. In 1924, he married a former Mathematics student, Sophie. The next important influence on his thought would be the publication of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (1927), as a result of which he returned to Freiburg in 1928 to study philosophy with Heidegger himself (1928-1932).

In 1933, in Frankfurt, he joined the *Institut für Sozialforschung*, but one year later, Hitler became both chancellor and president of Germany and declared the Nazi Party the only legal political party. In the face of these events, Marcuse felt forced to flee from Nazism. He and his family emigrated first to Zurich, then to Geneva, finally arriving in New York in 1934, where he settled and adopted American nationality. The encounter of the members of the *Institut* with National Socialism, however, marked the route of their research which largely focused on cultural production. The *Institut’s* work continued in the United States, although not without financial difficulties. A similar interest was awakened in Aranguren who, like other opposition intellectuals, became highly critical towards any form of cultural manipulation.

Marcuse was initially interested in the integration of Marxism and existentialism, so as to revise the position of Marxism
towards the problem of the individual from an existentialist perspective. Communication with Heidegger, however, broke down as a result of the latter’s tolerance of –if not outright support for– Nazism and Marcuse distanced himself from existentialism. In fact, in 1947, Marcuse sent Heidegger a letter by which he hoped to extract from him a public apology or explanation regarding his relationship with the Nazi regime and ideology (see Marcuse, 1991: 28-29). In this letter, Marcuse explained how Heidegger the philosopher and Heidegger the man cannot be separated, for this would contradict Heidegger’s own philosophy. No such public statement was ever issued by Heidegger. With this gesture, not only does the lack of correspondence between Heidegger’s thought and praxis become visible, but the relevance that such correspondence has for Marcuse is underscored. As a result, Marcuse’s relationship with Heidegger was broken off, which resulted in a change of direction for Marcuse. Aranguren considered this shift to be pivotal to Marcuse’s thought, to such an extent that for him, Marcuse only truly forms part of the Institut once he distanced himself from Heidegger (see 1996, 4: 542-43).

Regarding Aranguren’s attitude towards Heidegger, in his
prologue to the collection of essays entitled *Heidegger: La voz de tiempos sombríos* (1991), he shows his awareness and interest in the debate around Heideggerian thought and the distance which existed between this thought and his life. Amelia Valcárcel also bears testimony to the value that Aranguren –like Marcuse– awarded to the correspondence between thought and *praxis* and his critique of the distance which exists between Heidegger’s life and thought. She recalls that as a result of her teasing Aranguren in relation to Heidegger’s thought, he answered: «todo eso es la teoría, pero lo importante es la vida» (1997: 45).
4.3.3 Marcuse’s and Aranguren’s career and thought

In spite of all efforts to the contrary, in December 1942, the financial difficulties and the general climate due to the United States entering the Second World War led to the suspension of the Institut’s activities. At this point, Marcuse left Santa Monica, California, where he had been residing for a short while to move to Washington and join the Bureau of Intelligence in order to apply his particular regional knowledge, linguistic competence, and other valuable skills to the analysis of intelligence data. Although in 1948 he was made Chief of the Central European Branch, he became intellectually and politically isolated. Due to his wife’s poor health, however, he remained in the job until her death in 1951.

In 1945, and coinciding with the end of the Second World War, Aranguren came out of his isolation and started attending tertulias —informal but regular gatherings of friends in a cafe to discuss politics, philosophy, culture and topical issues—, coming into contact with various promising and prominent intellectuals. Between the years 1945 and 1955, Aranguren’s work was marked by his writings on religion, which constitutes one of the threads
running through all his work, providing it with a certain cohesion. This constitutes the first of the several stages found in Aranguren’s work. Although there is no agreement in the exact division of this stages, it is useful to bear in mind the stages identified by Juan Tomás Pastor García: religious, ethical, socio-political stages, plus the performance of *el oficio de intelectual*, the role of the intellectual, which—as Hermida del Llano has argued— is closely linked to Aranguren’s biography (2000: 678)²⁹.

In 1951, Aranguren obtained his doctoral degree and, in 1956, he became professor of *Ética y Sociología* at the *Universidad de Madrid*. As Gracia indicates, the regime’s search for legitimation led to the appointment as lecturers and the –possibly premature– pre-eminence of some very young intellectuals, such as Pedro Laín Entralgo, Antonio Tovar, and Aranguren himself, in the hope that, coming from a conservative background and having studied in post-war Francoist Spain, they would contribute to such a legitimization (1996: 19). This conservative background, as well as the pressures of the regime, can be observed in Aranguren’s earlier work, which –despite the evolution of his thought– has often

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²⁹ For a thorough discussion of the stages found in Aranguren’s work see Hermida del Llano, 1997: 5-28.
led to him being considered a conservative, even Francoist thinker by some\(^{30}\). The most representative book of this period is, thus, *Catolicismo, día tras día*, which, although published in 1955, gathers a number of articles written between 1949 and 1953. His tone, however, progressively became more inquisitorial, critical, and, even, polemic. The publication of *Ética* (1958), introduced the second stage in Aranguren’s work; it signalled, as Gracia puts it, «la primera aportación de peso a la filosofía moral, no subordinada a la preceptiva católica» (1996: 24). His attitude regarding the relationship between religion and ethics is to a large extent Unamunian, for as Bonete explains, «la religión no es la base de toda moral, sino al revés, la moral [...] (el hacer el bien y el proceso de llegar a ser bueno) es la base de la religión» (2003: 390). Good, not happiness, forms the basis for Aranguren’s moral philosophy and, 

\(^{30}\) Although this view has been most publicly voiced by Javier Marías, Aranguren’s liberal credentials have been questioned by others. As Santos Juliá indicates, in *Memorias y esperanzas españolas* [1969] Aranguren politically separates himself from the participants in the journal Escorial by highlighting what he described as the «contradicción interna, el callejón sin salida del "falangismo liberal"» (Aranguren, 1997, 6, 206 quoted by Juliá, 2002: 3). Nevertheless, Juliá remains skeptical about Aranguren’s liberalism as shown by his quoting Olegario González de Cardedal: «[Aranguren] "releyó su historia anterior a la luz de su posterior actitud", lo que habría dado lugar a "una malinteligencia y una malinterpretación"» (González de Cardedal, 2000: 49 quoted by Juliá, 2002: 14).
although religion is not at its foundation, it is still an integral component. In *La ética de Ortega* (1958), his focus widened to include three very closely interrelated fields of study: ethics, politics, and morality.

During the 1960s, Spanish universities experienced a period of unrest with an increasing number of student protests. Consequently, in response to this, in *El futuro de la Universidad* (1963), Aranguren expressed the need to open up the intellectual sphere of the university system. During this time, his classes and persona became quite popular amongst students due to the climate of intellectual freedom he maintained, in spite of the control, restrictions, and, indeed, censorship imposed by the regime. Amando de Miguel bears testimony to Aranguren’s abilities as a lecturer throughout his career and explains that «era un mago de la mayéutica. Llevaba el auditorio donde él quería» (1997: 26). This popularity is one of the characteristics shared with Marcuse for largely the same reasons, the praxis of intellectual freedom, but also what Cerezo refers to as his role as emancipator (1991: 104). As Gracia explains, students were interested in Aranguren’s:

intentto de comprensión del marxismo, su búsqueda de una
This stage culminates with *Ética y política* (1963), which marks a stronger preoccupation with political and social issues and establishes Marxism as his main interlocutor. It is from this publication onwards that he demonstrates an awareness of the impossibility to effectively extract oneself from politics and, as a result, he engaged henceforth with politics from an intellectual platform, for he never became involved with party politics. During the period from 1963 to 1965, Aranguren was starting to engage with several typically neo-Marxist topics, such as consumerism and manipulation. Hence, his distance from the regime grew as he became increasingly critical of it and more interested in socio-political issues.
4.3.4 The Californian experience

Aranguren’s dissidence came to a head with his participation, alongside other professors and over 15,000 students, in the 1965 peaceful demonstration outside the vice-chancellor’s office. As a result of this participation, he was formally sanctioned and, six months later, deprived of his Chair at the Universidad de Madrid, as was also the case with Agustín García Calvo and Tierno Galván. This drove Aranguren to find work abroad, becoming a visiting professor in Sweden, Denmark, France, Italy, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and, finally, the United States, where he was eventually given a tenured position at the University of California. There, he settled down until he retired as emeritus professor in 1977. Thus, Aranguren adopted what Hermida del Llano labels as «exilio filosófico» or «exilio académico», with profound consequences (1997: 17, 20, 389; see also Caballero, 2012: 656-74). Aranguren, like Marcuse and the other members of the Frankfurt School, had a first-hand experience of the neo-capitalist system and consumerist patterns governing society in the United States. Nevertheless, like the members of the School, Aranguren maintained his identity,
instead of being absorbed by the new culture in which he was embedded. This experience and its contrast with the different economic and political circumstances of Spain—still under the Francoist dictatorship—had a decisive impact on Aranguren, who became a keen observer and critic of both socio-economic and political systems, as the changes in focus and tone of his works since his stay in the United States bear testimony to.

As regards Marcuse, he left the Bureau of Intelligence and returned to academic life, lecturing at Columbia (1952-1953) and Harvard (1954-1955), having received a Rockefeller Foundation grant to study Soviet Marxism, although during this period he also focused his interests and work on Freud. In 1958, Marcuse received a tenured position at Brandeis University where he stayed until 1965, when—as Kazt explains—his contract was allowed to lapse due to political considerations (1982: 169). Thus, not only was Marcuse initially threatened by the persecution of the Nazi regime which made exile necessary, but he also suffered the consequences of his overt political and philosophical positions in a country which boasted a climate of political and intellectual openness and freedom, the country which was offering him asylum. In
1965, Marcuse accepted a position at the University of California at San Diego, by which time he had already published his most popular and influential work: *One-Dimensional Man* (1964). It was during the 1960s when Marcuse became, if not the leader, the inspiration of the New Left, travelling extensively and giving lectures and advice to activist students. As Kellner explains, «Marcuse achieved world renown as ‘the guru of the New Left’» (2001a: 45). Incidentally, in May 1968, Marcuse was invited to Paris to take part in a symposium on Marx and was consequently present during the May events, participating in numerous debates and lectures. As result of his radical stand and political involvement, he was charged with accusations, such as politicizing university students and corrupting the minds of the young (see Katz, 1982: 171, 174).

It was at California University where Aranguren met and befriended Marcuse, who was also there at the time. This friendship would have a tremendous impact on Aranguren, who –according to his own testimony– considered Marcuse a close friend, and whom he would often describe with admiration as an example of an intellectual leader and as an example of a young spirit in an old body (see 1995, 3: 697; 1996, 5: 566). In fact, whilst discussing his
experience in the United States during an interview with Javier Muguerza, Aranguren named Marcuse as one of his two closest friendships during his time there –the other one was the well-known Spanish philologist and historian Américo Castro (Muguerza, 1997: 85). As Aranguren’s sons Felipe y Eduardo remember, Aranguren and Marcuse not only knew each other, but professed a mutual admiration for each other’s thought: «Allí [California] conoció y trató a Marcuse, de quien él, poco proclive a elogios, hablaba con admiración, al tiempo que sugería que se trataba de una admiración correspondida (‘venía a mis cursos de doctorado siempre que podía’, le hemos oído decir)» (López-Aranguren, 1997: 49). Hence, it is hardly coincidental that Aranguren’s very last lecture at the Universidad Complutense in 1980 was on Marcuse, serving as a testimony to the relevance he awarded to his thought.

Needless to say that during the 1960s, California was at the heart of counter-culture, whose most visible expressions were the protests against the Vietnam War, the hippie movement, and the New Left. These trends and events had a decisive impact on Aranguren, who reflected on them and became a fierce critic of American society:
Y por si todo esto [los problemas que conlleva la sociedad de consumo] no fuera bastante para dar pábulo a la crítica radical, [también están] el escándalo moral de la injusta y atroz guerra del Vietnam, el de la violencia establecida y ejercitada cotidianamente desde el poder, el del mantenimiento por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de toda clase de dictaduras y oligarquías, el del despilfarro para la destrucción, el del creciente militarismo e imperialismo (1996, 5: 168).

As Pastor indicates, as a result of this impact, Aranguren focused his attention on sociological issues, such as communication and political behaviour (2000: 674). In the United States, Aranguren had a first-hand experience of «la revuelta, o revolución según algunos, de la juventud universitaria norteamericana, que se había originado precisamente en California para extenderse luego por el resto de la nación e irradiar desde allí a Europa, es decir, Alemania, Italia y Francia [...]» (1994, 1: 85). In addition, Aranguren was also deeply influenced by Marcuse’s work. As Bonente puts it, «muchas de las tesis marcusianas de esta obra [El hombre unidimensional] están de fondo en las críticas que hace Aranguren –y que vamos a ir viendo– a la sociedad desmoralizada» (1989: 275). It is from this Californian experience onwards that Aranguren kept
Spanish readers up to date on the Frankfurt School, the New Left, and Marcuse’s moves in the series of articles for *La Vanguardia* (spring 1970 to January 1973), which were later collected and published in the aptly named collection of essays entitled *Entre España y América* (1974).

This book reflects the fact that during his stay in California, Aranguren never lost contact with Spain, where he would return yearly; moreover, he continued to have a significant intellectual presence there. In this way, he acted as a critic and cultural bridge between the two countries. Regarding Aranguren’s life in California, according to José Enrique Rodríguez Ibáñez, he became an integral part of the Spanish residents there (1997: 13-16). Nevertheless, as de Miguel indicates, Aranguren never adapted completely to the Californian way of life (1997: 28). It is precisely because of his geographical distance from Spain and because of not having been assimilated by North American culture, that Aranguren can observe both cultures from the outside and adopt a more critical stance. In fact, *Entre España y América* signalled another stage in Aranguren’s career, one that was marked by carrying out what he always considered to be the role of the intellectual, that is, being
a critic. José Luis Abellán, who also emphasizes the need to recover the role of the intellectual as the critic of society, praises Aranguren’s work in this area, describing him as «el crítico por excelencia de la etapa de transición» (1979: 93-94). Aranguren himself highlighted the influence that the work of the School has had on him and other thinkers in establishing the importance of the role of critique (1996, 4: 544). Thus, it is no coincidence that this was also the period when Aranguren devoted more attention to the work of the members of the Frankfurt School.

Aranguren, unlike Marcuse who chose to remain in the United States and visit Germany only occasionally, settled back in Spain after Franco’s death. In 1976, his chair at the Universidad Complutense was reinstated by the Suárez government as a result of the decree of general amnesty. There, he taught during the following three years until his retirement in 1979. After this point, he still published and often participated in conferences, interviews, debates, and made television appearances defending conciliatory positions and the virtues of democracy, becoming a recognizable public figure in the process. In conclusion, both Marcuse and Aranguren proved to be independent-minded and highly critical.
As a result they both enjoyed great popularity with students and like-minded intellectuals, but paid dearly personally and professionally. Nonetheless, Marcuse maintained his revolutionary attitude until his death in July 1979, as did Aranguren, who passed away in 1996.
4.3.5 Advocating for utopia

Aranguren described Marcuse’s position as half way between political and cultural radicalism, but, above all, as essentially utopian (1996, 5: 199). Aranguren was also interested in the possibilities of utopian thought and consequently dedicated a total of four articles to this topic: «Política y utopía» (1976), «Comentarios a un libro utópico» (1977), «Los reversos y la calderilla de la utopía» (1977), and «La función de un utópico Ministerio de la Cultura» (1977). In fact, Aranguren considered it essential for the intellectual to have a critical and a utopian attitude, which should go hand in hand. He summarized his views on this matter by saying that «La utopía es el ‘espíritu’ de toda política que no se conforma con ser mera política. La utopía española de 1976 es la democracia [...]» (1996, 5: 401). Aranguren –like Marcuse who also explores the feasibility of formerly utopian ideas– concludes that some formerly unattainable utopian possibilities, such as a democratic Spain, were no longer so (Aranguren, 1995, 3: 429). This critical

31 Although these articles were first published in El País, they were later compiled as part of La democracia establecida. Una crítica intelectual (1979) (see, respectively, 1996, 5: 399-401, 435-37, 438-40, 478-80).
and utopian attitude constitutes a combination of qualities which Aranguren described as vital for the moral thinker and the politician. Aranguren understands this combination in Marxist terms:

Hence, Aranguren highlighted the link that Classical Marxism establishes between politics and utopia; a link that neo-Marxism later continued to explore. What is more, as discussed in his article «Utopía y libertad», Aranguren valued the possibilities of utopia not only at a political level, but also at an individual one insofar as utopian vision was the first element that allowed the individual to become a better version of him/herself. Projection, imagination, and utopia are all, for Aranguren, at the root of any process of
evolution. What he does, in line with Critical Theory, is to empower the agent by linking his/her individual processes to those of the collective suggesting the relevance of his input.

Marcuse, in *Eros and Civilization* (1955), firmly believed that the material bases, that is, the technological advances to implement a socio-economic structure which may bring quality of life for everyone already existed at the time of his writings. He describes a society of free men and women who live in peace—although not necessarily without conflict. He suggests that the relationship between work and leisure would be inverted: the majority of the work would be carried out by machines, so that most of people’s time could be devoted to their self-development and only a small fraction to work. This is an idea he reiterates also in *Soviet Marxism* (1958) and in *An Essay on Liberation* (1969). Marcuse, however, realized that technological progress was not enough to bring about this qualitative change; as explained in «The End of Utopia», people would need to be freed, liberated. This liberation would come with negation, with a break with the existing structure, rather than with modifications which may result in its continuity. From his point of view, individuals tend to reproduce the
existing repressive structure, although human needs are historically determined and, thus, changeable. Thus, he advocated for a leap which can only be possible from a «fundamentally different experience of being» (1970b: 24). In An Essay on Liberation and Counterrevolution and Revolt, he concludes that awareness of our current situation as manipulated agents is the first step towards this idyllic society where there would be a qualitative difference in the social conditions, giving each individual the genuine opportunity to fulfil his/her potential (1969: 33, 37; 1972: 83-86).

Aranguren, on the other hand, seems to be less vague and utopian by placing his hopes on democracy. A closer look at Aranguren’s views of genuine democracy, however, brings him much closer to Marcuse. Aranguren proved to be very critical towards the existing democratic models, which he considered merely formal; at the same time, he strived for a fairer socio-economic structure which was essentially very similar to that propounded by Marcuse. Aranguren’s link to Marcuse, however, is stronger than the mere coincidence on abstract goals. As a result of their concern for social justice, they share the same preoccupation regarding the new challenges brought about by neo-capitalism, such
as the new forms of alienation, manipulation, consumerism, mass society, and its totalitarian manifestations. Thus, they both coincide on signalling the need for a revision of Classical Marxism, the inadequacy of the neo-capitalist system, the insufficiency of contemporary democratic practices, while emphasizing the need for utopian models.
4.4 Aranguren’s *ethos*

4.4.1 Religion

Religion is the common thread which runs throughout Aranguren’s work, providing it with cohesion. He exercised a profoundly religious attitude which is clearly reflected on his early writings in particular. In fact, echoing Ortega’s influence on Aranguren, Abellán sees in Aranguren’s work an attempt to complete Ortegan philosophy by linking it to Catholicism (1989: 256). In *Catolicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia* (1952), Aranguren argues that religion should be a major concern for anyone wanting to understand any given social structure because religion conditions our way of thinking (1994, 1: 242). This is also true of Aranguren’s own *talante religioso* or religious disposition, which not only made religion the focus of his earlier work, but it also coloured much of his later thought, including his approach to politics. But what exactly does religion mean for Aranguren? And what are the motives and intellectual consequences of his focus on religion?

Eugenio d’Ors also had a considerable influence on the
direction of Aranguren’s thought. As Gracia explains, what *La filosofía de Eugenio d’Ors* (1945) –Aranguren’s first published book– confirms is «esa conciencia de prolongación de un mismo mundo cultural y de imposibilidad de reanudar el camino *ex novo*» (1996: 16). This is crucial for developing Aranguren’s supradisciplinarity and his interest in German culture in particular. As Bretz explains, «Eugenio d’Ors labours to reconcile admiration for German cultural contributions with opposition to German militarism and at the same time, to establish a link between Latin and Germanic cultures» (Bretz, 2001: 126). This early interest in German culture can be observed in Aranguren’s effort to understand and build a bridge between Catholic and Protestant religions, and the impact of these beliefs on their attitudes and behaviours, and, ultimately, on their wider cultural frameworks. Nevertheless, when Aranguren writes about religion, he does so primordially in the context of Christianity: the analysis of different forms of Christianity –including Catholicism and Protestantism– and the contrast between Christianity and other non-religious attitudes towards life, such as Marxism. Evidence of this can be observed in *Catolicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia* (1952), *El*
protestantismo y la moral (1954)—which was originally his doctoral thesis—, Catolicismo, día tras día, (1955), and El marxismo como moral (1968).

Rather than directly answering the question of what religion is, Aranguren prefers to emphasize what religion is not. In an allusion to Marx, he states that religion is not a phenomenon that derives from «una superestructura de alienación, sino la muestra más alta de esa intencionalidad ante-predicativa» (1996, 5: 54). In Aranguren’s view, religion is an inherent pre-ontologic response to a human need. In El protestantismo y la moral (1954), he explains that religion is not the mere search for justice either, but a much more complex phenomenon, responding to the most inner needs of humankind (1994, 2: 45). His main concern is not its truth value, but what religion can do for us. He argues that each person has to face the very thorny task of searching for his perfection; the quest for virtue, as well as finding purpose or meaning to life, which, for him, is the reason why people need revelation, religion (see 1994, 2: 295, 326, 392, 586).

According to Aranguren, «el hombre está inserto en un orden que ni siquiera le es dado ver» (1994, 2: 295). By means of this
assertion, he is making an elusive reference to the supra-rational or supra-moral elements which he considers to be part of human existence, such as destiny and fortune, but also to the very nature of such an existence, that is, our own finitude and our necessary moral freedom. Although all of these circumstances and characteristics define the inherent co-ordinates according to which our existence develops, Aranguren’s point is that human beings are not, however, in a position to make sense of these co-ordinates. This results in an existential disorientation which, in his view, accounts for the need for religion to tell us about virtue and happiness. Thus, Aranguren does not deal with specific issues regarding religion, dogma, and the Church as an Institution—which only become important in as far as they fulfil their guiding role towards the individual; instead he reflects on the impact of religion on human experience and culture, as can be observed in his Catholicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia (1952). This conception of religion, instead of exploring spirituality or seeking a foundation in faith, approaches religion almost as a utilitarian commodity which is required to provide to satisfy people’s existential needs by providing an answer to the unanswerable and –in
his early thought— to provide a moral code.

Subordinating morality to religion involves several serious difficulties. A religious morality constitutes a heteronomous morality; its laws are placed outside the individual, thus, the individual is expected to follow a given moral code. This is to be done without questioning the suitability of such a code—which is unmodifiable—, thus limiting the individual’s moral choice to right or wrong, to go with or against the code. Aware of these shortcomings, as Aranguren’s thought evolves, so do his views on morality and on ethics. Thus, in Ética (1958), he opts for an autonomous morality where the individual has the freedom and responsibility of critically assessing the situation and making a moral choice based on his/her judgement. Although this may point to a Kantian morality, Aranguren’s opposition to individualistic ethical positions, particularly his concept of co-responsibility by which we are all co-responsible for each other’s decisions, suggests closer links to Heidegger than it does to Kant (see Aranguren, 1994, 2: 298; 1996, 5: 394; Bonete, 2003: 399-403)\(^{32}\). A rejection of the strong individualism developed during the Enlightenment is visible throughout his

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\(^{32}\) For an analysis of Aranguren’s relationship to Kant, see Cerezo’s «El giro kantiano en la Ética de J.L. Aranguren» (1997: 127-43).
ethics which, as Bonete explains, is based on: «la abertura del ethos personal al ethos social, [que] supone rechazar la separación drástica entre la dimensión personal y social de nuestros actos» [author’s italics] (2003: 399-400). That is why Aranguren understands existence in terms of co-habitation, suggesting a link to Heidegger’s Mitsein (see 1996, 5: 439).

Despite the continued, even guiding, presence of a religious element, Aranguren’s religious beliefs evolved as his thought grew more critical. As Gracia explains, «Aranguren había ido rebelándose desde el filo de los cincuenta contra el cristianismo saturado de embustes de sus jefes espirituales. Porque en muchos el cristianismo fue una convicción no sólo irrenunciable sino exigente razón antifranquista» (2004: 258-59, see also 361). Aranguren gradually evolved from a naive form of Catholicism, whose main concerns are religion, the Church, and the Christian world, to the engaged and comprehensive view of Christianity already expressed in Catolicismo día tras día (1955) (1994, 1: 453; see also Díaz, 1983: 65). His naivety consists in the initially moderately critical acceptance of the Catholic dogma—including its heteronomous morality—and the ways of the Church as observed
in *Catolicismo y protestantismo* (1952) and *Protestantismo y la moral* (1954). However, the involvement of the Catholic Church in politics clearly constituted a disappointment for Aranguren—as it did for Aguirre—(see Aranguren, 1995, 3: 221; 1996, 5: 317).

It progressively became clear to Aranguren that the Catholic Church did not sufficiently respond to the challenges posed by a society ruled by a totalitarian regime which, seeking empowerment and legitimation, aligned the Church to its political programme. Even the reforms undergone as a result of the Vatican Council (1962-1965) proved insufficient; it was not until 1973 that the Spanish bishops voted to publish a document entitled «La Iglesia y la comunidad política» where they committed themselves to political neutrality. Aranguren argued that if Catholics truly lived their faith they would then have to concern themselves with social justice (1994, 1: 676; 1995, 3: 220). In the face of this inconsistency, unwilling to let go of his faith, Aranguren opted for a politically independent and morally autonomous form of faith. His disillusionment had two effects; a personal one: he no longer felt part of the Catholic structure, so he preferred to define himself as Christian instead (see 1994, 1: 537)\(^3\); this prompted the re-orientation of

\(^{33}\) For a more detailed account of Aranguren’s religious evolution, see
his thought towards socio-political discussions, so that he could contribute towards the creation of an essentially fairer society, which would be more in line with his own faith:

Era menester que el cristianismo en cuanto tal, y concretamente el catolicismo, aceptasen el engagement mundano, fundado en una teología de las realidades terrenas, como se decía hace unos años, para que los cristianos, liberados de subrepticios compromisos, cobrasen conciencia de su responsabilidad social (1995, 3: 220).

Consequently, social justice became one of his priorities precisely because of his religious commitment; in pursuing the practical implications of his faith, religion became inextricably linked to ethics and politics.

Thus, the evolution of Aranguren’s views on religion has an impact on his views on morality. He grow out of his scepticism regarding the reliability of autonomous morality, not only pointing out its feasibility, but also promoting tolerance and dialogue between heteronomous and autonomous forms of morality, such as

Religious, Marxist, and neo-Marxist morality. He was able to do so because he understands «moral como autonarración e interpretación del ‘texto vivo’ en que consistimos» (1994, 2: 165). Echoing Ortega’s ratiovitalism, a vitalist rationality which retains the role of reason, Aranguren views life as the unfolding and realization of a personal project. During this unfolding, the individual’s ethos, is formed in the process of confrontation with reality and the appropriation of some of the possibilities displayed before us. Following Xabier Zubiri, from whom Aranguren borrows the concept of appropriation, Aranguren considers that each person is put in the situation of deciding what «his/her» good is, of realizing it in the world, and personally making it his/her own, apropiándoselo:

mi realidad natural es mi propia realidad, en tanto que recibida;  
mi realidad moral es mi propia realidad, en tanto que apropiada.  

Thus, Aranguren’s attempt to confer meaning to individual existence involves the realization that in carrying out one act or another, the individual is appropriating one possibility of being. It is by
means of these acts, by appropriation, that his deep moral reality is created.

In spite of Aranguren’s recognition and acceptance of heteronomous morality, there is unwillingness to relinquish the central role of religion. Even at a late point in his career, there is evidence of a certain resistance to accepting his growing non-religious outlook on life. This can be observed in *Bajo el signo de la juventud* (1982), where a ubiquitous spirituality is also maintained by assuming that religion is not only inherent, but also inescapable (see Aranguren, 1996, 5: 610). For Aranguren, religion can be considered inescapable in the sense that it is ever-present, if not directly in our personal experience, in society at large. Even more importantly, religion is inescapable from the point of view of rationality because, for Aranguren, it can be the best –most fulfilling and least risky– rational choice available. This is to be understood in reference to Blaise Pascal’s theological wager. As it will be recalled, Pascal reasons that there is no rational way to positively find out whether God exists or not. Thus, we are left with two options: first, we may choose to believe that God does not exist, in which case, if we are right and there is no God, death will effectively be
the end of everything or, if we are wrong and after having lived a godless life we discover that there is, indeed, a God, it will be our loss; second, we may choose to believe there is a God, in which case, if in death we are proved wrong, at least we would have enjoyed the comfort of faith during life or, if, on the other hand, we are right, we can only benefit from having lived a life guided by this God. Thus, we can only win by wagering on God’s existence, because wagering against it does not result in any gain, even if we happen to win our wager. It is significant that Pascal uses the term pari, wager, in place of «choice», thus effectively emphasising the uncertain nature of such decisions. With this reasoning, Pascal avoids supporting his belief in God on arbitrary foundations. Instead, faith becomes the result of a rational choice.

There are strong resonances of Pascal’s practicality in Aranguren’s faith and, in fact, numerous references to Pascal throughout his work\(^{34}\). The influence of Pascal in Aranguren is such that Blázquez says in reference to Aranguren’s prologue to Pascal’s works that «de manera rigurosa, certera y precisa, se instala en el

orbe de la filosofía del autor de Pensamientos sobre los problemas últimos» (1997a, 6: 12). Aranguren himself explains the nature of Pascal’s wager and wonders:

¿hay una falacia en el tránsito del apostar al creer, o se trata más bien de que el interlocutor se da cuenta de que esta ‘apuesta’ o compromiso total de la existencia no puede reposar sino sobre una creencia, y envuelve, por tanto, un acto de fe? (1997, 6: 611).

As regards this question, he concludes that both interpretations are possible; however, given Aranguren’s religious nature, his inclination is to interpret the wager as an act of faith in itself, thus aligning himself with Pascal.

This has far-reaching epistemological consequences. For Aranguren, as in the case of Aguirre, in the face of the impossibility of proving or disproving God’s existence, the belief in it is as much an act of faith as atheism is. Taking it a step further, even atheism can be labelled as a religion. As Mircea Eliade explains, there is a multitude of definitions that try to encompass the nature of religion; the main reason for this is the complexity and diversity of the phenomenon itself as well as the influence of the background of
those attempting to provide such definition (1987: 282). Bearing in mind the intricate nature of this term, one of the possible ways to understand religion is in relation to its social, economic, historical, and cultural context, which may provide a motivation for religious practices which –Eliade argues– may not necessarily be linked to spirituality. This approach suggests that the analysis of the manifestations of the religious structures, such as beliefs, customs, and rituals, accounts for religion itself. If religion is «profesión y observancia de la doctrina religiosa», as one of the definitions found in the Diccionario de la Real Academia Española (DRAE) suggests, the spiritual element is, then, not mandatory. In fact, from this perspective, Marxism itself –it has been claimed– has a religious quality, with its own rites and ideology (see Cristi, 2001: 145). Hence, on the grounds of this understanding of religion, it can be contended that those who do not believe in God or in the transcendental nature of existence choosing to take a purely positivist approach not only towards science, but towards life itself, are doing so as followers of a particular religion: a religion whose doctrine is scepticism and whose dogma is the scientific method. As Pierre Bourdieu argues, «scientific thought has no foundation other than the
collective belief in its foundations that the very functioning of the scientific field produces and presupposes» (1991: 8). The key to understanding the religious nature of this position is the word «belief», which reinforces the idea that there is no possibility of certainty and that science becomes irrelevant in this area. In the end, both perspectives require a leap of faith. This is precisely the key to Aranguren’s epistemological underpinning.

Although, from a personal point of view, Aranguren is far from denying the existence of a supreme being and the spiritual experience itself, rather than focusing on the individual personal dimension of religion, he analyses religion as a social phenomenon. This explains why Aranguren interprets people’s religious attitudes as a reaction to their personal needs –Unamuno’s attitude– rather than as any kind of transcendental communion (see 1996, 4: 532). This also applies to those who choose to believe in the non-existence of God, since it can be argued that they do so in an effort to maintain cognitive consistency, that is, the psychological effort to make their perceptions match up with their beliefs. Thus, in El marxismo como moral (1968), Aranguren concludes that Marx places the same wager as Pascal, only he does it in the
opposite direction; given the unavailability of conclusive evidence and the inadequacy of reason to solve the question of the existence of God, Marx chooses to wager on its non-existence (1995, 3: 222).

This position—although rational— is not without problems, for there is no shortage of plausible arguments against God’s existence. A comprehensive account of counter-arguments to the main classical theistic arguments is provided by Richard Gale in «The Failure of Classical Theistic Arguments» (2007: 86-101). Particularly relevant to this discussion is the cosmological argument, which is based on the principle that every fact can be explained only «in terms of the causal efficacy of a necessarily existent God-like being», that is to say, identifying God as the ultimate cause (Gale, 2007: 90). Gale succinctly explains that the difficulty with this argument is that accepting it «would be arguing that it is epistemically rational to believe a proposition \( p \) because it is pragmatically rational to believe some proposition \( q \), from which \( p \) follows or which is needed for the deduction of \( p \)» (2007: 90). In other words, believing in something because it provides a convenient explanation is not evidence of is truthfulness. Whereas
this is precisely Pascal’s and Aranguren’s argument for believing in God, at no point do they use this reasoning to argue the truth of God’s existence. In contrast with these arguments, what makes Aranguren’s approach valuable is that it does not constitute an attempt to prove God’s existence. As he puts it, «la creencia en la existencia de Dios es razonable: esto es lo más que hoy se puede decir» (1994, 1: 768). What Aranguren argues is that this is a question which is beyond human capacity. Aranguren finds himself in the same quandary as Unamuno, for as Amando de Miguel points out, «con el de Salamanca, Aranguren mantiene muchos puntos de contacto, como el gusto por la paradoja, el placer de la etimología o la angustia religiosa» (1997: 25). Unamuno realizes that reason alone cannot provide proof of God’s existence, but neither can it deny it; thus, as Abellán explains in his Miguel de Unamuno a la luz de la psicología (1964), Unamuno ultimately concludes that reason must be transcended and justifies God’s existence on the grounds of his own need for it. However, unlike Unamuno, Aranguren does not resolve to transcend reason. Instead, he focuses on the impact that faith—or lack thereof—may have on the subject and makes what he considers to be the best available rational choice.
Here it is also possible to trace d’Ors’s influence. In an effort to move on from the French rationalist tradition and unlike Ortega, who deposits many of his hopes on the possibilities of rationality and science, d’Ors highlights the impossibility of solely rationalist explanations to successfully and satisfactorily account for the complexities of life and the human experience. As Bretz indicates, «defining life as movement and flux, d’Ors argues that no figure, formula, or rational conceptualization fully comprehends its complexity and dynamism» (2001: 127). D’Ors rejects all-encompassing rationalist explanations in favour of an open-ended dialectic approach; relying on Nietzschean philosophy, he defends the significance of dynamic oppositions, at the same time as he envisages irony as the bridge between Germanic and Mediterranean cultures (see Bretz, 2001: 128). It is from this rejection of rationalism that Aranguren develops his own Critical Theory by unmasking the reductionist and destructive content of formulaic solutions and highlighting the value of contradiction. Instead of irony, Aranguren –and also Aguirre– wagers for faith not only to bridge the cultural gap, but, more importantly, as the cohesive ingredient for his utopian socio-personal project.
Religion, for Aranguren, has a crucial social dimension and it is, therefore, inherently linked to morals, politics, and ethics. The socio-political dimension of religion is key to understanding his underlying motivation, a motivation which he shared with Marcuse: social justice. This becomes even more apparent with the advent of democracy in 1978 and the subsequent rapid transformation of values in Spanish society. These events are viewed by Aranguren as an opportunity to give a practical dimension to his work; echoing Zubiri, Aranguren appropriates the *oficio del intelectual*, a task which he performed, not because he had left his religious stage behind, but rather, because of and from his *talante religioso*. 
4.4.2 Talante

Aranguren first developed his concept of talante in El buen talante, as a foretaste to Catolicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia (1952), although it was not published as an article in its own right until 1985 (1994, 2: 619).

Aranguren describes talante as a spontaneous and pre-rational disposition, closely related to our estado de ánimo or mood, terms which, in fact, he often uses interchangeably. For him, our personality springs from our individual talante; each person possesses a fundamental talante from which all different moods and preferences emerge. In fact, for Aranguren, each person searches for the religion or, even, political ideas that best match his/her talante. This is so because perception is modified by talante, thus «la realidad se nos aparece, así, como un reflejo del talante» (Aranguren, 1994, 2: 621). Each talante conditions the individual to perceive a different aspect of any given reality. Similarly, each act requires the right talante. This view of talante closely echoes Ortega’s perspectivism, which emphasizes the inextricable link between philosophy and biography, questioning
our ability to perceive reality as a whole, concluding that individuals can only ever perceive reality from a specific perspective. Therefore, for Ortega, the process of discovering truth is necessarily the process of reconstructing the number of fragments, -perspectives- available to us (see Ortega, 1946, 2: 18-19; 1946, 3: 199-201). Influenced by Ortega, Aranguren encapsulates his conceptualization of talante as follows:

pero acaso la fórmula que más libremente de presupuestos éticos resuma lo que aquí queremos decir sea aquella del poeta, según la cual ‘todo es según el color del cristal con que se mira’. El cristal es nuestra alma, y su cambiante color, el estado en que ella se encuentra, su talante (1994, 2: 624).

This point of view leads to two potentially dangerous directions: the relativistic and deterministic cul-de-sacs. Aranguren tackles both of them. Aranguren is well aware of the immediate relativistic implications of suggesting that different perceptions of the same reality may be acceptable. In order to avoid the relativistic trap, Aranguren specifies that although there is no one talante that can be deemed best to gain knowledge, there is still a
hierarchy relating the different anaemic dispositions. Hope, trust, faith, and peace are situated at the top of the ladder, conforming what he describes as *buen talante* (see 1994, 2: 634). It is from this understanding of *buen talante* that Aranguren develops what Soldevilla describes as a

> teoría de la acción [...] preocupada por dilucidar las condiciones de posibilidad éticas, sociales y políticas, de un actor que, en momentos de crisis, cuando los sentidos y valores socioculturales son severamente cuestionados, sólo cuenta con criterios propios para fundamentar su acción (see 2004: 130-41).

Thus, for Aranguren, *talante* affects the realm of ethics and consequently, also the realm of action.

This concept of *talante* may seem to imply the deterministic suggestion that we are bound by it to access only a certain aspect of reality. A closer look, however, will prove that this is not necessarily the case, for Aranguren clarifies that a certain *talante* can be induced or fomented by a number of means, thus leaving room for free will and personal choices (see 1994, 2: 70-71, 621-26). Amongst the factors which can have an impact on talante,
Aranguren points to physical factors or more subtle methods, such as poetry, music, rhetoric, philosophy, and, of course, religion. He even suggests that religion influences *talante* more than culture does and urges the reader to remember that religion is culture, although not only culture. Equally, some strong emotions, such as hatred, envy, or fear, can taint our *talante* when their intensity is such that they take control of our being. *Talante*, therefore, is not a permanent disposition; it can be influenced and modified by circumstances and decisions. Personal as well as intellectual evolution takes place in a spiral trajectory: our inclinations and decisions are influenced by our *talante*, but in turn, our *talante* is also influenced by the result of such decisions, which ultimately affects our following decisions in a progressive spiral movement that lasts for as long as we live. Hence, the concepts of freedom and choice are at the very core of Aranguren’s thought. That is why, in *Ética* (1958), he argues that freedom cannot be granted by any political regime, because, first, it must be a personal attitude, a virtue (1994, 2: 459). Freedom cannot be given; it can only be exercised by the appropriation of choices.

*Talante* is then a pre-moral disposition, and it is only by
conscious decision-taking and the voluntary acquisition of habits that a moral ethos is developed. Nevertheless, the intellectual consequences of this seemingly tangential development of the theory of talante are deep. What this means is that Aranguren grants subjectivity a privileged position on his work, since according to him, subjectivity or, to adopt his terminology, talante, is at the very foundation of every discourse. Accepting the subjective implications of talante has significant consequences for Aranguren’s ethics. Vitalist postulates, such as Aranguren’s, which are deeply rooted in Ortega’s thought, must necessarily reject general or abstract mandates for, as Ortega puts it, «¿no es sospechosa una ética que al dictar sus normas se olvida de cómo es en su íntegra condición el objeto cuya perfección pretende definir e imperar?» (1946, 3: 101). It is in this sense that Aranguren is not a Kantian, for the categorical imperative which states: «act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law» is too general and, therefore, insufficient for Aranguren’s ethics (Kant, 1995: 30). This is also one of the reasons which moved Aranguren to discard his heteronomous morality in favour of an autonomous one.
The reach of the implications of talante, however, does not stop at ethics. *Talante* also hints at an epistemology which, instead of being based upon an alleged objectivity, is flexible enough to reflect the nature and limitations of the researcher, including his subjectivity. Thus, Aranguren rejects any reductionist approach which rests on logic alone, such as scholastic and dialectic thought (see 1994, 1: 224; 1994, 2: 628). Hence, Aranguren shares with Critical Theory its concern with an excessive reliance on objectivity and its reclamation of other forms of knowledge.
4.5 Aranguren’s relationship to politics

Although his role and impact on the process of Transition is widely recognised, research on Aranguren’s interest in politics is limited. Although Victoria Camps, Carlos Soldevilla, Hermida del Llano, and Elías Díaz in particular delve into this aspect of Aranguren’s thought, more research in this area is still needed. This section aims to elucidate the political dimension of Aranguren’s work and its relationship to Critical Theory.

During the 1940s, most of the essays and articles published in Spain were regime-legitimating ones, as Gracia explains: «el intelectual vencido que permaneció en el interior calló a la fuerza o se resignó al Nuevo orden seleccionando sus asuntos desde la inocuidad aparente o real» (1996: 10). This is also the case with Aranguren who, in Catolicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia (1952), says:

me ocupé de religión, no porque no se permitía hablar con la más mínima libertad de política, sino porque, al revés, la política nunca

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me ha importado, de verdad, sino desde el punto de vista ético, y que los temas últimamente capitales para mí son los sociales y morales, los culturales en general, los religiosos en particular, y muy poco los estrictamente –estrechamente– políticos. A cada uno lo suyo, y lo mío, ciertamente, felizmente también, no es la política (1994, 1: 213).

This statement, however, must be understood within its socio-political context and should not be taken as representative of Aranguren’s thought. Gracia argues that the gap between the regime’s discourse and what many of its initial supporters expected from the regime on the one hand, and the reality the regime actually delivered on the other, was steadily growing; the worst enemy of the regime was reality itself (1996: 10-12).

In the 1950s a new opposition culture –its democratic colours somewhat muted– emerged from within the ranks of the privileged, for –as Díaz, indicates– the sons and daughters of prominent Nationalist families turned their backs on a would-be totalitarian regime which they found politically appalling and culturally false, in the sense that it represented a negation of ethical, humanist civic values (1995: 284). Disillusioned by the regime, this was the journey taken during the late 1950s and 1960s by some prominent
intellectuals, ideologues, propagandists, and supporters of the regime such José María Castellet, Pedro Laín Entralgo, Enrique Tierno Galván, José Antonio Maravall, Dionisio Ridruejo, Luis Rosales, Torrente Ballester, Antonio Tovar, and also Aranguren. It is for this reason that, although it is true that Aranguren is often associated with Catholicism and the regime’s hegemonic efforts, this association only echoes a very early time in his career; upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that Aranguren’s personal trajectory went from his somewhat sheltered early years, resulting in a naive outlook, to the discovery of the distance between the regime’s discourse and its practice, which led to his subsequent active dissidence. Moreover, the disillusionment involved in this process and the caution learnt may have been key factors in pushing Aranguren’s thought towards highly critical directions, searching for radically different alternatives. As Díaz argues, «Francoism, precisely because of its stultifying cultural and political dogmatism, sharpened the critical edge of new, emergent currents of thought and generated significant cultural and political forms of resistance among writers, poets, philosophers, and

36 For a study of political dissidence among writers in the post-war era, see Jordan, 1990 and Gracia, 2004.
Consequently, Aranguren’s initial position regarding politics is in clear contrast with his views as published in *Ética y política* (1963):

> el hombre es constitutivamente político y lo único que consigue con la abstención es continuar siéndolo, sólo que deficientemente. En realidad el hombre apolítico, a su pesar, opera políticamente: bien “dejando hacer”, bien desde fuera, en un grupo de presión, sin asumir responsabilidad política (1995, 3: 72).

Further on in the same publication, Aranguren continues to make his point by emphasizing that «lo político, como lo moral, constituyen una *estructura*, que es previa a que el hombre, cada hombre, se decida a comportarse moral o políticamente» (1995, 3: 124). Upon this realization, politics necessarily became a continuous focus in his subsequent work. In fact, from this point onwards he considered the separation between the private and political spheres as unsustainable. This appears to contrasts with Aranguren’s later comments in *Memorias y esperanzas españolas* (1969b), where he retrospectively reflects upon his own
Aranguren’s relationship with politics:

en el contexto de la época [los años cuarenta], la presión de una censura agobiante, hacía imposible asumir una ‘política’ también en sentido amplio, pues nunca he tenido, ni tengo, vocación político-profesional, ni tampoco mucha fe en la militancia –más o menos clandestina– en los partidos de la oposición, y mi crítica del sistema es intelectual, moral y sociológica (1997, 6: 197).

Although it is true that –partly due to a lack of personal inclination and partly due to the pressures of the regime– Aranguren did not actively engage in politics during his early career, this statement seems to underplay his post-1963 relationship with politics; that is, his engagement with the Christian-Marxist debate during the late 1960s and his deliberate critique of politics during the Transition. The reason for this can be found in Aranguren’s keenness to establish the difference between his intellectual engagement and party politics, so as to emphasize his distance from the latter. He stresses this distinction between party politics and politics as an intellectual pursue further on in Memorias y esperanzas españo-las:
[me interesa mucho la política] como engagement de convivencia, fundado en una moral social, ninguna otra cosa de tejas abajo me importa más que la política [...]. Y no me interesa nada la política como afán de participación en el apartado de poder a través de sus dispositivos. Dispositivos que, sin embargo, me entretiene analizar, como viejos, toscos artefactos totalmente inadecuados a nuestro tiempo... y que, extrañamente, siguen funcionando aunque, a mi juicio, no para bien (1997, 6: 229).

During the 1970s –the period when he most actively engaged with the thought of the School–, Aranguren’s interest and engagement with politics grew to the point that he considered that he had been dealing with nothing but politics all along (1979: n.p.). Whereas Aranguren did not affiliate himself to any political party, with the Transition and the following advent of democracy, he considered that one of the main aims of his critical approach was precisely to have an impact on the political realm, so as to effectively crystallize Critical Theory’s transformative aspirations. His theoretical contributions were designed to have a practical effect on himself as a writer, but also on his readers, awakening the individual to become a critical, participative, and creative member of society. In Aranguren’s own words, «la lección de mayo del 68
es la de la profundidad del cambio y, consiguientemente, la de la necesidad de un trabajo lento y asimismo en profundidad, para su logro cultural» (1996, 5: 507). Along with many Spaniards, he considered that the Transition was a period of change, renovation, and hope, when longed-for utopias had an actual chance of realization. This is, for Aranguren, a period which necessarily demands the political engagement, not only of intellectuals and politicians, but of the population at large, because only then—aided by a progressive programme of political education—can a true transformative process take place in the form of an emancipated democratic society. Such high hopes became, of course, doomed by the limitations of reality and its agents, giving way to a generalized feeling of disillusionment which is referred to as *desencanto*. Even then, Aranguren considered more crucial than ever his self-appointed task of the intellectual; becoming a socio-political, cultural and, even, moral critic, that is, effectively functioning as the conscience and voice of society. His most radical refusal in this context was his refusal to adopt the pessimistic immobility often associated with the Frankfurt School. Hence, much of his later work was dedicated to bring about this change; his theoretical work was also his *praxis,*
his *moral vivida*, his resistance. His hope was that his critical stand would have an impact in the political, but also moral decisions of his contemporaries. His relevance lies in that, as Lannon explains, «in these circumstances, any major shift of religious sensibility, any severe questioning of intellectual presuppositions, was likely to modify the vocabulary and tone of political discussion, and ultimately to affect political values and expectations» (1987: 243).

For the rest of this career, politics became for Aranguren a moral obligation and as such a prerequisite for the democratic process. Depoliticization, as he argues in *La comunicación humana* (1965), rather than the refusal to immerse oneself in politics, constitutes the conformist acceptance of the established regime (1996, 5: 113). What is more, for Aranguren, politics—democratic politics in particular—could not be compartmentalized, for this relationship between politics and morality involves the understanding of the individual as a political entity. In *La democracia establecida* (1979b), Aranguren succinctly summarized his position: «creo en el compromiso político total y eso, y no otra cosa, es lo que entiendo por democracia como moral, democracia como modo de ser» (1996, 5: 530).
Nevertheless, Aranguren, like Aguirre, in line with Marcuse and the rest of the members of the School, while a supporter of political dissidence, critique, activism, and reform, eluded providing practical details of the specific organization of his political project and refrained from suggesting any specific political or pedagogical reform or programme. Whereas this vagueness is sometimes interpreted as a lack of commitment or consistency in Critical Theory, it is, in fact, the direct result of their theoretical framework; the role of heterodox and autonomic ethics as well as the necessary separation between the critic and the politician would make it inappropriate and counter-productive for Aranguren—or any Critical Theorist as understood by the Frankfurt School—to develop such a normative programme because it would be necessarily limiting.

Even so, whereas Critical Theory is often regarded as a negative philosophy, Aranguren placed Critical Theory in Spain in the context of positive action. Aranguren’s faith in the democratic process is, in fact, in stark contrast with Marcuse’s Great Refusal, that is, the refusal to engage in liberal democratic politics based on the idea that qualitative change could not be accomplished from that
framework. The members of the School and Marcuse, in particular, were decidedly pessimistic regarding the possibility that Critical Theory could affect a positive change in society. As Marcuse himself put it at the end of *One-Dimensional Man*: «the critical theory of society possesses no concepts which could bridge the gap between the present and its future, holding no promise and showing no success, it remains negative» (1964: 257). In contrast, although Aranguren was vague at times regarding who the agents of social change should be, he concluded that the key elements of that change should be a social morality, social action, and the recuperation of the value of resistance (1994, 2: 598, 667; 1996, 5: 226-27). It is the emphasis placed on these elements which suggests that, for Aranguren, is ultimately the individual who is responsible for striving for this qualitative change. Despite this divergence, in 1979, while looking in hindsight at the accomplishments of the New Left, Marcuse also exhibited a hopeful and proactive attitude towards the possibility of bringing out «a leap to a qualitatively new level of civilization where human beings can develop their own needs and potential in solidarity with one another» (1979: 8). Thus, Aranguren’s faith in the transformative possibilities of
utopian thought and, ultimately, the human being, are not so far apart from Marcuse’s. The vagueness of both Marcuse and Aranguren lies in that no specific group is appointed as the agent of change, because this agent is society itself; the power of liberation is understood to be within each individual member of society (see Aranguren, 1994, 2: 459; Marcuse, 1970b: 69, 71; Marcuse, 2005: 78).
4.6 Speaking about the unspeakable: the Christian and Marxist dialogue

4.6.1 Marxism in Spain

Marxism was first introduced into Spain at the end of 1871 by Marx’s son-in-law, Paul Lafargue. The Partido Comunista de España (PCE) was founded in 1921 as a splinter group of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), as a result of the PSOE’s rejection of the Third International. Thus, the PCE’s birth reflected the serious fragmentation of the Spanish left which later contributed to its defeat in the Civil War. Many landless peasants –mostly in the south of Spain– welcomed Revolutionary ideas, particularly those of a Marxist or Anarchist nature. Its impact was such that, during the 1920s 1930s, the rise of Communism on the hand and of the anti-communist and Fascist responses on the other constituted one of the pivotal factors which led to the Spanish Civil War. This tension, however, acquired an international relevance. Europe was engaged in a campaign against Communism, while also being cautious towards the advances of Fascism. Thus, as Enrique Moradiellos concludes, «it was no coincidence that for
almost three years Spain became the bloody setting of a miniature and small-scale European civil war, a forewarning of the war that would break out in September 1939» (2002: 96).

Although the *Communist Manifesto* was translated into Spanish in 1872 and the first volume of *Das Kapital* was translated in 1935, as a result of the Civil War and the Francoist victory, subsequent translations of this nature would only take place in exile during the following years. In fact, as Abellán explains, the rest of the volumes of *Das Kapital* were translated in Mexico during the years 1945-46 (1998: 239).

With the end of the Civil War, many Republicans chose exile. This is the case of Luis Araquistán, a revolutionary Socialist, and of various thinkers of Marxist inclinations such as Julián Beistero, Vicente Uribe, Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, Fernando Claudín, David García Bacca, Sánchez Barbudo, and Juan Rejano. Those who remained in Spain witnessed the heavy-handed repression of the regime. Communism was demonized. Consequently, as Díaz explains,

> durante muchos años no se publica, por lo que yo conozco, ningún libro español sobre filosofía marxista [...] en aquellos tiempos
lo que se escribe sobre este tema posee, por lo general, un carácter fundamentalmente propagandístico, inspirado más por el deseo de la refutación (religiosa o política) que por el de una comprensión científica o filosófica (1983: 101).

There were, however, several intellectual and political circumstances which led to the renewed interest in Marxism that took place in Spain during the 1960s.

In spite of the lack of publications on Marxism from the end of the Spanish Civil War until the 1960s, Marxism was far from being forgotten. In fact, Marxism and Marxists became the embodiment of almost all evil, the enemy, in the eyes of the regime. Rejecting Freemasonry and Communism became part of the regime’s ideological creed. This attitude was further encouraged by the events that would come about with the end of the Second World War. The Cold War reduced to a great extent the political debate to the dichotomy of capitalism as opposed to Communism, hence actively contributing to the already existing demonization of Marxism in Spain. This attitude was later reinforced with the Pact of Madrid (1953); an agreement reached with the United States, which allowed it to establish military bases in Spanish territory in exchange for some economic support.
In 1959, the Economic Stabilization Plan marked the death of autarky and the creation of a market economy with the introduction of Spain into the international economy. This was designed to encourage foreign investment, industrialization, and economic growth. As Adrian Shubert indicates, «industrialization brought a rising standard of living and with it new levels of consumption. Average income jumped from $290 (US) in 1955 to $497 in 1965 and $2,486 in 1975» (1990: 258). Spain rapidly adopted a capitalist economy. Spaniards experienced a growing spending power, visible in their adoption of a consumerist behaviour which materialized in the purchase of non-essential commodities, such as the acquisition of televisions or cars. The economic boom, however, had some hidden costs:

the rapid economic growth of 1962-9 is undeniable, but so too is the less palatable reality that underlay the bonanza: the structural weakness of the Spanish economy; the high social cost of the boom, disproportionately paid for by the poorest; and the lack of freedom (except for capital), which seriously impaired the quality of life (Díaz, 1995: 286).

These circumstances gave raise to anti-American and anti-capitalist
sentiments, and attracted some degree of sympathy towards Communism.

During the 1960s, and largely as a consequence of the economic boom of this decade, there was a substantial increase in the number of students in higher education, which also increased dissent. As Martin de Riquer i Permanyer explains, «this increasingly critical attitude was based on two fundamental principles: better information about world affairs and the decline of traditional religious values» (1995: 266). As a result, this post-war generation, which did not suffer repression in the same way as their parents may have done, hungry for political participation and freedom, became an important source of opposition against the regime and many of them found Marxism attractive.

In addition, Marxist works by some Spanish exiles were slowly being filtered into Spain. A number of journals of Marxist tendencies were published in exile during the early 1960s and found some –limited– distribution in Spain. This was the case of Realidad (Rome 1963, associated to the PCE), Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico, and Mañana. Tribuna Democrática Española (París, 1963). Well-known Spanish intellectuals, such as Jorge Semprún, Manuel
Sacristán, and Fernando Claudín, can be found amongst the editors and contributors. A similar interest in Marxism was also awakened amongst the Spanish exiles living in Latin America, as can be observed in the work of Wenceslao Roces, José Gaos, and Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez. What is even more relevant is that, as Abellán argues, their views –far from being dogmatic or orthodox– reflect a need for the renewal of Marxism (1998: 238-40).

In Spain, in 1954 Enrique Tierno Galván founded the Boletín del seminario de derecho político de Salamanca, which boasted an array of Marxists and Socialist contributors, such as Raúl Morodo, Elías Díaz, Fernando Morán, Ignacio Sotelo, and Iris Zavala. Thus, interest in Marxism within Spain grew and gradually stepped outside clandestinity. As Gracia explains:

> los primeros análisis marxistas de alguna solvencia se harían con la conciencia de extirpar el disfraz retórico y apuntar a diagnósticos precisos, de aires –todavía– vagamente regeneracionistas. Y me refiero a los que pueden aparecer en el Boletín de Tierno, en la misma Praxis de Aumente o a los que figuran en las páginas más interesantes de Índice en torno a 1960 (1996: 31).
Praxis (1960-1961), although short-lived, also contributed to the Marxist debate in Spain. However, it was not until 1961 that the first serious book on Marxism since the end of the Spanish Civil War was published: Introducción al pensamiento marxista. This was a collective work which published the outcome of a series of public lectures held at the Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (from 17 October to 6 December 1958) and imparted by Carlos París, Carlos Alonso del Real, Pedro Lucas Verdú, José Lois Estévez, Carlos Eduardo Bastos de Soveral, Luis Legas y Lacambra, and José Guerra Campos. This publication opened an intense debate, by voicing informed views on a subject which could no longer be disregarded. The importance of the revival of the Marxist debate was such that it is qualified by Díaz as the newest and most characteristic occurrence of this decade (1983: 143). In the same year, 1961, Aranguren directed an international seminar in Madrid on Nationalism and Marxism, also becoming one of the first Spanish authors to publicly discuss the influences of Marxist thought.

Valuable Marxist analyses were also provided within Spain by Manuel Ballestero, Gustavo Bueno, Manuel Azcárate, and Carlos Castilla del Pino. In Marx o la crítica como fundamento (1967),
Manuel Ballestero explored Marxism’s relation to existentialism. He also analysed on the concept of freedom in relation to three key authors, namely, Nicolas de Cusa, Martin Luther, and Karl Marx, in *La revolución del espíritu: Tres pensamientos de libertad* (1970). During the decade of 1960s, Gustavo Bueno’s publications were sparse, but during the next decade, he became more prolific, focusing on Marxism, on philosophical materialism in particular. Some of his most relevant publications during this decade include: *Ensayos materialistas* (1972), «El materialismo histórico de Gramsci como teoría del Espíritu objetivo» (1973a), «Sobre el significado de los Grundrisse en la interpretación del marxismo» (1973b), «Los Grundrisse de Marx y la Filosofía del Espíritu objetivo de Hegel» (1974), «La filosofía del futuro es solidaria del socialismo (entrevista a Gustavo Bueno)» (1975), «Cuestiones sobre teoría y praxis» (1977), «Determinismo cultural y materialismo histórico» (1978a), and «Las fuerzas del trabajo y las fuerzas de la cultura» (1978b). Finally, Carlos Castilla del Pino relates Marxist principles to psychiatric and psychoanalytic practice in *Fundamentos de antropología dialéctica* (1969a) and *Psicoanálisis y marxismo* (1969b). He highlights, in particular, the relevance and impact
of the socio-economic context of the patient in the development and cure of different pathologies. Incidentally, Castilla del Pino provides the prologue for Marcuse’s *Psicoanálisis y política*, entitled «La inflexión del pensamiento de Marcuse en la antropología freudiana» (1969c). Marxist ideas were also visible in the arts; this is the case of the poets Gabriel Celaya and Blas de Otero, and the film director Juan Antonio Bardem. There were also several Marxist activists, such as Simón Sánchez Montero, Julián Ariza, Marcelino Camacho, and Nicolás Sartorius, who during the 1960s engaged in the political debate in *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*. They championed workers rights during Francoism and continued to represent their interests during the Transition.

Despite all efforts to suppress interest in Marxism, the Christian-Marxist dialogue acquired a very public and popular dimension during the 1960s. In fact, the Marxist-Christian dialogue became a central feature of the Spanish socio-political debate during this time. The publications of Pope John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council, as Lannon argues, opened «the way to Christian-Marxist dialogue by clearly distinguishing between ‘false philosophical teachings’ and the ‘historical movements
that have economic, social, cultural or political ends’ that they inspired» (1987: 248). These factors led to an increased interest in Marxist ideas in Spain and to the realization of the need for its acknowledgment and discussion. It was certainly no longer possible to ignore the presence of Marxists in Spanish society; during the 1960s even their condemnation required dialogue and engagement, as argued Aranguren and Aguirre themselves. In fact, as Herralde indicates, both Aguirre and Aranguren, along with Alfonso Carlos Comín, all played key roles as precursors of the Christian-Marxist dialogue (2006: 13).

Another decisive factor in the revival of the Marxist debate in Spain was the reform of the censorship system introduced in 1966. The new Press and Printing Law meant that prior censorship was replaced with post-publication censorship. This slight relaxation of the censorship system provided enough leeway for the discussion in print of issues previously largely silenced, such as Marxism. In addition, the centenary of the publication of Das Kapital took place in 1967. This symbolic event was taken by many as an invitation to revive and, indeed, review the Marxist legacy. In contrast with this, in 1967, the Ley Orgánica del Estado was approved,
establishing the definitive constitutional structure of the regime, which exacerbated the already present need for the search for, or, at least, acknowledgement of, other alternatives.

As a result of the public nature of this dialogue, during the 1970s, Marxist ideology, although still feared and officially rejected, enjoyed a higher degree of toleration, with greater availability of Marxist materials. During the Transition, there was an increasing awareness that democratic elections would have no validity as such without the legalization and inclusion of the PCE in the elections. Therefore, the PCE was legalized in June 1977. That same year, the PCE adopted Eurocommunism, thus distancing itself from the much-feared Soviet Republic. Nevertheless, after 1968-1969, Marxism experienced a decline in Spain, whose lasting effects became evident in the unexpectedly low results obtained by the PCE in the first democratic elections after Franco’s death held in 1977.
4.6.2 Aranguren’s relation to Marxism

Aranguren’s active encouragement and participation in the dialogue with Marxism constitutes a central element of his socio-political engagement. That is why, understanding it, is essential to understanding Aranguren’s relationship to the Frankfurt School and to Critical Theory. Several reasons drove Aranguren to turn Marxism into his interlocutor.

Aranguren’s relationship with Marxism can be traced back to the 1961 international seminar on Nationalism and Marxism. Two years later, he would publish some reflections on the significance of Marxism in Implicaciones de la filosofía en la vida contemporánea (1963c). There, he argues that Marxism represents the negation of metaphysics, the irruption of freedom in history, and the introduction of the conception that philosophers should change the world (1994, 2: 545). Aranguren, who insists on the concept of philosophy as subversion, agrees with Marx in that the aim of philosophy is to transform the world. That is why, for Aranguren, Marxism matters more as praxis than as philosophical truth (1994, 2: 552). Nonetheless, it was only in 1968 –one year after
Sánchez Vázquez published in Mexico *Filosofía de la praxis*—that his publications explicitly engaged in the Christian-Marxist debate, as evidenced by *El marxismo como moral*, followed one year later by «El diálogo futuro entre marxistas y cristianos», his contribution to Aguirre’s collection of essays *Cristianos y Marxistas: Los problemas de un diálogo* (1969a). Aranguren himself explained that his choice of Marxism as a subject for discussion is the result of his decision to engage with the course of events, *por comprenderse*, as opposed to just theorising about them (1995, 3: 180-81); thus, highlighting once again his conscious effort to merge his theoretical positions with his actions. He repeatedly engaged with Marxism from what Díaz describes as a Catholic-Ortegan perspective, turning Marxism into his main interlocutor during this period (1983: 100).

*El marxismo como moral* focuses on three key points, which Aranguren later reiterates or expand on various subsequent publications. First, aware of the presence of Marxist ideas in a considerable sector of the opposition and equally aware of the rejection of Marxism by Christians, Aranguren—a non-Marxist author—was keen on promoting what he considered to be a very necessary
dialogue. Not interested in addressing Marxism to discard it, he explains that he is committed to creating a constructive dialogue with the aim of fostering comprehension on both sides, which Aranguren, like Aguirre, turned into one of his priorities. In order to promote this dialogue, and in an effort to bridge the distance between Christianity—in particular Catholicism—and Communism, he highlights that not only do they have in common their moral concern for social justice, but also that they share some of their problems, such as the exaltation of authority, obedience, discipline, and dogmatism. He also underscores the fragmentation of both Marxism and Christianity by drawing attention to the plurality of variants that they have given rise to, which in Aranguren’s eyes weakens both doctrines. On a more positive note, he points out that both Catholicism and Communism are slowly overcoming their rigidity. For Aranguren, these elements not only provide evidence of the similarities between Catholicism and Communism, but also of their shared need for renewal, which makes dialogue all the more urgent. Hence, in *Memorias y esperanzas españolas* (1969b), he argues that there are lessons to be learnt from Marxism, just as Marxism also has a lot to learn from Christianity.
(1997, 6: 209). Similarly, in *Soviet Marxism*, Marcuse draws a parallel comparison between capitalism and Communism (1958: 88, 93, 185, 195, 197, 242). These analyses not only provide evidence of the similarities in the content they discuss, but they are also a testimony to the subtlety of both authors, who are keen to overlook the formal differences which separate the above mentioned systems of thought, to reveal their fundamental similarities which should not be considered as isolated occurrences, but as the manifestation of a shared rationality, that is, instrumental reason.

As a result of this dialogue, Aranguren hoped that those who are Marxist will continue to be so in an informed and reasoned way, and not just as a mere reaction against the regime. Equally, he denounced the way the anti-communist regimes and the mass media in general create a negative emotional response towards Marxism (1995, 3: 24, 59). Aranguren encouraged Marxists to become informed and critical about Marxism; at the same time he hoped that «quienes sean anti-marxistas pasen a ser no-marxistas» (1994, 3: 180-81). He used this discussion to pave the way towards democracy by seeding the explicitly democratic values of tolerance and coexistence: «el más eficaz no-comunismo es el que

Second, in an attempt to move Christians and Marxists closer, Aranguren was determined to provide evidence of the moral content of the Marxist discourse. He identified religion at the centre of the discrepancy between Christians and Marxists. Moreover, he argued the impossibility of the Marxist quest for rationally ruling religion out of people’s lives (1995, 3: 220-21). To this end, he pointed out that Marx’s position on religion is ambiguous. According to Aranguren, Marx views religion as a form of expression, mainly the expression of a very real misery. It is in this sense that religion is, for Marx, the product of the social structure that perpetuates the exploitation and alienation of the proletariat. However, in his view, in as much as religion represents the need for a sense of justice which is lacking in the worldly reality, is also viewed as protest, although insufficient and evasive in itself, but protest nonetheless. In *La democracia establecida* (1979b), Aranguren developed this argument further, even questioning the common assumption that
Marx wants to do without religion altogether, describing Marx’s opinion towards it as twofold and ambivalent. There, he explains how this interpretation is the result of the phrase «religion is the opium of the people» –which first appeared in Marx’s «Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right» (1844)– having been taken out of context and having been blown out of proportion. He goes as far as even offering a counter-reading of Marx’s famous quote:

yo pienso que si por “opio” no se entiende estupefaciente paralizador de la actividad mental, sino transposición de ésta al plano de una “irrealidad” exaltante, levantado sobre la “realidad” rastrera, estrechamente pragmática y “política”, la expresión de Marx es, dentro de la nueva cultura, perfectamente recuperable (1996, 5: 527).

In La crisis del catolicismo (1969), Aranguren develops his argument in the opposite direction, suggesting that certain forms of Catholic commitment are ideologically very close to Marxism: «repárese en el hecho de que los ‘progresistas católicos’ se agrupan, en los países que se hallan en situación pre-revolucionaria, formando verdaderas sectas [...]». Y ¿en qué medida son católicos
Aranguren’s relation to Marxism

marxistizados o, más bien, paleo o neomarxistas católicos?” (1994, 1: 725). What is clear from both arguments is that, in spite of the undeniable theoretical differences, Aranguren was determined to highlight the common ground between Christians and Marxists in order to encourage a dialogue, concluding that they both share the same core concern: social justice (see 1995, 3: 156).

Aranguren tries to overcome the perceived dichotomy between Christianity and Marxism by creating a bridge which connects them; he brings out the moralist in Marx. Aranguren argues that beneath Marxism’s scientific veil—which he quickly discards as over-pretentious—there is an underlying morality and claims that «Marx era moralista en términos socioeconómicos» (1995, 3: 156). He goes on to explain his claim:

porque no pudo hablar un lenguaje abiertamente moral, que no estaba vigente en su época; pero también porque no quiso hacerlo, precisamente por honradez. Frente al abuso de las palabras, tan propio de la era victoriana, conforme al cual todo ciudadano, por proletario que fuese, poseía la libertad abstracta de serlo todo... y la imposibilidad concreta de ser otra cosa que proletario, él luchó por la liberación real consistente en el acortamiento de la jornada de trabajo, en la elevación del trabajo,

In Aranguren’s eyes, Marx developed his materialism mainly because he was more of a moralist in the true sense of the word than the moralists of his time themselves. This may become more evident when Marxism’s aim is re-examined: the self-liberation of the proletariat. As Camps indicates, Aranguren’s argument is that, insofar as such a liberation is sought, Marxism –independently of Marx’s own terminology– can be considered as a moral movement for it is chiefly concerned with social justice (1997: 182). That is why Aranguren does not perceive Marxism itself as a direct threat to Christianity, since, in his view, the moral dimension to Marxism means that Christians and Marxists pursue the very same thing: improving the conditions of our existence so as to allow the flourishing of the human being. Furthermore, in an effort to underscore the common moral ground of Christianity and Marxism, Aranguren points out that both share a common threat, that of capitalism: «una valoración cristiana auténtica y una valoración marxista de la existencia coinciden, la primera confesándolo abiertamente,
la segunda no siempre, en que la oposición al capitalismo tiene que ser, ante todo, una oposición moral» (1995, 3: 220). Consequently, the implicit conclusion of Aranguren’s analysis of Marx as a moralist is that it is not Marxism itself which poses a threat, but, rather, people’s interpretation or understanding of it.

All in all, Aranguren considers that, historically, Marxism has exerted a good influence on the Catholic Church. In *El marxismo como moral*, he explains that Marxism has had a positive effect on the Catholic Church in the sense that it has encouraged it to recover the social character of its morality and gain awareness of the socio-economic conditionings which have been placed upon Catholic morality (1995, 3: 220). Despite this praise, he quickly becomes more critical of the role of the Catholic Church. Only one year later, in *La crisis del catolicismo* (1969a), Aranguren questions the Church’s commitment at the same time he urges it to let go of its hold of power: «el catolicismo, en su estructura oficial, ¿se desligará de los poderosos o, por debajo de ciertas apariencias y a la hora de la verdad, seguirá vinculado a ellos? La crisis del catolicismo se manifiesta en este campo con extrema necesidad» (1994, 1: 725). That same year, in *Memorias y esperanzas españolas*
(1969b), he argues that there are still lessons to be learned from Marxism, namely, «la liberación del individualismo, la abertura del hombre a la comunidad y sus problemas, la recuperación de la dimensión social de la moral» (1997, 6: 209). Thus, it is possible to observe a tension between Aranguren’s will to safeguard the Church and a critique of Catholic practices, which runs parallel to the progression of his own views towards more critical stands. Aranguren, like Aguirre, is particularly concerned with the freedom—or lack thereof—that the Spanish Catholic Church allowed its devotees. As a result, he insists on the need to overcome the dogmatism of Catholicism, to allow for intellectual freedom, and to establish a dialogue with Marxism. He identifies two main factors which hinder this dialogue: the resistance of the Church to relinquish its position as a political power and the utilization of religion as the ideology of the dominant class (1995, 3: 220-21).

Third, Aranguren does not defend the righteousness of Communism, but its value as a countervailing power. In Bajo el signo de la juventud (1982), he explains how Marxism represented a political, social and economic alternative to Western civilisation, but it failed to provide cultural alternative. Despite this failure,
Aranguren thinks that Communism performs a valuable, even necessary function: serving as a countervailing power—at least until the creation of what he refers to as the United States of Europe—(see 1995, 3: 106, 123, 185). Thus, for Aranguren, one of the benefits of Communism is that it represents a threat against what he considers to be the fundamentally unjust social disposition of the Western Welfare State (1994, 2: 554). Despite being positive about the impact that Communism may have on neo-capitalist societies, Aranguren remained critical of the dynamics of both socio-economic formats. In fact, Aranguren, like Marcuse in Soviet Marxism, also drew a comparison between Communism and Western capitalism: «cabe también plantearse el problema de si el Welfare State o ‘sociedad de consumo’ no es la réplica práctica al materialismo teórico marxista; y, dando un paso más, si uno y otro modelo, el neocapitalista y el paleocomunista, por parecerse demasiado entre sí, no serían ambos recusables» (1994, 1: 724-25). Aranguren is critical of Communist ethics for having an instrumental foundation. In the first stage of Communism, the violence of the proletariat is justified to overcome the existing power structures, thus seizing the State. Then, power is given to the State as
the great administrator. Hence, ethics is subjugated by the pursuit of power; the individual is subordinated to the community. The result is an inherently repressive society, which, in fact, has many features in common with Fascism and, indeed, with capitalism, as argued by Marcuse. Similarly, Aranguren criticized the subordination of ethics to politics for reducing ethics to social ethics so that, ultimately, ethical –according to Communism– is that which benefits the party; consequently, anything which runs counter to the party’s interest would, then, be unethical (see 1994, 2: 194-95).

He also specifically criticized the elimination of the private sphere in that every aspect of life is absorbed by the State. Consequently, he considered Communism to be a radical political form (1996, 5: 199).

In addition to this, as a Christian thinker, for Aranguren, another serious shortcoming of Marxism is that it unnecessarily gives up religion, depriving people of the experience of transcendence (1995, 3: 545). Rooted on Christian values, it is this criticism of capitalist and Communist models, that has lead Vázquez García to affirm that Aranguren’s views are in line with those who intend to conciliate Christian Theology with the Frankfurtian critique of
In conclusion, there is ample evidence to suggest that Aranguren was very much interested in Marxism. His engagement with Marxism was moved by an awareness of the need for a dialogue and a shared sense of social justice. Moreover, he was aware of the economic, cultural, moral, and, even, spiritual changes that Spanish society was undergoing as a result of adopting a capitalist economy. For Aranguren, the changes brought about by the consumerist society require the abandonment of Marxism’s intransigence and its adjustment to the new circumstances; he was concerned with identifying and addressing the new forms of alienation which aroused from the evolution of capitalism into what has been referred to as the affluent society, which Classical Marxism could no longer address.
4.6.3 The shortcomings of Marxism

Marxism needs to be revised if it is in any way to provide a coherent and suitable framework for critique and action, because there are some aspects of the Marxist critique which are no longer applicable to advanced capitalist societies. As Aranguren briefly explained in Memorias y esperanzas españolas (1969b):

Marx dijo bien que la pobreza conduce a la alienación. Lo que no tuvo tiempo de ver es que también el proletariado, fuerza de liberación según él, puede recaer en alienación, precisamente al salir de la pobreza y lograr un bienestar manipulado por los poderosos (1997, 6: 246-47).

That is why Aranguren, like the Frankfurt School, considered that the changes of perception and behaviour brought about by neo-capitalism require a revision of Classical Marxism in order to face the challenges of the new forms of the alienation, the disappearance of the proletariat as understood by Marx, along with class-consciousness, and its implications. He explains how the image of the proletariat as opposed to the bourgeois ceased
to be functional, because with a substantial change in the nature of work, the workforce also changed substantially, becoming the middle class:

el neocapitalismo, el tránsito de la economía de producción a la de consumo, y el acceso de los obreros al “bienestar” –buenos sueldos, mucho tiempo libre, automóvil, confort moderno, aparatos electrodomésticos y televisión para todos– han logrado la asimilación del proletariado blanco a los ideales del *American way of life* y la pérdida total de la conciencia proletaria (1996, 5: 167).

The concept of alienation is no longer suitably descriptive and false consciousness becomes for Critical Theorists the explanatory model of behaviour for neo-capitalist societies. As Rosen explains, according to the Frankfurt School, false consciousness means that «all our judgements are formed through a matrix or veil of concepts» (1996: 49). Thus, the reason of the falsity of such consciousness is not its irrationality, but that it is beyond the individual’s own awareness and, as a result, it is not possible for this individual to change his/her attitudes and beliefs on the basis of reality. Such unawareness is what makes this type of consciousness false and
self-perpetuating. Furthermore, Rosen concludes that a necessary factor in false consciousness is that «it must be socially related, either because it is functionally explained by social circumstances or because it is causally related to them in some other way» (1996: 52-53).

In line with the concept of false consciousness, from the 1970s onwards, Aranguren draws attention to the issue of manipulation. Like the School, he argues that the methods of control became more subtle, but also more comprehensive; force is relinquished in favour of manipulation, which is far more effective. Aranguren denounces the internalisation of external and possibly unhealthy values and goals which only leads to the continuing dissatisfaction of the individual; he explains how individuals expect to find happiness in the next car, promotion or any other unattainable aim, however, as he puts it, «la agridulce verdad es que, a medida que parece que nos acercamos a la felicidad, ella se aleja» (1994, 2: 577). It is in this sense of the adoption of hopes and values that the individual mistakes for his/her own and which go against the individual’s best interests, that Aranguren’s analysis can be compared to the Frankfurtian critique of false
Whereas eliminating alienation implies the notion of liberation from unwanted influences and constraints, eliminating false consciousness implies the liberation from influences and constraints which go against the individual’s best interests, even though the individual may be unaware of their existence in the first place. Marcuse explains this mechanism in *One Dimensional Man*:

Under the rule of a repressive whole, liberty can be made into a powerful instrument of domination. The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual. The criterion for free choice can never be an absolute one, but neither is it entirely relative. Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves (1964: 7).

Similarly, Aranguren, aware of the different factors which condition human will, desire, and behaviour, as patent in this statement, elaborates a critique in order to liberate individuals of such conditionings. He expressed the hope that, once people are liberated from their socio-cultural conditioning, their desires would no longer go against their best interest. Nevertheless, Aranguren
did not talk about overcoming false consciousness, but about encouraging *egoísmo racional* instead (see 1995, 3: 87-88; 1994, 2: 669). This concept refers to people’s chance of fulfilment, but it also charged morally, as it implies the underlying assumption that the true good of the individual lies in line with the good of the group. Hence, for Aranguren, ethics at the level of the individual is closely linked to politics; an ethical individual is required to become politically engaged in order to be able to act ethically, but also political action should start an ethical commitment. Hence, in his strive for liberation, Aranguren exposed socio-cultural and political manipulation, and he also argued that freedom cannot be granted by any political regime, because first it must be a personal attitude (1994, 2: 459).

False consciousness, however, leads to a circular argument: not only does neo-capitalism create this type of false consciousness, but more importantly, it is this false consciousness that assures the continuity of the system. Thus, it functions as a perpetuating mechanism. False consciousness is, in fact, a complex concept which encounters a number of difficulties; its conflicts with intentionality and agency are amongst the most salient ones and
remain problematic. It is, however, worth pointing out that Critical Theorists’ underpinning of false consciousness does not rest on the truth value of their perceptions, but on their role towards the fulfilment of each agent. By re-marrying theory and practice, Critical Theorists hope to empower each individual to re-assess and re-invent people’s relationships to the existing social structures, but also, more radically, to the structures of thought.

Thus, having chosen Marxism as his interlocutor, Aranguren’s awareness of the shortcomings of Classical Marxism, the importance that he awarded to the need of updating it, paired with his growing concerns regarding the Western Welfare State, mean that, particularly during the 1970s, he effectively became the embodiment of the dialogue he promoted during the 1960s, as his reflections were made largely from a Christian and neo-Marxism standpoint. More importantly, it means that Aranguren gradually made the issues of neo-Marxism his own while taking the Frankfurt School as his main point of reference. Through this process, he experienced a re-evaluation and transformation of his own positions into more progressive and critical ones.
4.7 A Neo-Marxist critique of advanced capitalism

Philip J. Kain argues that the implicit standpoint of the Marxist and neo-Marxist critique is the Aristotelian premise that the human essence—suppressed by capitalism—may flourish given the right conditions in the society people live in (2001: 3, 25, 52). In contrast, for Critical Theorists, the consumerist behaviour encouraged by a neo-capitalist economy is considered to be to the detriment of the individual. What links Aranguren to the Frankfurt School is that, sharing this premise, they provide a wide-ranging critique of neo-capitalist society in the hope that such a critique would contribute to create a freer, fairer, and more rational society where each individual is encouraged to participate in a process of self-government and of personal development.

Aranguren’s analysis of democracy suggests that such a society would only flourish in a genuinely democratic system. By embedding this quest for social justice in democratic co-ordinates, Aranguren indicates the central role that morality ought to play in socio-political and economic organization. At the same time, because of his advocacy of the separation between Church
and State, these guiding moral principles can only arise from a heteronomous morality. In *Ética y política* (1963a), Aranguren reflects about the nature of democracia and explains that «democracia es *participación activa* del pueblo en el gobierno, democracia es *elección*, o dicho en el expresivo lenguaje político-popular, ‘elecciones’» (1995, 3: 108). Thus, the functioning of democracy depends not only on its legal and political existence, but also on the political engagement of citizens. In Aranguren’s view, democracy is not a political system which can be implanted; it has to be progressively achieved and exercised: «democracia es siempre lucha continua por la democracia» (1996, 5: 100). Despite his continuous defence of democracy, Aranguren was careful to draw early on a distinction between what he referred to as merely formal democracy, democracy in its existing format—in those countries where it exists—, and what he considered to be an authentic—and arguably utopian—democracy. This distinction can be first observed in *La juventud europea y otros ensayos* (1961), where he explains that «una democracia meramente formal no es todavía una democracia, aun cuando lo parezca, si no ha establecido, como punto de partida, una igualdad de oportunidades
para todos los que de verdad quieran aprovecharlas» (1996, 4: 189-90). From this point onwards, Aranguren continues to reiterate the insufficiency of formal democracy (see 1995, 3: 128-29; 1996, 4: 248; 1996, 5: 431). In Ética y política the possibility of democracy is presented dependant on the economic development of the nation (1995, 3: 136). Nevertheless, this economic development as prerequisite for a true democracy should not be taken as synonym with a neo-capitalist or consumerist economy, of which Aranguren is highly critical.

With the so-called economic miracle of the 1960s, Spaniards were rapidly immersing themselves in the Welfare State and into what José Carlos Mainer refers to as a «cultura postiza y portátil» (1988: 15). The economic bonanza ultimately meant more acquisition power for the majority of the population, leading to a rise in the standard of living. However, this new life-style gave way to new problems. The spread of television constitutes a reliable indicator of Spain’s economic development. Whereas televisions were unaffordable for most of the population when they were first introduced in 1956, Shubert indicates that «by the 1970s the ownership of a television set had become the norm for Spanish
households, even in the countryside. In 1975, 79 per cent of all homes and 63 per cent of the homes of farmers and agricultural labourers had a television» (1990: 258). In addition to being a testimony of the high economic growth experienced in Spain during this period, it is also socio-culturally significant. On the one hand, television exposed viewers to a greater cultural diversity and—despite censorship—various directors used this opportunity to make covert political criticism and push the moral limitations imposed by National Catholicism. On the other hand, the growing reach of television contributed decisively to the entrenchment of mass culture into Spain and it raised the issue of manipulation. These developments led Aranguren to take a critical stand towards an unsatisfactory cultural ideal, that of consumerist and technological society.

In *La juventud europea y otros ensayos* (1961), the raised standard of living, with individuals having a greater spending power than they or their parents used to before the adoption of a capitalist economy in Spain. Instead, he identifies a greater mobility, both geographical and social, which result in a social levelling effect. This became manifest in the patterns of education,
employment, and leisure—particularly travel—pursued by young people, led Aranguren to conclude that the distance which separated different social classes was disappearing. Consequently, he wonders if Western society has chosen a bloodless path to reaching the material objectives of Soviet social philosophy. He considers this as a process of *aburguesamiento* and described this bourgeois attitude as «sentir como necesidades las presentadas como tales por la técnica moderna de la propaganda al servicio del capitalismo» (1996, 4: 194). Hence, it is clear from this description that Aranguren did not approve of this shift to a consumerist economy.

His position moved from a growing awareness of the phenomenon of consumerism, to an unequivocally critical view. In Aranguren’s view, Spanish society was undergoing a moral crisis. Thinking retrospectively, in *Entre España y América*, he reasons that Spain’s incursion into consumerism brought about a moral crisis because, unlike other countries where consumerism developed progressively from an earlier form of capitalism, in Spain, «gozamos de un consumismo no surgido de la dialéctica económica, sino inventado por el sistema, difundido por la televisión,
impuesto, para crear en el español medio la sensación de "bienestar" que proporciona el hacer dejación de toda responsabilidad social» (1996, 5: 231). This crisis, to be sure, was not limited to Spain, but common to Western societies and its manifestations were consumerism, the welfare ethics, mass media, tecnification and depolization. Aranguren’s critique of neo-capitalist society is essentially a moral one, a point made by Bonete (1989: 273). In fact, the de-moralization of society and of the contemporary individual, as Bonete has pointed out, is a central theme in Aranguren’s thought (1989: 270). Aranguren shares this sense of morality with the members of the School, whose criticism –as Honneth indicates– is also ultimately also made on moral grounds (2004: 338).

By 1963, Aranguren was already a fierce critic of consumerism and its effects, arguing that:

From this point onwards, his attacks on consumerism and its implications grew more frequent and are present through most of the rest of his thought, for as he explained in *La comunicación humana* (1965), «el hombre necesita hoy consumir sin cesar tiempo, dinero e información» (1996, 5: 92). He denounced the emptiness that the constant fabrication of needs produces on the individual. Once again, Aranguren’s attack on consumerism is not made on material grounds, but moral ones, as de Miguel points out (1997: 27-28). This can be observed in *Entre España y América* (1974a), where Aranguren states:

sí, sin duda es improbable que un campesino andaluz que se muere de hambre se convierta en crítico del consumismo. Sólo quien ha pasado ya por esa forma de “felicidad” que brinda la sociedad americana establecida puede sentir su insuficiencia. El ‘materialismo’ es la necesidad de los pobres y, hoy, el sórdido lujo de los ricos (1996, 5: 168).

Aranguren denounced the pursue of material well-being as an end in itself. However, like Marcuse in *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), Aranguren’s aim is not to reject material abundance or technological advances, but their role and use in consumerist
societies, which renders the individual subservient to them; he rejects them as empty if they are not accompanied by a moral and political engagement, by a conscious effort for self-actualization. Hence, for Aranguren, satisfying the individual’s material needs is only a requisite for his/her further development and does not guarantee his/her fulfilment. Which is why consumerism is an unsuitable companion for the genuine democracy Aranguren envisaged.

The high standards of the democracy Aranguren propounded—the moral, ethical, political, and, even, educational demands it places on its agents—make of this genuine democracy a utopian one. He was well-aware of the utopian nature of the democracy he encouraged, as it becomes clear in *La democracia establecida* (1979) from the humorous reference he makes to the deficiencies of existing democracy: «mi posición es clara: pienso, con Churchill, que la democracia (parlamentaria) establecida es el peor de los regímenes imaginables —con excepción de todos los demás...— que hasta ahora se han realizado» (1996, 5: 469). Nonetheless, his awareness of the utopian nature of his task did not preclude him from striving for a utopian democracy, which he considered necessary to adopt as a reference, guide, and aim.
Already in *Ética y política* (1963), Aranguren contented that: «la democracia no es un status en el que pueda un pueblo cómodamente instalarse. Es una conquista ético-política de cada día, que sólo a través de una *autocrítica* siempre vigilante puede mantenerse. Es más una *aspiración* que una *posesión*» (1995, 3: 111). Thus, for Aranguren, democracy, like u-topia, is not a place, not even a state, but an aspiration and a process. As Camps explains, Aranguren «propugnó el compromiso, pero con la utopía, no con la imperfecta realidad» (1997: 185). Although Aranguren did provide some suggestions of how to develop and achieve a genuinely democratic society, he did not put forward a detailed plan to do so. His focus was largely the critique of the merely formal democracy.

Given that democracy rests on the possibility of free choice which requires sufficient information, Aranguren identified communication as one of the key pillars of democracy. In *Ética y política*, he explains that «La democracia ha sido ya descrita, en términos de ciencia moderna, como un *sistema de comunicaciones* entre el poder funcionalmente especializado y la masa» (1995, 3: 134). His views on this become increasingly utopian and critical,
so that in *La democracia establecida*, he states that: «la auténtica democracia es un sistema omnidireccional de comunicación. Nuestra ‘democracia’, el monopolio unidireccional de la comunicación» (1996, 5: 431). With this concise phrase, Aranguren makes reference to the less than optimal levels of participation in the democratic process, but also attacks the very mechanics of such a process. In the course of these two books devoted to the analysis of democracy, and also in *Entre España y América* (1974), Aranguren criticizes the limitations of participation in this prefabricated democracy, the limited availability of information, the use of the mass media and its effects, and the lack of real choice given the manipulative environment in which individuals are immersed.

Thus, Aranguren addresses the issue of manipulation. It is possible, however, to observe a changing, even, contradictory attitude towards the subject of manipulation. In *Ética y política* (1963a), Aranguren became highly critical of the consumerist economy because of how it affects the quality and integrity of the products sold, but also because of how individuals become consumers:
lo característico de ésta [economía] es que, en ella, el consumidor se ve atribuido el papel fundamental de motor de la rueda producción-consumo. Ha de ser, necesariamente –con necesidad impuesta por el sistema económico– el consumidor insaciable que demanda bienes de uso siempre nuevos y absolutamente innecesarios. Pero justamente por ser tan importante su función no puede confiársele, sin más, a su iniciativa, sino que es menester, a toda costa, estimular ésta. Para ello se monta todo un sistema de publicidad o propaganda que, mediante una perfecta técnica sociológica, psicológica y aun psicoanalítica del anuncio, alumbre en el consumidor una fuente incesante de necesidades siempre renovadas y de necesidades de prestigio y status social (1995, 3: 158).

Thus, publicity is identified as the key component of the consumerist economic structure, so that when consumption increases, so does production. For this reason, Aranguren argues that the welfare society constantly creates new needs and the impression of scarcity with the purpose of increasing consumption and prices. That is why, his critique of consumerist society cannot be understood without his reflections on the concept of manipulation.

In Ética y política Aranguren identified and criticized the existence of mechanisms of manipulation driving both market
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economy and politics:

la manipulación publicitaria se traspone del plano económico al político exactamente con la misma técnica. El ciudadano es tan libre, o tan poco libre –según se consideren las cosas–, como el consumidor. Enteramente libre de coacción violenta, pero heterocondicionado –al menos mayoritariamente– por la presión social ejercida mediante los medios de comunicación de masas a los que, como no tenga una mente extremadamente crítica e independiente, es muy difícil que pueda resistir (Aranguren, 1995, 3: 159).

In contrast, two years later, in *La comunicación humana* (1965), Aranguren contemplated the possibility of the existence of manipulation by the mass media and discarded it, describing it as naive. Instead, he discussed «instrumental communication», which refers to any communication whose aim is to produce a pre-established response in the receptor (see 1996, 5: 69, 91-92). Incidentally, his choice of terminology reveals he was already being influenced by the School and by their concept of instrumental reason in particular.

It was after his stay in the United States that Aranguren
Beatriz Caballero Rodríguez consistently argues that the choices made in the political, economic, or, even, personal aspects of life, such as leisure, cannot be qualified as free or rational and denounced the manipulation exercised by the mass media and the apparatus of power. In Entre España y América (1974), he fearlessly denounced consumerism and manipulation:

el hombre americano de la “mayoría silenciosa” se siente libre porque puede elegir entre diversos modelos de automóviles, entre diversas marcas de otros, de todos los bienes de consumo, entre diversas confesiones religiosas y entre dos partidos políticos –últimamente entre Humphrey y Nixon–. E incluso moverse y elevarse dentro de una escala: pasar de baptista a merodista [sic], a unitario, a episcopaliano; pasar de demócrata a republicano; pasar de consumidor de Chevrolet, a través de toda la gama, a consumidor de Cadillac, o bien de consumidor de Ford a consumidor de Lincoln.

¿Es ésta una elección real? No. [...] porque tal asimilación es, en realidad, un conformismo conseguido por la manipulación o persuasión escasamente racional, lograda a través de los medios de comunicación colectivos (1996, 5: 167).

The influence that American culture and the existing socio-political
atmosphere at the time had on him is palpable; he took the United States as a point of reference as regards the development of the consumerist society and its effects on politics and the individual.

As Hermida del Llano puts it, the origin of Aranguren’s concern with the moral issues aroused by contemporary technological society can be traced to his contact with the Frankfurt School (1997: 390). His discussion of the concept of propaganda reflects his concern with the influence of the mass media on the will of the individual. In *La comunicación humana*, according to Aranguren, «las fronteras entre la información y la propaganda son difíciles de fijar, no solamente por ésta sino también por otra razón: la interferencia de la política en la información» (1996, 5: 89). Here, he explains how linguistic evidence of the impossibility of determining where publicity stops and information begins and vice versa can be found in the changes in the use of the Spanish words «propaganda», which etymologically means to propagate information, and «publicidad», which originally means to make a piece of information public. He argues that the deliberately political content of this «propagation» with the aim of influencing people’s opinions and behaviours motivated the Ministry of Propaganda to become
the Ministry of Information. Aranguren’s conclusion is that the blur between propaganda and information is revealed in the attempt of the media to maintain an appearance of objectivity. His point is that often information is tainted by political or economic interests:

Aranguren suggests that information, when mediated by economic interests which are common to different companies, becomes one-sided; differences are minimal and there is no real critical, socio-political, or economic discussion. According to him,
consumerism and manipulation, particularly through the influence of the mass media, result in the homogenization of the population with devastating political consequences; the assimilation of difference into sameness, which results in conformism and the creation of a sense of consensus. That is why he highlights the importance of the economic and ideological independence of the mass media in order to ensure the quality and impartiality of the information they transmit. He argues that, far from being independent, if the services of information are run by the State, their political integrity is compromised, whereas if they are privately owned, they are subjected to the demands of the market. Thus, the mass media are dependent on consumption in as much as they become a product to be marketed.

Aranguren identifies the subordination of the mass media to the market as one of the key factors affecting the reliability and quality of the information transmitted. As a result, he considers that the information being transmitted is little in quantity and possibly biased, in the sense that it is difficult to tell where propaganda stops and information begins; and that, in addition, it tends to be general and superficial so as not to disappoint any group of
consumers. According to him, the mass media aim to entertain the audience with trivia so that they cannot gain a global perspective and full awareness of what is going on. The result is that, despite the copious amounts of information people receive, they still feel thirsty for information, because of its questionable quality. His conclusion is that this is a thirst which they often attempt to quench with the consumption of novelty—not information—.

Neo-capitalist society, rather than as a nurturing community, is perceived by Aranguren as a hostile atmosphere and source of multiple threats to the individual which often shapes and limits the possibilities for personal and social development through the manipulation of the mass media. As he put it in *Entre España y América* (1974) in relation to North American society,

verdaderamente la sociedad americana de hoy, manipulada por esos mismos medios de comunicación de masas [...], por la “maquinaria” de una organización de los partidos que impide toda opción política real y por la voluntad de poder de las fuerzas económicas, militares y políticas que gobiernan el país, no ayuda a ser optimista (1994, 1: 775).

Regarding the issue of manipulation, the question that
inevitably arises is: how is it possible to become aware of being manipulated in the first place? Aranguren argued repeatedly that he was personally aware of this manipulation due to his role as intellectual, that is, his informed and critical attitude towards the Establishment. Critical Theorists consider themselves to be in an allegedly epistemologically privileged position which would allow them to subtract themselves enough from the society and mechanisms they are criticizing so as to be able to perceive them in the first place and not succumb to false consciousness themselves. In a similarly elitist argument, for Aranguren, the intellectual is supposedly aware and above the manipulation of the mass media and of the economic constraints which may influence his/her reasoning. It is through education and his critique that Aranguren hoped to awaken an equally critical attitude in the reader, who would, then, become aware of his own false consciousness, initiating a process of liberation.

The lack of freedom which entails the widespread manipulation Aranguren condemned, led him to consider neo-capitalist societies –even democratic ones– as totalitarian, which is reminiscent of Marcuse’s denunciation of the totalitarian nature of
advanced capitalist societies. At first, this conclusion is absorbed by Aranguren’s discourse and it is present only in the form of allusions, found in reference to other issues, particularly manipulation, as observed in this example from *Ética y política* (1963a): «ahora bien, los regímenes políticos de nuestro tiempo, lo mismo los totalitarios que los que pretenden no ser tales, para mover a las masas recurren con frecuencia al llamado ‘culto de la personalidad’» (1995, 3: 107). In 1963 he was not prepared to make such comparison explicitly. At this point, based on the increasing development and proliferation these mechanisms of manipulation and their subtlety, Aranguren limits himself to concluding that the tendency in the Western world is to substitute terror with manipulation:

el Welfare State o Estado de bienestar no es totalitario, puesto que no pretende absorber la vida entera, ni se impone por la coacción y la violencia. Es, en cambio, “manipulador” del ciudadano al que, como contrapartida de su sometimiento a la manipulación, le garantiza el bienestar, la abundancia y la seguridad. Esta manipulación es doble: manipulación económica y manipulación política (1995, 3: 158).
Although, initially, Aranguren stated that a preference for manipulation over coercion and violence indicates that the Welfare State cannot be considered totalitarian, this assessment evolved through time. In *El marxismo como moral* (1968), he identifies numerous parallels between the Welfare State and Communism, which he considered totalitarian. He considers the Welfare State totalitarian because of the lack of freedom that manipulation entails, but also because of the extent of its reach, its ubiquity. The reach of the mass media has led to its presence in and invasion of the private sphere. Moreover, the division between private and public becomes blurred for the individual and for the politician. As a result, Aranguren implicitly suggested a parallelism between the Welfare State and Fascist regimes by reminding us of the masterful utilization of the mass media as a powerful tool of manipulation made by Fascist regimes:

> el fascismo consistió en una utilización de las masas como material plástico, en el doble sentido de esta última palabra: moldeable a voluntad, gracias a las dotes estéticas o histriónicas de fascinación que había de poseer el *Duce* o el *Führer*, y susceptible de ordenaciones estéticas y rítmicas de valor plástico (1996, 5: 77).
Democratic societies, however, maintain the appearance of freedom of choice. According to Aranguren, «la pregunta que hay que hacer, puesto que están siendo manipulados, no es si en efecto quieren tal o cual cosa (lo previsto desde arriba), sino si les será posible querer otra cosa» (1994, 2: 595). This is comparable to Marcuse’s understanding of manipulation in democratic societies which, as he explains in *One-Dimensional Man*, involves lack of real choice, not because of the unavailability of choices and alternatives, but because of the individual’s ignorance of his own manipulation, that is, because of false consciousness (1964: 144-45). It is in this sense that, for Aranguren, the dictatorship of manipulation is worse than that of terror (1994, 2: 595).

Both Marcuse and Aranguren coincide in perceiving that this has a far-reaching consequence: there is no distinctive agency. There is no one person, institution, political party, or regime against which to direct the individual’s anger, frustration, or unhappiness; there is no immediate agency to make directly responsible or to take action against, thus adding to the confusion and sense of loss of the individual (see Aranguren, 1996, 5: 434; see also Marcuse, 1964: 32). On other occasions, Aranguren points to
the Establishment in the context of Spain, understood as those who after the Civil War enjoyed a comfortable economic and political position, as the agents of power (see 1996, 5: 172; 1996, 4: 425-32, 583-84, 586-90). It is precisely because of having identified the responsibility of the Establishment that Aranguren did not share the sense of hopelessness that runs through much of Marcuse’s work. Aranguren did not subscribe to the School’s lack of hope in the transformative effects of his own work, as evident by his proposals for change and by his embrace of the self-appointed task of the intellectual. In contrast with the School, Aranguren felt democracy may empower Spanish citizens to take control over their own socio-economic and political destinies. Awareness of manipulation and its effects are, thus, vital to allow the process of liberation and empowerment. To this end, Aranguren discussed at length the effects of the mass media in Ética y política (1963), La comunicación humana (1965), and La democracia establecida (1979b). Nevertheless, despite differing from the School’s conclusions, this is not contrary to Critical Theory, as the ultimate aim of Critical Theory is precisely the emancipation and self-actualization of the individual, which Aranguren is also advocating.
In «El consumismo como forma de evasión política», Aranguren pinpoints the welfare society and the morality associated with it as the main source of political apathy (1973: 31-37). For him, democracy as morality is essentially a *moral vivida*, lived morality or moral engagement, which—despite its social nature—requires the acceptance of responsibility at an individual level. As Bonete argues, Aranguren advocates for the politicization of life and the moralization of politics as a way of overcoming the moral crisis associated with neo-capitalist societies (1989: 268). In short, Aranguren’s answer to these problems lies in every individual’s acceptance of their moral and political responsibility, and their subsequent moral and political engagement, that is, in *la moral vivida*.

It is hardly surprising then that, for Aranguren, apathy is one of the most serious political effects of the manipulation of the mass media. He points to rhetoric as one of the main causes of political apathy because it obscures the political discussion and makes it very difficult for people to have an opinion about that which they cannot understand. He considers apathy a serious challenge for democracy because, whereas the essential feature of democracy is participation, apathy undermines participation and results in
conformity. That is why Aranguren concludes that in order to have a genuinely democratic society a profound change must take place, although not a mere political change, but a generalized personal one:

Para que haya verdadera democracia, lo hemos visto ya, tiene que producirse una auténtica conversión del hombre privado en hombre público. Cada ciudadano ha de anteponer el interés del Estado a su interés particular; más aún, debe vivir, obrar y pensar, ante todo, para la patria (1995, 3: 104-05).

The challenge remains how to achieve political involvement. Like Marcuse, who in «Repressive Tolerance» (1965) supported mobilisations and resistance as means of pressure on the government by those who chose to step away from the silent majority, Aranguren recognised the value of movements such as environmentalism and pacifism as effective ways of involving people in the political arena. However, for Aranguren, a healthy democratic society, where there is a successful process of communication and a comprehensive understanding of the problems and challenges faced, where individuals are concerned and involved with politics, can only be
achieved by means of education: political, economic, and moral education.

Education, particularly political education, is at the core of Aranguren’s concerns; he saw a direct connection between interest and awareness. Like Marcuse, Aranguren defended the need for an essentially different kind of education, one that allows the individual to achieve more satisfactory levels of communication and political engagement. According to him, citizens must be educated towards democracy, but this must be a comprehensive education, one which besides its political and economic content should also include an education towards solidarity and peace. Hence, education plays a crucial role in making democracy possible by providing citizens with a social morality, as well as with an understanding of the socio-political and economic structure. More importantly, education is expected to foster a critical attitude and independent thinking, which would ultimately contribute to the individual’s liberation from false consciousness—a pre-requisite for a genuine democracy. Thus, in Aranguren’s view, this process would have an objective social impact, because—free from manipulation and false needs, realizing the close relationship between
personal and social ethics— the best interests of this empowered individual would coincide with society’s.

Aranguren envisaged a very different concept of socio-political transformation from that of the Enlightenment or Marxism, both of which expect the individual citizen to be the moralizing and revolutionary force which ultimately created the desired State. Instead, Aranguren advocated for what he calls «ética de la aliedad», ethic of otherness. Considering the role of the other is key to this understanding of ethics, as evidenced by Aranguren’s emphasis on the concepts of co-habitation and co-responsibility discussed at the end of Ética y política (1963). It is because of this central role of the other that his ethics, as Camps explains, result insufficient unless they are linked to a social project (1997: 182). These concepts of co-habitation and co-responsibility are entirely coherent with the ethical positions of Critical Theory, which involve the premise that no society can be considered a free society until all individuals within it can also be considered free individuals. The fact that for Aranguren ethics must be intrinsically linked to politics, that is, not just that the personal is linked to the social, but that the nature of that link must be transformative, requires
that such transformation may only take place in stages; individuals transform their society and their institutions, while the State also promotes social justice and self-development, which in turn, would have an effect on the individuals who would also affect the State. Hence, this understanding of ethics advocates the individual to integrate into their community and from it to develop a process of spiral personal and socio-political transformation.

The level of commitment expected from the individual, however, is problematic. Marcuse suggests that liberated individuals organized as a community may unite and transcend their selfish interests and impulses (1970b: 150). Similarly, in Ética y política (1963a), Aranguren seems to suggest the subordination of the individual to the State, not so much the naive assumption that there will be no conflict of interests between the two of them, but rather defining the role of the State as seeking the common good. To this effect, he explained that «el ‘bien común’, debe prevalecer por encima de las ganancias o beneficios de las ‘grandes sociedades’ y por encima también de un Estado concebido como poder y dominación» (1995, 3: 163). Having said that, despite this caution against the State as power and domination, Aranguren
seems to believe that defending the State’s interests will have a positive repercussion on the individuals who form it. As he put it: «en definitiva, las decisiones fundamentales para la sociedad han de hacerse desde el Estado y por el Estado» (1995, 3: 145). As a result, Aranguren defends the role of a paternalistic State whose planification should not stop at the economic realm, but should also include the spheres of leisure time, education, and the search for justice, welfare, and equality. In his own words: «pero la planificación no debe limitarse al plano económico. El Estado moderno no puede ser éticamente neutral» (1995, 3: 146). When discussing the motivations for the intervention of the State in implementing social measures, particularly in reference to socialist government, Aranguren explains:

el motor no puede ser –no debe ser– el interés capitalista determinado a dar la primacía a los bienes suntuarios de consumo para conseguir así, como un subproducto ético, el bienestar material de todos, sino la organización, inspirada en una auténtica voluntad de justicia, de dar a cada uno lo suyo, de la democratización económico-social (1995, 3: 162).

That is why, Camps explains that Aranguren opts for a political
approach which must be intrinsically moral, as opposed to a political morality, that is, the subordination of morality to politics. In Aranguren’s own words: «la política debe aspirar a ser moral; la moral no debe condescender ante los condicionantes de la política» (1997: 181). For Aranguren, ethics is a primarily personal concept; moral decisions, rights and obligations exist in as much as they ultimately refer and apply to individuals. However, he reasons that, in order to avoid the powerlessness of the individual in relation to the pressures of the State, it is necessary to institutionalize ethics. It is based on this guiding position that Aranguren awards to morality that Díaz argues that Aranguren’s understanding of democracy is best synthesized by his well-known phrase: «la democracia como moral» (1996: 109-15).

This intrinsically moral State would, then, be obliged to adopt a paternalistic attitude so as to put in place the necessary mechanisms to promote social justice. Despite this necessity, Aranguren understood the tension between individual and the State, and the individual and society, and he was well-aware that such paternalistic interventionism on the part of the State would result in the limitation of the freedom of the individual. This, however, seems
to be a sacrifice which he is willing to justify on account of the greater common good. As he put it, «se trata de limitar en cierta medida la libertad precisamente para salvaguardarla y para la democratización de su núcleo esencial» (1995, 3: 163). Nevertheless, his emphasis continued to be on participative democracy understood as the moral obligation of citizens. For him, the condition for this participation to be meaningful and not driven by manipulation, is that citizens must receive a solid education on morality, politics, and economics, so that they can be truly critical of the system and make discerning choices. Nevertheless, although by 1961, Aranguren already concludes that a genuinely participative democracy can dismantle the self-perpetuating cycle that neo-capitalist societies are immersed into, the tension between the role of the individual and the role of the State is present throughout Aranguren’s work (see 1996, 4: 226-27). This tension has been aptly described by Díaz, who concludes that Aranguren’s political positions are very close to social democracy, particularly in Ética y política, however, after his experience in California, his thought turned more libertarian, politically less institutional (2006: 6). Always critical, Aranguren oscillated between both positions throughout
the rest of his life.

In conclusion, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that, influenced by the neo-Marxist critique of advanced capitalism offered by the Frankfurt School, during his later thought, Aranguren made their preoccupations his own and developed his work in socio-politically critical directions in a manner consistent with the Critical Theorists’ approach. Like the Frankfurt School, Aranguren developed a comprehensive critique of neo-capitalism; he criticized mass culture and the forms of cultural control and manipulation; he established links between economic stability, capitalism, consumerism, political participation, and the possibility of freedom and true choice. Motivated by his religious beliefs, Aranguren strived throughout his career for social justice, towards which he contributed with his theoretical efforts in the fields of religion, ethics and communication, but also with a more practical approach as he performed the task of the intellectual, as he often applied this criticism to the specific socio-political situation in Spain, becoming an influential voice during the process of Transition. It is on these bases that Aranguren can, therefore, be considered a Critical Theorist himself.
5 Aguirre and the Frankfurt School

The reach of Critical Theory in Spain cannot be properly addressed without analysing the role Aguirre played in introducing the writings of the Frankfurt School to Spain.

As indicated in previous chapters, Aguirre is generally considered to have introduced the School in Spain. However, it is important to remember the pioneering key role that Manuel Sacristán performed in this process. First, because it was Sacristán who translated the first two books by any of the members of the Frankfurt School to ever be published in Spain. But also because during the first seven years since their introduction, Sacristán was responsible for translating a total of five books by members of the Schools: three by Adorno –*Notas de literatura* and *Prismas* (both in 1962), and *Crítica cultural y sociedad* (1969a)– and two books by Marcuse –*El final de la utopía* (1968b) and *Ontología de Hegel y teoría de la historicidad* (1970b)–, all of them published by Ariel, with the exception of the last one, which was published by Martínez Roca.\(^{37}\)

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\(^{37}\) For further reference, a list of the books by Adorno, Benjamin, Horkheimer and Marcuse published in Spain between the years 1962 and 1981 can be found in the Appendix Two.
Nevertheless, Aguirre can still be considered the introducer of the Frankfurt School into Spain on account of the fact that most of the works by Adorno and Benjamin published in Spain since shortly after their introduction and until the end of the Transition were published by Taurus at his request, and most of them were either translated or revised by him. From his various positions at Taurus since 1962 until 1977, he promoted—with different degrees of involvement—the publication of a total of thirteen books by the various members of the School. The first of such books were Adorno’s *Filosofía y superstición* (1964a) and *Justificación de la filosofía* (1964b), which were translated by Aguirre when he was still a priest. What is more, nine out of the seventeen books written by Adorno and published in Spain during this period were, in fact, published by Taurus and are directly linked to Aguirre in his capacity as editor.

It is no coincidence that a book by Adorno constituted Aguirre’s first translation of a member of the Frankfurt School. It was in the course of his stay in Germany, that Aguirre met and befriended Adorno. According to a quote cited by Vicent, Aguirre described Adorno in the following terms: «Era un personaje en
apariencia muy poco interesante, como un señorín, pero cuando entrabas en conversación con él terminabas por quedar encantado por una serpiente. Me atraía su espíritu crítico permanente, enmarcado en la línea progresista» (2011: 110). It is clear from this quote, but also from Aguirre’s translations that he was impressed by and interested in Adorno’s thought; what is less well-known is that Adorno was also impressed by Aguirre, as it is reflected in Adorno’s will. As Savater recounts: «Adorno había dejado una disposición testamentaria de que cualquier traducción o cualquier cosa que saliera suya en castellano tenía que pasar por la revisión de Jesús Aguirre» (2006: n.p.). Another example of Aguirre’s interest in Adorno is Aranguren’s seminar on *Minima Moralia*, which was organised at Aguirre’s insistence.

Aguirre played a more exclusive role in the introduction of Benjamin. The introduction of Benjamin in Spain took place in 1971 with the publication of two separate books during that same year: one by Edhasa and one by Taurus. At this point, Aguirre was no longer a priest and he had already become editor-in-chief at Taurus. Benjamin’s heterodox position in reference to the School and the difficulties and harshness experienced throughout his life, as well as his death at the Spanish-French border, awakened
Aguirre’s—and Aranguren’s—interest him. Aranguren pointed to Aguirre as the person responsible for making Benjamin accessible to a Spanish readership (1996, 4: 474, 477; 1996, 5: 291, 319). With the exception of *Angelus Novus* (1971a), which was translated by Héctor Murena and published by Edhasa, Aguirre was responsible for every work by Benjamin published in Spain since *Iluminaciones I* in 1971 until 1975, when he published *Iluminaciones III: Tentativas sobre Brecht*. Not only that, he also translated and prefaced all such books.

The case of Horkheimer, chronologically the second one of these authors to be introduced in Spain, is entirely different. Although Taurus was the first to publish one of Horkheimer’s books in Spain, *La función de las ideologías* (1966a), which was translated by Víctor Sánchez de Zavala; it is unclear to which extent Aguirre was involved in its publication, but all evidence suggests that all books by the Frankfurt School published by Taurus during Aguirre’s stay there were instigated by him—even in those cases where his name is not acknowledged in the title page—. In any case, this and *Sociológica* (1966b), which Horkheimer co-authored with Adorno, are the only books by Horkheimer to be published by Taurus.
fact, out all of the members of the Frankfurt School, Horkheimer is the least published of all in Spain during the period that extends from his introduction in 1966 until the end of the Transition. Only five of his books, including *Sociológica* (1966b), were published in Spain in the ten-year period from 1966 until 1976, and no other books by him appeared since 1976 until 1982, when Alianza published *Historia, metafísica y escepticismo*. Five are dramatically fewer titles than in the case of Adorno who, during the same period, had seventeen of his books published in Spain, or Marcuse, with sixteen. This is even fewer titles than Benjamin, who only had six of his books published in Spain during this period.

The reasons for this disparity are not clear. It might be surmised that one of the factors involved may be that those books which are considered Horkheimer’s seminal work, such as *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (1947a) and *Zur Kritik der Instrumentellen Vernunft* (1967) had soon been translated into Spanish in Buenos Aires, where they were published as *Dialéctica del Iluminismo* (1969) and *Crítica de la razón instrumental* (1969), respectively. It would seem that as a result of their translation, they may have been already accessible to a Spanish audience, hence eliminating
the need for their publication in Spain. However, some books by
the rest of the members of the School had been translated and
published in Latin America, and this did not detract Spanish publis-
hers from publishing yet more titles by these authors

Marcuse was introduced to Spain in 1967 by Revista the Occi-
dente, which published El marxismo soviético. From this point on-
wards, given Marcuse’s popularity, various publishing houses pu-
lished his works in Spain; out of sixteen books, Seix Barral, Ariel,
and Alianza published two each, and other companies published
the rest. In contrast with the authors discussed above, only one
of Marcuse’s books was published by Taurus, namely, Ética de la
revolución, which appeared in 1969 when Aguirre was already edi-
tor-in-chief of Taurus.

All in all, in the light of his involvement, it is possible to affirm
that Aguirre is the person who, in the capacities of translator and
editor, contributed the most to promote the introduction of the
Frankfurt School into Spain. Moreover, he was the first person to
introduce Horkheimer and Benjamin to a Spanish readership. The

38 An example of this can be observed in the case of Benjamin, whose work
is prolifically translated and published by Aguirre, despite having already
been translated and published in Spanish in Buenos Aires since 1961.
se efforts to introduce and promote the Frankfurt School in Spain are also evidence of his interests and his theoretical background in the work of the School. These publications demonstrate Aguirre’s awareness of the existence of the School. What is more, they also demonstrate, on the one hand, an affinity with their thought and, on the other hand, that he considered their work sufficiently relevant to commit to their translation and publication, passing over – as Romero de Solís indicates– the opportunity to publish other currents of post-war European thought, such as structuralism (2002: 295). What is there in the Frankfurt School that resonated with Aguirre? What is there in its content that –to Aguirre’s eyes– made it relevant to the situation of Spain? Aguirre explains that «lo de Frankfurt, Benjamin sobre todo, Adorno y los otros, tenía que ver con el aburrimiento insoportable que me causaban los catecismos marxistas» (1985: 47). Aguirre had already acknowledged the importance of Marxism, having even encouraged a dialogue; however, he was also well aware that the Marxist co-ordinates no longer applied to neo-capitalist societies. Furthermore, he perceived Marxism as a set of dogmatic formulae. The alternative, for him, lied with the Frankfurt School, who offer a critical and penetrating
approach to the challenges posed by the new forms of alienation. Given Aguirre’s critical positions and subversive style together with his rejection of systematization, it is easy to understand why he did not feel as close to structuralism as he did to Critical Theory, thus declining the chance to publish the former. Aguirre was yet more explicit in his motives for his interest in the School, making a further reference to the perceived relevance of publishing the Frankfurt School in light the socio-cultural and political in situation Spain, by adding –echoing Marcuse’s terminology– that «España se desvivía en una inquebrantable apariencia unidimensional» (1985: 47). This statement, like much of Aguirre’s language, is rich in implications. By using the adjective unidimensional in a clear reference to Marcuse’s most influential work, One-Dimensional Man (1964), Aguirre is alluding to the totalitarian rule of the Franco regime, but also to the fundamentalist practices and attitudes that it fostered, as discussed above in relation to Christianity and Marxism39.

39 A helpful interpretation of Marcuse’s concept of one-dimensionality can be found in Kellner’s introduction to the second edition of One-Dimensional Man, where he says: «I would propose interpreting ‘one-dimensional’ as conforming to existing thought and behavior and lacking a critical dimension and a dimension of potentialities that transcend the existing society. In Marcuse’s usage the adjective ‘one-dimensional’ describes practices that conform to pre-existing structures, norms, and behaviour, in contrast to multidimensional discourse, which focuses on possibilities that transcend
However, there is much more to this one-dimensionality. Aguirre uses the word apariencia, appearance, to suggest that, in fact, there is an under-layer of the Spanish population abundant with variety and alternatives, ready to embrace multidimensionality. Thus, he strived to provide the theoretical co-ordinates to create a platform which may activate these latent forces of change.

Therefore, although the choice of titles for this exercise of translation and publication could have well been arbitrary or it could have followed reasons completely unrelated to their contents, there is evidence to suggest the contrary. This evidence is closely linked to Aguirre’s own biography and his socio-cultural context. In fact, according to his own testimony, he translated these texts because

\[\text{quiso que los estudiantes españoles leyesen textos escritos en la posguerra, y no sólo, engañados por la intemporalidad que lleva consigo el retraso de las traducciones, los de Lukács y Korsch, que poco o nada supieron del pacto de Hitler y de Stalin y de cómo al primero le derrotó no la revolución, sino la sociedad liberal, en la que no se había extinguído la dialéctica de la ilustración (1985: 47).}\]

the established state of affairs» (1991: xxvii).
In conclusion, Aguirre has been largely, although not solely, responsible for the introduction of the thought of the members of the Frankfurt School into the Spanish socio-cultural debate. Despite having discarded the element of exclusivity, Aguirre’s role in the introduction of neo-Marxism and Critical Theory had an important impact on Spanish intellectual thought, which experienced a period of expansion by having access to a wider range of material. Díaz suggests that, as a result of these editions of the School’s work, a wave of interest in the authors and some key topics discussed by the School, such as utopia or consumerism, was sparked during 1969-1975, a period during which they had very direct repercussions on the realm of political action (1983: 166). Moreover, as I contend throughout this book, as a consequence of this contact, some Spanish intellectuals, most notably Aranguren and Aguirre, develop their own brand of Critical Theory; they identify the key issues raised by the School making them their own subject matter. Whereas in Aranguren’s case, Marcuse is the most visible influence, in the case of Aguirre, Benjamin is often echoed in terms of style and themes; a number of Benjaminian themes, such as the impoverishment of experience, the preference for an
oral style, and the need to re-invent oneself are also present in Aguirre.
5.1 Aguirre’s relationship to Benjamin’s thought

Aguirre not only translated and published Benjamin’s work in Spain, but he also gained international recognition as an expert on his work, although this is something that at times, has been called into question. Rafael Gutiérrez Girardot –whose animosity towards Aguirre is well-known– is decidedly critical of Aguirre’s reputation as an expert on Benjamin’s thought:

Jesús Aguirre, autor de defectuosas traducciones de Walter Benjamin, fue un peculiar especialista en Walter Benjamin de renombre mundial: aunque no se conoce un solo ensayo y menos aún un libro suyo sobre Benjamin, fue invitado por los germanistas norteamericanos a dictar conferencias en varias universidades norteamericanas (2004: 282-83).

There are others, however, such as Roberto Mesa and Rafael Atienza who praise his translations as well as his expertise on the subject (see 2002: 302; 2002: 307, respectively). Although the quality of Aguirre’s translations and understanding of Benjamin is open to argument, the lack of publications on the subject of Benjamin requires clarification. It is true that Aguirre did not write any
books on Benjamin; however, it must be noted that Aguirre was no scholar. He was a translator and an intellectual. As such, he translated most of Benjamin’s work; in fact, as Juan García Hortelano points out, «Aguirre, en la década de los setenta, tradujo, anotó, comentó, y editó la obra de Benjamin» (1985: 12). In addition to Aguirre’s editions, translation, notes, conferences, and recurrent comments to Benjamin’s works and persona, he also published—although in a rather informal and personal style—two newspaper articles in *El País* devoted to Benjamin, entitled «Moscú, capital del dolor» (1989a) and «Músicas para Walter Benjamin» (1990). He also wrote prologues to his translations of Benjamin, such as «Walter Benjamin. Estética y revolución». This essay first appeared as a prologue to his translation of the first volume of *Iluminaciones* (1971b), which then reappeared in the collection of essays *Casi ayer noche* (1985) under the name of «Estudios sobre Walter Benjamin». Other notable prologues include «Walter Benjamin: Fantasmagoría y objetividad» in *Iluminaciones II* (1972) and «Interrupciones sobre Walter Benjamin» in *Discursos interrumpidos* (1973). Given the very limited number of his publications on Benjamin on the one hand and his reputation as a Benjaminian scholar
on the other, it is possible to conclude that the comments about Aguirre’s expertise on Benjamin are mainly based on his work as a translator and not on the production of works of a scholarly nature. Even so, there is no contradiction in defending his expertise, as is widely known, an exercise of translation is not a mere «transportation of meaning» into a different language, but it presupposes an understanding of the oeuvre of the author in question, as well as its interpretation, because ultimately every translation is precisely this, an interpretation. Whereas an assessment of the quality of Aguirre’s translations of Benjamin is beyond the scope of this research, Gutiérrez Girardot’s criticism of Aguirre’s expertise on Benjamin paradoxically serves to provide confirmation of the international renown of Aguirre’s reputation as an expert on Benjamin.

Returning to Benjamin, Aguirre explains the choice made in selecting Benjamin’s texts as the object of his translations, saying that «no se trata, sin embargo, de una selección retrospectivista, sino de una cala en la experiencia de una sensibilidad que nos parece necesaria para llegar a un enriquecimiento del ámbito de lo subjetivo» (1971: 14). Thus, Aguirre manifests his main interests.
He is moved by a pedagogic intention, his aim is to expand the capabilities of perception of his readership in such a way that a further development of the self, a self-realisation, may be possible. Making use of Goethe’s terminology, García Hortelano describes Aguirre’s predilection for Benjamin in terms of *elective affinities*, making a reference to Goethe’s novel by the same title (1809) (1985: 12). Such an affinity can be first spotted in the existence of some parallels between the two thinkers, such as their views on art, the concept of aura, the fragmentation and discontinuity of their work, and their overall highly cultivated and complex style. Aguirre may have seen in Benjamin’s dissension and fragmentation a reflection of Spain. He may have also been drawn to Benjamin’s thought because, there, traditional elements are intertwined with very progressive attitudes, as is the case with Aguirre himself. The latter aspect is particularly visible in their conception of time and progress. As Aguirre explains,

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40 This influential term, «elective affinities», *Wahlverwandtschaften*, whose central idea is that individuals experience an attraction towards other individuals according to the compatibility of their character, has also been employed by Weber in his essay *The Protestant Ethic and the «Spirit» of Capitalism and Other Writings* (1905), as well as by Benjamin, who wrote an essay entitled «Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften» (see 2002: 36; 1924 respectively).
en su último texto [de Benjamin], *Tesis de filosofía de la historia*, la revolución es un ‘salto de tigre’ no al futuro, sino al pasado, [...] para hacer con él una experiencia que ‘haga saltar el continuum de la historia’. No hay aquí cabida para el progresismo futurista, ya que la acción revolucionaria debe liberar ‘el pasado oprimido’. Con estas tesis, Benjamin combate la ‘testaruda fe en el progreso’ de la socialdemocracia y del marxismo vulgar (1971: 9).

In this aspect, Benjamin shows a more conservative attitude than that of other members of the *Institut*, which may contribute to further understanding Aguirre’s preference of Benjamin over the other members of the School. Benjamin refuses to venerate progress for its own sake. In fact, his concept of progress is not tied in to mechanical achievement and the increase of productivity. Progress for him does not follow a straight line forward, but rather a trajectory curved backwards. If progress is to be a synonym of improvement, then, for Benjamin, such improvement can only be found in the redemption of the past. Once this has been achieved, the lineal, hierarchical perception of time can no longer be sustained, hence history is perceived as a continuum, in which every point in time is in contact with every other point. This must have resonated in Aguirre, who, submerged in the last stages of the
Franco dictatorship, sees both the necessity as well as the danger of change. The need for change is undeniable, but it involves a risk to the country’s stability. Hence, this change should not represent a break with their present time, but a recuperation of a past, which need not be real; instead, a conceptual past—one which may not have necessarily taken place—grants continuity and therefore stability. Placing the values sought in this conceptual past has yet more advantages. When the values are thought of as something that once was but is no more, two things happen: first, their worth increases as a side-effect of the sense of loss and, second, their possibility is also increased in the knowledge that it once was, thus dissipating doubts as to whether they can come into being again. Hence, as he says in relation to Benjamin, «así será la memoria una facultad con función de futuro» (1971: 14).

Aguirre reinterprets Benjamin’s thought in relation to the situation in Spain, that is to say that he is cautious regarding the future of Spain and firmly believes that any change—religious, political, or otherwise—must take place not with the desire to break with the past, but to integrate it in the exercise of shaping the future. His positions are, therefore, imminently practical when their role
as engines for change is considered.

There are a number of elements in Aguirre’s thought, such as the conceptions of progress and time, and even more in his personal life, such as having belonged to the clergy and becoming Duke of Alba, which reveal his conservative tendencies. Despite these tendencies, it would be unfair to describe Aguirre as a conservative figure. In the first instance, he constantly promoted change: religious, in his early days as a priest; political, in the case of the Transition; cultural, when he became Duke. Second, he expressed rather daring views, as can be observed in his criticism of the insufficiency of the revolutionary movement, that is, the insufficiency of its scope: «la contracultura pudo haber recurrido al ‘acto gratuito’ (Los sótanos del Vaticano), a la protesta contra la heterosexualidad dominante (Corydon), al estado de lirismo constante e intramundano (Los alimentos terrenos). Pero no lo hizo» (1985: 96). Therefore, in some ways, he perceived some of his own thought as more progressive than the thought of those who, at that time, were considered to be the revolutionary force. The insufficiency of their positions for Aguirre lies in that they did not offer a radical change, but a change that allows for the continuation of existing
models and power structures. In contrast, Aguirre cultivated and promoted a way of thought and expression distant from instrumental reasoning, as is patent in his style. It is the combination of these elements that accounts for Aguirre’s description as a Critical Theorist.
5.2 The unity behind Aguirre’s multiple faces

The analysis of Aguirre’s work presents two central problems: first, his publications are less extensive than those of Aranguren and, second, his content, but, particularly, his expression are obscure and vague. Nevertheless, the analysis of his work acquires a clearer sense as a whole when looked at in the context of the struggle against instrumental reason.

Aguirre and Aranguren—who knew each other well and remained in close contact—developed similar interests and themes in their work. Regarding the friendship between Aranguren and Aguirre, it was not merely anecdotal, but one that had profound intellectual consequences for both thinkers. In an interview with Francisco Umbral, Aguirre acknowledged the influence and guiding role that Aranguren played on his thought by saying: “diría que Aranguren ha sido mi maestro si no sospechase que esa palabra no le gusta ni le suena bien” (1984: 11). Conversely, as Aranguren remembers, it was Aguirre who first directed his attention to Adorno’s *Minima Moralia*, which had a strong impact on Aranguren’s thought. It was also Aguirre who, in his capacity as
editor while at Taurus, encouraged the publication and compilation of several Aranguren’s works.

One reason to explain their affinity is the fact that they shared a similar heritage and they are both hugely influenced by Heidegger, whom Aguirre met while in Germany. Despite this influence, Aguirre remained deeply critical of his personal and political decisions, as evidenced by «Miseria de la filosofía» (1976) and «El ‘caso Heidegger’» (1989b), published in El País, where he attacked Heidegger’s inaction, even, out-right support of Nazism, as well as his later silence. In fact, critical engagement with Heidegger’s persona and work is present throughout Aguirre’s publications. This alone does not constitute a satisfactory explanation for the affinity of Aranguren and Aguirre’s thought. More important, however, is their shared intellectual interest in religion and their deeply spiritual nature. There are also some key influences that they do not share, or, at least, not to the same degree, such as the influence that Ortega had on Aranguren. Aranguren is considered a late member of the intellectual circle created around Ortega and his teachings known as the Escuela de Madrid. In contrast, although

41 As Abellán explains, strictly speaking, the Madrid School ceased to exist in 1936 as a consequence of the Civil War. Despite José Gaos’s leadership in Mexico, the main difficulty it faced in exile was the subsequent diaspora
there is evidence of Aguirre’s familiarity with Ortega’s work and his influence emerges in some aspects of Aguirre’s thought, Aguirre is neither an Ortegan disciple nor a member of the Madrid School. What they do have in common, however, is a common goal: the rejection of and struggle against instrumental reason. In fact, they developed similar processes of resistance, mainly the destabilization of instrumental reason with a thought-provoking and subversive use of language, and the incorporation of faith to the realm of epistemology as a cornerstone of the alternative rationality they envisaged.

Aguirre was not a systematic thinker. The consequence of this for the present research is that the analysis of his thought involves an important element of reconstruction, which is carried out by developing the theoretical implications of his positions, but also by developing and interpreting the implications of what may initially seem marginal comments in the light of the rest of that took place in Latin America. The Madrid School in the mainland, headed by Julián Marías, along with Laín Entralgo, Joaquín Ruiz-Jiménez, and Aranguren himself, also suffered considerable difficulties, mainly the weight of the dictatorship upon intellectual and University life. As a result of the emerging personal and theoretical divergences, Abellán ultimately concludes that after 1936 it would be more appropriate to refer to the philosophical tradition that originated with Ortega, instead of using the term Madrid School (1989: 254-57).
his thought, because these seemingly marginal comments are, in fact, a deliberate aspect of his style and an intentional attempt to demand the engagement of the reader with the text.
5.2.1 The underpinning of Aguirre’s thought

Me inicié a la lectura y a una expresión literaria adolescente en la humedad verde y el fuego subitáneo, catastrófico, de Santander, una ciudad norteña que del sur sólo al viento presta oídos. Más tarde, me entretuve con ‘los rigores de la idea’, ya filosófica, esto es, sentimental y descriptiva, ya teológica, y en mi caso razonada hasta el límite, en una Europa con larga y abundante vocación de consonantes, diéresis y nieve. Llegaron luego los madrileños, siempre de aprendizaje y nunca magistrales, en los que la crítica predominó, acertadamente, sobre la dialéctica. Sofoca ésta la libertad, mientras aquélla la vincula a la historia propia, cuyas razones cordiales, que la razón sí entiende, dan cuenta de la secreta gimnasia de nuestros saltos cualitativos (Aguirre, 1987: 57).

This is how Aguirre summarized his intellectual progression. Even from this short paragraph, it is already possible to discern in Aguirre’s life a key tension, dichotomy at first, between reason and faith, and conciliation later, between reason and lived experience. This chapter expands the evolution outlined above, particularly exploring the process, technique, and underlying critical framework by which this dichotomy is overcome, analysing it in
the light of its socio-historical context. Attention must be drawn to his style, a taste of which can be extracted from this passage, which – both personal and enigmatic – endeavours to avoid the beaten path of instrumental rationality. I contend that the conjunction of Aguirre’s writings, but also the other dimensions of his work and, even, the very unusual and fascinating trajectory of his life embodies the development and expression of a project of Critical Theory.
5.2.2 Who was Jesús Aguirre?

One of the defining features of Critical Theory is the complementarity of theory and practice, where the actions of the agent become the materialization of his theoretical discourse. This is even more relevant in the case of Aguirre because, not only did he have a considerable impact on intellectual, political, and public life, but also, given the scarcity of his writings, the element of reconstruction involved in studying the work of Aguirre makes the link between work and biography crucial. In fact, in line with Critical Theory, he demonstrated an awareness of the key role of the biographical component, as well as an overt willingness to incorporate it into his work. As a result, most of his writings incorporate a strong autobiographical component, even when the content is markedly non-biographical. An example of this can be found in his literary reviews, in which instead of aiming to express himself with objectivity, he deemed this objectivity neither possible nor desirable and embraced his subjectivity. Hence, he openly approached all content from the perspective of his own experience and preferences. In fact, in Casi ayer noche, he pointed out how this is a
conscious practice he followed as a result of the influence of the Frankfurt School (see 1985: 237). This constitutes yet another attempt to vindicate the relationship between biography and work, whose separation is considered artificial and counter-productive.

Aguirre has been described by Mesa – who knew him personally – as multifaceted, highlighting the variety of enterprises which he embarked upon during his life, as well as his ability to deal successfully with each one of them (2002: 300). This multiplicity of interests and, indeed, endeavours, makes it difficult to clearly establish the different stages of his life. Not least, because one of the key features of his character is not revealing himself, while adopting different persona’s, that is, the use of the mask, which is not limited to his public persona, but which extended to his many roles and which, partly explains their variety.

Another layer of difficulty in understanding the reconstruction of Aguirre’s trajectory is the lack of dates regarding the key events which marked his life. This is a common feature of his writings, which despite delving on other details, carefully avoid providing the reader directly with a clear chronology of events. This confers a certain sense of atemporality to Aguirre’s persona and
to his writings, which is further enhanced by the fact that other authors who refer to him, –seemingly emulating Aguirre’s style– are also sparse with the use of dates. This is the case of Vicent. Finally, given the obscurity surrounding his chronology, it is hardly surprising that, although it is true that other authors who refer to Aguirre’s activities do employ some dates, in many cases there is little agreement exactly when many events took place$^{42}$.

$^{42}$ Every effort has been made here to elucidate a chronology of the key events and dates which have marked Aguirre’s life. I refer the reader to Appendix One, where such chronology has been provided.
5.2.3 Aguirre’s early years

Jesús Aguirre Ortiz de Zárate was born in 1934 –only two years before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War– in Madrid according to official records. However, Vicent indicates given the fact that he was born out of wedlock and as a result of the effort to hide his provenance, there is reason to believe that he may have well been born four years earlier (2011: 63-69). He soon moved to Santander. There, he received a conservative education, studying at the Catholic school of La Salle. He first stood out when, in July 1951, he became «premio extraordinario en el examen de Estado». In 1952, he started his theological education in the seminary school of Comillas.

He furthered his religious education in Munich with the support of a grant awarded by the Humboldt Stiftung. This period abroad –from 1955 until 1961– is crucial in understanding Aguirre’s development and interests. While in Germany, he studied under the theologians Michael Schmauss, Joseph Pascher, and Gottlieb Söhngen, and he was deeply influenced by the progressive liberal theologians Karl Rahner and Joseph Ratzinger, whom he translated.
and published –the former contributed significantly to shaping the outcome of the Vatican Council and latter was an influential ecclesiastical figure at the time, to the extent of becoming the present Pope–. Evidence of Aguire’s interest in them as well as of their impact on Aguirre is the fact that their work became the object of Aguirre’s first published translations. Moreover, considering the amount of books which discuss religious matters which was translated and published by Aguirre during the Second Vatican Council, it is reasonable to surmise that Aguirre himself must have effectively played an influential role in disseminating progressive religious ideas and, thus, fuelling the religious debate amongst Spanish readers during this period.

Aguirre recalls that «mediada la década de los cincuenta empecé, tembloroso, mis estudios de teología en Múnich. La capital del Isar y una beca, felizmente suculenta, de la Fundación Humboldt, me procuraron libros sin censura e inolvidables contactos personales» (1985: 22). In fact, upon his return to 43 The first one of Aguirre’s published translations was Söhngen’s El cristianismo de Goethe (1959), followed by El camino de la teología occidental (1961), also by Söhngen. In fact, as one would expect from his position as director of religious publications, his early translations focused mainly on matters of religion, although his scope quickly became wider. See Appendix Three for further details.
Spain, Aguirre remained deeply impressed by German philosophy and the European ways of German life and culture, being particularly influenced by German Theology, Idealism, Husserl’s phenomenology, and by Heidegger’s work. Having received what can be considered as a reactionary education and coming from a totalitarian regime which severely restricted the exercise of a political, social, and, even, cultural debate, this experience had a decisive effect in broadening his horizons and shaping the young Aguirre into the politically engaged intellectual he later became. As Lannon explains,

it was not possible to study in Paris or Rome or Munich and then find the orthodoxies of the Spanish ghetto in the 1950s and early 1960s other than stifling. Nor was it possible to engage in serious discussion with foreign Marxists or even Catholic democrats and then tolerate the stultifying complacency of the Spanish Catholic dictatorship (1987: 48).

Aguirre himself explains in Casi ayer noche – a collection of autobiographical essays – how, influenced by Hegel, Goethe, Adorno, Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Beethoven, he reached what he describes as an early desencanto burgués, a bourgeois disillusionment,
making a reference to how these figures have contributed to the awakening of his socio-political conscience (1985: 24). The authors selected when reflecting upon the influences which shape his own development are very informative in what he includes and in what he leaves out. This list is a testimony to the constant element of self-reflection and subjectivity present throughout his work. It is worth noting that other authors of great socio-political importance who also constitute an important influence on Aguirre, such as Lukács, Gadamer, and the rest of the members of the Frankfurt School, have not been included in this list. The most obvious omission for the external observer is probably that of Benjamin, who left a strong mark on Aguirre’s literary production. Should we then distrust the personal information volunteered by this author? Perhaps. Should we take this as evidence of the lack of knowledge or honesty about and with the self? We could do so, but we would be better off taking this information as an instance of experiential rationality, where this information reflects which authors have been felt by Aguirre to have borne the most impact on his focus, thought, and process of production, rather than being the result of objective measurement of the presence of other authors’s influences. Georges Gus
dorf observes regarding the nature of the autobiographic text that it shows us not the objective stages of a career— to discern these is the task of the historian— but that it reveals instead the effort of a creator to give the meaning of his own mythical tale. [...] the testimony that he does produces constitutes no ultimate, conclusive authority— not only because objective scrutiny will always discover inaccuracies but much more because there is never an end to this dialogue of a life with itself in search of its own absolute (1980: 48).

In relation to Aguirre, this indicates that the evaluation he makes of his own influences differs substantially from an evaluation produced by an external observer is not necessarily evidence of his deceitfulness or lack of self-awareness, but it is more likely to correspond to the expression of, on the one hand, his own perception and, on the other, how he would like to be perceived and remembered, and who he would like his name to be associated with. That is why it is significant that none of the authors listed are Spanish. This invites the conclusion that Aguirre— despite having taken a proactive part in Spanish intellectual life— has deliberately distanced himself from Spanish intellectual tradition, even though
its heritage is still visible in his work. Instead, most of the names listed are of Germanic origin.

Having obtained a degree in Philosophy and Theology and having been deeply influenced by the experience and contacts made, he returned from Germany in 1961. Although it is not possible to refer to Aguirre as an *exiliado* because his leaving Spain is not the result of political pressure and the duration of his stay abroad is relatively brief, he still established strong contacts with Spanish exiles, to the point that he experienced a feeling of participation in exile through these contacts. This is how he explains his relation to *las Españas*: «volví a España, a la primera, que será probablemente la geográfica; tenía amigos en la segunda, la del exilio, y compañeros en la tercera, que se llamaba disidencia interior» (1985: 26). The Spain he found upon his return was hungry for dialogue and thirsty for change. His homecoming signals the start of his public life, which run until 1992 with *Crónica en la Comisaría*, his last published book, although in 1994 he still translated Robin Cook’s *Tratamiento letal*. *Crónica en la Comisaría* marks his retreat

44 Even after Franco’s death his affinity and certainly his respect for the Spanish exiles is manifest in his indignation towards the political exploitation of their memory (see 1985: 55-58, 67-71).
from the spotlight as, from this point onwards, he progressively retired from the public sphere until 2001, when he passed away at the age of 66.
5.2.4 Aguirre the priest

Understanding Aguirre’s Christianity and its evolution is of crucial significance because it is at the foundation of the rest of his thought. Aguirre was ordained a priest in 1961 in Munich. Soon after, he moved to Madrid and joined a small group of priests who worked with Federico Sopeña at the church located in the Ciudad Universitaria. His work there is best understood within the context of a Church in deep need of renewal and, given its political position, in the context of its internal division, and the problematic relationship between religious observance and faith. Whereas as Juan J. Linz argues the period which ranges from the 1945 until 1957 constitutes «el punto álgido del triunfalismo católico de la identificación pública de la Iglesia» (1993: 20), a time when –with the exception of Bishop Pildain and few others– not many dared to express dissenting views during this period, the beginning of the 1960s marks a time when the Catholic Church –until then a strong ally of the regime and one of the hegemonic powers– experienced a process of division: inner division at first, but, most visibly, the partial, but increasing process of rupture of the alliance between
the Church and the State.

Despite this friction, the Church did not announce its separation and independence from the State until 1973, in a statement produced in the Episcopal Conference celebrated and published that same year. Until this separation took place, the number of its members who felt or expressed dissatisfaction with the relationship between the Church and the regime grew with the passing of time. One of the reasons for this was, as José María González Ruiz indicates, the loss of some of the Church privileges and power, such as the loss of autonomy of the Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica (HOAC), a quasi union for Catholic workers (1977: 182). As William J. Callahan puts it,

although bishops and lay activists from Catholic Action remained loyal to Franco during the 1940s and 1950s, they struggled to break through the exclusions imposed by the regime. As circumstances changed during the 1960s, some bishops, priests, and religious began to question not only this attempt to confine the Church to a narrow role in a time of economic change and social upheaval, but also its identification with an authoritarian State (2000: 385).
Another cause for dissent within the Church, and of distance between the Church and the regime was the regime’s immobility regarding issues of social justice. An example of this can be found in the pastoral letter attacking social injustice issued by Bishop Vicente Enrique y Tarancón, which was met with accusations in the official press of being communist. Paradoxically, the Church or, rather, not the Church as an institution, but numerous priests and churches supported those opposing the regime. In fact, some churches became a meeting—and sometimes a hiding—place for activists. As Callahan explains,

the divide between bishops and many, though by no means all, priests rested on more than differences of opinion over civil-ecclesiastical relations. [...] The causes of this avalanche of protest and demonstrations varied. Some protests were inspired by concern over abuses of civil rights, others by issues of social justice, and some, in the Basque Provinces and Catalonia, by regionalist sympathies, while still others were moved by demands for a more open ecclesiastical organization. Taken as a whole, the protest wave revealed widespread discontent with both the dictatorship and the hierarchy’s ambiguous response to demands for fundamental reform in the way Spain was governed and in the Church’s role within a society undergoing rapid social and
economic change. [...] This historic and deeply conservative prophetism was now turned on its head in the form of vigorous clerical denunciations of the regime and even the hierarchy for tolerating social, economic, and political abuses regarded as incompatible with Christian values (2000: 516).

Evidence of the growing distance between the regime and the Church can also be found in the fines, even jail, in some cases, that the Francoist police imposed on priests for the dangerous contents of their religious homilies; according to González Ruiz, 109 priests faced such fines (1977: 183-84).

It is important to understand the complexity of the internal division within the Spanish Catholic Church. Care must be taken not to reduce these internal divisions to the tensions that exist between the hierarchy of the Church and some dissident priests. There is an important division even within the hierarchy itself. Lannon highlights what happened to some associations related to the Church to illustrate this point: «what is certain is that JOC [Juventud Obrera Católica] and HOAC were actually undermined, not by Communist rivalry nor by state oppression, but by episcopal hostility» (1987: 235). As González Ruiz explains, there is «rivalidad entre los dos ‘primados de España’» (1977: 181).
In addition to this and, despite the apparent compliance with religious rituals, there was an increasing gap between religious practice and religious faith. A practical reason for religious observance can be found in socio-political pressures. As Callahan explains, «civil marriage was possible during the Franco period, but baptized Catholics wishing to evade a church marriage had to take the audacious and potentially damaging step in personal and career terms of formally abjuring the Catholic faith» (2000: 473). Thus, participating in religious rituals was often a requisite for the successful integration in the work-place and in the community. For this reason, church attendance, was not a reliable indicator of the faith of the church-goers. A survey undertaken in 1957 amongst 15,491 industrial workers by the HOAC (Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica) revealed that whereas over 86% of them declared themselves to be Catholic in rites of passage, over 41% described themselves as anti-religious, and almost 55% were uninterested in religion (see Atkin, 2003: 276). Furthermore, even the levels of formal religious observance lowered after 1960s, as fewer and fewer people attended mass. Faith or, rather, the lack thereof, became a matter of concern for the Church\(^{45}\). During the 1960s and 1970s, 

\(^{45}\) The Church had a clear awareness of this crisis of faith, which can be
many priests and some concerned Catholics harboured fears that religious observance had become for many an empty formalism (1987: 34). This is poignantly portrayed by García Berlanga in *Plácido* (1961), where the gap between truly charitable actions and keeping up class and religious commitments is patently visible. Dissidents within the Church hoped, instead, that genuine religious commitment would be «expressed by action for social justice as well as pious exercises» (Lannon, 1987: 34-35).

The Second Vatican Council also had a profound impact on the Church in Spain and its followers, as well as on its relationship to the regime. Largely as a result of the spirit of this *aggionarmento* – lead, first, by Pope John XXIII and, later, Paul IV –, the Vatican Council represented the efforts of Catholicism to embrace modernity. Callahan assesses the Vatican Council on the following terms:

> On balance, the Church’s position on social justice was stronger in 1965 than it had been a decade earlier, but it was not without any ambiguity. Impelled by the social documents of Pope John XXIII and the Vatican Council, the hierarchy developed a more realistic

observed in some of its efforts to win acolytes, such as the organization of country camps where it tried to convert working class atheists to the Catholic faith (for a study of working-class consciousness around this time see Alfonso C. Comín, 1974).
perception of social problems and, in some cases, became bolder in its criticism of official policy. This produced inevitable tension with the regime, although the bishops sought to contain the pressure from Catholic activists and clergy for a more aggressive approach (2000: 507).

Consequently, the distance and tensions between the Spanish Church and the Vatican grew, as observed in the requests made by Pope Paul IV to Franco to relinquish the right of presentation to Spanish sees in 1968. As Linz explains, «las relaciones entre Iglesia y Estado después del Concilio Vaticano experimentaron un cambio fundamental: de una cooperación íntima a distanciamiento, tensión e incluso conflicto», the cause of which Linz identifies in a religious examination of consciousness (1993: 29). The reflection encouraged by the Vatican Council on issues in relation to faith and religious practices, the discussion of the challenges posed, and the changes proposed all contributed to the growing awareness, particularly amongst young priests in the early 1960s, of the existing gap between Catholic discourse and Catholic practice during Franco’s dictatorship. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Catholic Church in Spain became, to the astonishment of many observers, a force for political change. In response to the changes in Spanish
society and the new trends in Catholic theology, many priests, lay leaders, and, eventually, bishops publicly distanced themselves from the Francoist regime, costing the Church much of the support of the regime.

Aguirre, a progressive priest, adopted a socio-politically engaged position. Given the restrictive and repressive characteristics of the regime, as well as the rigidity of the official line of the Spanish Catholic Church in moral and social issues, this translated into a growing dissent in both respects: dissent towards the regime and the Church for, as he explains in *Casi ayer noche*, even the reforms undertaken at the Second Vatican Council seemed insufficient to him (1985: 169-93). From this religious platform, Aguirre chose a path of socio-political activism which took different shapes: those of his ministry, his political activity, and his role as translator and editor.

Aware of the privileged position enjoyed by the clergy during the regime, Aguirre saw in his ministry a chance to encourage a much-needed change. Although in a semi-coded manner, Aguirre often used his sermons to discuss issues, such as the incongruities of the Catholic practice with the Christian faith. As Aquilino Duque
recalls:

dado el clima eclesial y social de la época en que desempeñó su ministerio, hubo de envolver en sutiles circunloquios proposiciones tan audaces en su día como la del paralelismo entre la analogía escolástica y la dialéctica marxista, o la contraposición de la ortopraxis de la esperanza a la ortodoxia de la fe, o la misa como banquete frente a la misa como sacrificio, o la equiparación moral del creyente y el ateo y la consiguiente renuncia del cristianismo a su catolicidad (2002: x).

Aguirre’s views regarding the excessive formalism of the Church echo those of Krausism, whilst, at the same time, he also defended the desirability of an active engagement of the Church with social welfare—not directly politics—. This suggests that some of the basic difficulties of the Church as perceived by Aguirre were, in fact, very similar to those already denounced a century earlier by prominent left-wing intellectuals, who—despite the incongruities of the Church’s positions—were also reluctant to abandon their faith.

As with Aranguren, Aguirre’s interest in religion also sparked questions of a socio-political nature. The problematic approach
that Spanish society took towards religion is discussed in *La religión como sistema establecido* (1995), where Aguirre put together a number of the points made by a group of secular and non-secular contributors on the occasion of a religious Congress. This work, although theoretical in nature, has an incisive practical orientation in terms of criticizing current religious practices, as well as informing and guiding future religious activity. However, despite having been written in the late 1950s, this book was not published until 1995, in all likelihood due to the boldness of its criticism and the political circumstances at the time when it was originally written. Even so, this work still constitutes a testimony to its socio-political atmosphere, of the nature of the religious debate, and of Aguirre’s early positions.

Its aim, as stated in the prologue, is the revision of Spanish social life and of the sociological aspect of the Church in particular. The argument, as F. López puts it –no first name is provided–, is that «la vida social, por lo mismo que es pública, exige una revisión pública también» (1995: 5). As a result, López contents that the need for a public dialogue regarding the socio-religious issues is emphasized. This publication raises the very relevant question
of what it means to be Catholic in the climate of that time. Thus, it discusses not only questions of faith, but, particularly, the relationship between the social structure and religion.

One of the central topics it deals with is the division between the bourgeoisie and the people, and the relationship of this bourgeoisie towards God. In Aguirre’s words,

en la burguesía, el testimonio corre a cargo de su inconsciencia y su frivolidad; de su entrega, sin hondura ni consistencia religiosa, al disfrute bobo e inelegante de la paz actual; de su desentendimiento de todo noble afán de justicia social y de mejoramiento de la situación del pueblo; de su lujo injustificado e insultante; de su inmoralidad, cuyo aumento hace aumentar en proporción la hipocresía de su fiero egoísmo (1995: 10).

This critique towards bourgeois behaviour is evidence that Aguirre establishes an inextricable relationship between religion and social justice. Here he criticizes Spanish society using Heideggerian terminology, that is, in terms of its inauthenticity which he understands as «su terco distanciamiento de lo real» (1995: 17). Aguirre explains how this inauthenticity leads to the division between an official Spain –materialized in the State, the Church, and
the bourgeoisie— and what he describes as a vital Spain—represented by the common people—. He accuses this official Spain of inmovilidad, that is, of settling on an inflexible posture whose lack of dynamism gives rise to political scepticism, class resentment, and anticlericalism. His proposal is a new understanding of Catholicism, which is evidence, once again, of the link between social and religious issues. As he explains,

This text constitutes evidence of Aguirre’s efforts to push for revision and renovation of Catholicism in Spain and of its relationship with the State; it is a call for meditation on the role of faith and its social implications. The rest of the book elaborates on these topics
and, as a result of its eminently practical orientation, it also explores how young people relate to religion.

Upon expressing these criticisms, Aguirre is aware that he is voicing the concerns a considerable portion of the Spanish population. As Gracia points out, «la tendencia a supuestos agnósticos o a un catolicismo muy crítico es la forma de responder a una omnipresente espiritualidad ritualizada, cínica y tan tosca como indigesta» (1996: 13). As a result, Aguirre advocates the renovation and modernization of many of the Church’s attitudes and perspectives, pointing to the Vatican Council as the turning point that, while being insufficient by itself, leaves room for such changes. In Aguirre’s eyes, «los católicos seriamente postconciliares [...] [son] aquellos para los que vivir postconciliarmente no es vivir ‘después’ sino por delante del Concilio» (1969: 23).

Thus, the most salient feature of Aguirre’s Christianity is its social dimension —a position which he maintained throughout his life— for, from his point of view, calling oneself a Christian is meaningless unless religious practices are accompanied by a genuine social concern for justice. For him, faith, as a personal experience, is understood as a radical inwardness. This inwardness is
not to be interpreted as reclusion or isolation. On the contrary, as he explains in his prologue to *La libertad religiosa*, «esta interioridad radical obliga al hombre a enfrentarse, sin selección previa de ningún tipo, con la realidad entera en la que vive» (1969: 15). As in the case of Heidegger, for Aguirre, even such a personal and spiritual experience as faith is, first and foremost, being-in-the-world. This applies not only to the individual experience, but it also extends to a wider view of Christianity. As he puts it: «un cristianismo meramente interior ni es viable ni tampoco tiene por qué serlo» (1985: 235). This accounts for his critical and rebellious relationship with Catholicism. It is also this commitment which drove him to encourage the opening up of the Church to the issues of the world outside it and, ultimately, to abandon the priesthood. Aguirre –almost anticipating the morality of a global society– realized the multilayered process of inter-action whose effects, as well as the symptoms it manifests, cannot be ignored. This is best exemplified in the case of Marxism.

46 Incidentally, it should be noted that Heidegger himself also initially joined the seminary (1901), although he would soon renounced his initial priestly vocation. As a result of the awareness and significance of these connections, Aguirre is keen on highlighting Heidegger’s religious background: «el talante de Heidegger, personalmente católico de origen, ha de ser interpretado, según madrugadoramente advirtiera entre nosotros Aranguren, ‘como de una inequívoca procedencia luterana’» (1969: 27).
5.2.4.1 Aguirre: A Marxist priest?

Although a highly cultivated intellectual, far from burying his head in books, Aguirre sought to adopt a serious role of socio-political engagement. He succeeded in doing this at a variety of levels. Aguirre became engaged with his local community through his religious ministry, which he used as a platform for raising complex issues for debate and opening up his parishioner’s horizons into directions which, in many cases, would not have been publicly explored before. He also explored writing as a way of reaching a more specific audience. Through translation, he assured the availability of ideas that otherwise would not reach the wider public in Spain. In 1958, he founded and participated –alongside Ignacio Fernández de Castro, Julio Cerón, Juan Gerona, Alfonso Carlos Comín, and Manuel Vázquez Montalbán– in the Frente de Liberación Popular, a political group in the opposition which sympathized with socialism and advocated a revisionist Marxism. As Mesa remembers, «eran, también, los tiempos del compromiso político de Jesús con el Frente de Liberación Popular, los ‘felipes’; el grupo político más creativo, más interesante y más original de
Aguirre: a Marxist priest?


Despite this reputation, Aguirre was not a communist or even a Marxist at any point. An analysis of the titles he edited or translated reveals, however, that there is a clear evolution of his religious and political views. His entering the priesthood, as well as the religious nature of his early publications, is evidence of his strong interest and commitment to religion. However, Aguirre grew progressively critical of National Catholicism and, as he distanced himself from this form of Catholicism and turned to more political issues, his work and intellectual activity increasingly became the expression of his dissidence from the regime.

His participation in the IV Congress of the European Movement (1962) held in Munich constitutes an instance of this dissidence, not least because the regime interpreted it as an act of defiance and reacted with strong reprisals. Aguirre was also an active participant in regular debates between Catholic theologians and Marxist intellectuals since 1965 (held in Salzburg), as he explains in his introduction to his translation of Girardi’s Marxismo y
This interest in the Christian-Marxist dialogue led to the compilation and edition of a number of essays whose purpose is to voice different views and sides of the debate, which were published under the heading of *Cristianos y marxistas; Los problemas de un diálogo* (1969). This collection of essays is described by Gracia as emblematic for gathering together essays by such diverse and key authors for this debate as Karl Rhaner, Althusser, Sacristán, and Aranguren (1996: 35). In fact, its impact was such that it became what Díaz describes as the most important book on the topic published in Spain (1983: 143, 147).

This collection of works marks a cornerstone in the socio-political and religious debate in Spain, not only because of the representative character of its contents, but also because by means of this publication, the Christian-Marxist dialogue received acknowledgment and, even, encouragement. With the outbreak of the Civil War, modernity was halted. The liberal tradition was recuperated only as a result of the anti-fascist positions adopted by some Spanish intellectuals. As Gracia argues, only as a result of these efforts does Spain retake the path to modernity (2004: 387). Consequently, the importance of the engagement with Marxism is
such that it became one of the key features of Spanish modernity or, more precisely, as Aguirre puts it, «la recuperación que [...] tiene que llevar el cristiano a cabo de una ‘modernidad’ en la cual en cuanto creyente ha vivido un poco como invitado mosca» (1969: 21).

Marxism became an important contending ideology for it vowed to tackle many of those socio-economic problems which shook the credibility and integrity of the Church. Given these circumstances, it is easy to understand how some priests, reluctant to let go of their faith, adopted Marxism as a way of facing the regime’s disregard for liberties and the perpetuation of strong social inequalities. Thus, they became popularly known as *curas rojos*, red (Communist) priests.

Some sectors of the clergy adopted a very active political stance, sympathizing with or defending Marxist ideals, particularly from the late 1960s onwards. Evidence of their involvement in socio-political issues in conflict with the interests of the regime can be observed in the development of militant Catholic workers associations, in their participation in political demonstrations like Barcelona’s *Capuxinada* (1966), and their support for regionalist
movements, particularly in Catalonia and the Basque country. As Gracia argues, «el origen de una conciencia política de clase, an-duvo para muchos en esas formas de cristianismo politizado, aun-que a menudo fuese confusamente politizado» (2004: 359).

This involvement should not be interpreted as a change in the position of National Catholicism which, as Gracia puts it, «se nutre de elementos, por decirlo así, intraducibles al lenguaje racional» (2004: 42). Instead, it represents a deviation, at an individual level –particularly amongst the low ranks within the Church–, from the established practice and from the official position on the role played by the Spanish Church as an institution. The Jesuit priest José María Llanos constitutes an example of this, for despite having assisted Franco spiritually during the 1940s, he became during the 1960s a remarkable and inspiring figure who as a result of his faith engaged in social work, combining his vows with his support for the Communist union Comisiones Obreras. Similarly, as Lannon indicates, some Catholics, priests, and theologians, such as Alfonso Carlos Comín, José María González Ruiz, Olegario González de Cardenal, and the Jesuit Alfonso Álvarez Bolado, developed progressive or even Communist views (1987: 49).
It is precisely on account of Aguirre’s activism and his pro-
gressive political views —and not his Marxism— that he has someti-
mes been considered a red priest, because as Savater explains,

ser rojo era facilísimo. Ser cura, un cura que no estaba dentro de
la ortodoxia, y además que citaba a Marx y Engels en alemán, y a
Habermas, pues te puedes imaginar que eso, en aquella época,
era bastante escandaloso (2006: n.p.).
5.2.4.2 Aguirre’s contribution to the Christian and Marxist dialogue

Marxism, insofar as it promises an alternative socio-economic structure to capitalism, was perceived as a powerful and inspiring ideology by some, while also being regarded as a dangerous threat by others. This was also applicable to Spain, where despite Francoism—or perhaps because of it, in reaction against it—Marxism became one of the main interlocutors in the socio-political debate during the 1960s.

At the core of Aguirre’s interest in the Christian-Marxist dialogue, there is the realization of the connection between Christianity and Marxism. In his prologue to Girardi’s *Marxismo y cristianismo*, Aguirre drew a comparison between Christian and Marxist behaviour when motivated by fundamentalist positions: «formalmente y en lo que respecta al mecanismo de los comportamientos, un catolicismo a troche y a moche está emparentado en múltiples aspectos con un marxismo a ultranza y de orejeras» (1968: 14). This comparison hints at the characteristics that totalitarian forms may share, whilst also suggesting that a certain application
of Christian or Marxist ideology may materialize in a totalitarian expression. This totalitarian aspect of religion and of Catholicism in particular is more explicitly addressed in his prologue to the translation of the second volume published by the Second Vatican Council, *La libertad religiosa. Declaración «Dignitatis humanae personae»* (1969). The Second Vatican Council had decisive religious and political consequences, for—as Lannon explains— «the Vatican Council in 1962, demolished the theological and ecclesiastical underpinnings of National-Catholicism and state confessionalism, as they plotted a new, more liberal, and more tolerant course for the Church» (1995: 278). The implication is that a participatory democratic society adjusted better to the new papal ideal than the existing dictatorship. Given the climate of growing social dissidence and growing internal tensions in the Church, the Vatican Council was a hard blow for the already fragile relations between Church and State in Spain. Aguirre, well aware of the political implications of the religious policies discussed at the Council, did not miss the opportunity to draw a comparison between the kind of religious practice widespread during the regime and totalitarian government, thus subtly bringing to the fore, and questioning, the
issue of the close relationship existing between the regime and the Church.

In his introduction to *La libertad religiosa*, Aguirre states that Catholic faith is often more the compliance with duty rather than the result of individual decision, which has regrettable consequences;

That is why he argues that the need for dialogue is closely linked to the need for reflection on one’s own position. Freedom is essential for this, since both dialogue and reflection are only meaningful and defendable from a religious and spiritual point of view, as free
individual choices.

Consequently, the problem of freedom takes centre-stage. Aguirre’s demand for freedom goes beyond the understanding of freedom as lack of external pressures or constrains; religious and political freedom is insufficient because genuine freedom, for Aguirre, can only be understood as freedom from the self (1969: 8). This requires a reconsideration of the popular definition of freedom as the possibility to do one’s will, for it is the nature of that will that is called into question, thus bringing in –even if with a different terminology– one of the key issues discussed by the Frankfurt School: the issue of false consciousness. Aguirre acknowledges the existence of false consciousness by insisting on the need to become free from oneself; the implicit conclusion is that religious and socio-political change starts in the self; only by liberating one’s own consciousness can religious and socio-political decisions truly be free.

Despite defending the need for freedom, in *La libertad religiosa*, Aguirre reflected upon the moral difficulties which arise with the enjoyment of religious freedom, for he was well aware and concerned with the religious and moral disorientation that
came about as a result of the changes introduced with the Second Vatican Council. He observes how, in many cases, Spaniards’ relationship to freedom follows the trajectory of the pendulum, that is, it goes from an imposed lack of freedom to its wide embrace, without a process of reflection of this personal and social development:

This apparent contradiction between defending the abstract value of freedom, while having reservations regarding the consequences of religious freedom suggests two things. First, it suggests that Aguirre was more concerned with the various practical implications of theoretical concepts, such as freedom, than with the systematic
coherence of thought. Second, it also indicates that, in Aguirre’s view, change, in this case the award and exercise of freedom, should take place progressively in order to allow the individual to adapt to the consequences and demands of this process.

Influenced by Benjamin’s work, Aguirre does not conceive progress—in religion, in politics, and in the exercise of thought itself—as a necessary movement forward; he distrusts the benefits of progress for its own sake. This view can be observed in his prologue to his translation of Benjamin’s *Iluminaciones II* (1972), entitled «Fantasmagoría y objetividad», where he argues that radical change, revolution, is achieved going back to the past and integrating that experience in a continuum of thought and history. In line with this, Aguirre conceives thought not only as movement, but also as pause; in other words, thought needs to be reflexive and integrate in the present the experience of the past as well as the projection of the future. According to Aguirre, this kind of thought is not to be understood merely as a theoretical position, for he urges its application to deal with the socio-political situation of Spain at that time; that is, the final phase of Francoism and the glimpse of a possible transition to democracy.
Setting this digression aside and focusing again on the issue of the relationship between Christianity and Marxism or, more generally, between politics and religion, Aguirre concludes his introduction to *La libertad religiosa* (1969) by focusing on the often difficult and by no means obvious relationship that has existed and exists between religion and politics. He is well aware of the political implications of religion. This is not to say that Aguirre discusses the political role that religious figures should or should not play. What he does is to highlight the ideological implications of religious or non-religious positions.

In this context, it is no surprise that Aguirre perceived the engagement in a Christian-Marxist dialogue as crucial for Spain’s socio-political evolution. As he put it in the essay he wrote for what is widely considered his most significant contribution to the Christian-Marxist dialogue, *Cristianos y marxistas; Los problemas de un diálogo* (1969), «la utilidad del diálogo en sus diversas etapas hasta la actualidad es innegable. Los marxistas y los cristianos han reconocido una parte de su pasado, han luchado contra su propio integrismo, en suma, han eliminado prejuicios mutuos» (1969: 33). The fact that Aguirre deemed it appropriate to include
his essay, «La historia del diálogo y algunos pronósticos», in another compilation of essays some fourteen years later, *Casi ayer noche*—with no changes other than a slightly longer and contextualizing title: «Marxismo y cristianismo: la historia del diálogo y algunos pronósticos»—is evidence of Aguirre’s continuing interest in and perceived relevance of this matter (see Aguirre, 1985: 195-216).

As the title indicates, in this essay, Aguirre stresses the importance of tracing the history of the Christian and Marxist dialogue with the purpose of overcoming the resistance and rejection of Marxism by emphasizing that Marxist views have existed in Spain since the publication of Marx’s political-economic works written in 1844. More importantly, he underscores that Marxism has been an object of debate since then. Aguirre draws attention to the historical evolution of this relationship, which he considers to have progressed from an open antagonism which finds expression in a violent form during the nineteenth century to the frequent and often public dialogue in the late 1960s. His point is to, first, acknowledge the existence of such a dialogue and, then, to engage non-Marxists in the dialogue, especially Christians, so that it can become a constructive debate that may help to re-address
issues of faith and Marxism itself, which in his opinion has often been misinterpreted.

In the introduction to *Cristianos y marxistas: Los problemas de un diálogo*, which Aguirre felt the need to entitle «Justificación», he briefly points out that this publication may seem belated, given that this debate has already taken place throughout the 1960s and this book dates from 1969. In line with Aguirre’s digressive and often obscure style, this point is not expanded until eleven pages later, in his essay, where he explains that

antes de llegar a la década de los años sesenta, el diálogo [...] transcurre en libros y revistas predominantemente. Es además un diálogo en el marxismo, y los coloquiantes principales son por lo menos marxistizantes de una manera activa o estudiosa. En nuestros días cobra empaque de notoriedad pública el diálogo entre los marxistas y los cristianos. [...] Sociológicamente, por tanto, el fenómeno actual [de diálogo] es distinto, hasta en su expresión externa, del inmediato precedente (1969: 18).

Thus, this dialogue is essentially different because, first, it is no longer one-sided; although only Marxists or marxistizantes –Marxist sympathisers– had tended to enter the debate, during the 1960s
others joined in. Christians, in particular, became more vocal; as a result, it turned into a multi-sided dialogue. Second, it was no longer confined to the written word expressed in books or journals of limited circulation; it became a public debate. By way of justification, he simply highlighted once more the need for this dialogue and for the demystification of its nature. It is the inevitability of this dialogue that accounts for its necessity and importance. As he explains,

In contrast with Aranguren’s position, who simply sought to have a dialogue between the two confronted ideologies, Aguirre’s motives for this publication were, rather, to contribute to its viability and fertility.

In his essay, Aguirre suggests that the first step in enabling a successful dialogue is a «fundamentación filológica», the
understanding of the terminology involved. This almost Socratic importance placed on terminology is not a demand solely placed on the other, on the non-Marxists, to achieve an informed perspective, for he also identifies the need and willingness for a «lucha marxista contra su propio integrismo» (1969: 19). His call to reflect upon Marxists’ own fundamentalist positions reflects the need to reconsider the views of classical Marxism, for much of its critique and doctrine are no longer applicable to Aguirre’s society, as argued by neo-Marxism. It is relevant how Aguirre repeatedly chose the term *integrismo*, which he uses to qualify a Christian and Marxist standpoint, effectively criticizing the intransigence of both positions (see 1969: 19, 33). He argues that flexibility and tolerance are pre-requisites which need to be exercised by both sides. The premise, therefore, is that no understanding of the other and no communication is possible without a previous understanding of and preferably also reflection on the self. He offers examples of terms which are often misunderstood, misinterpreted, and misused, such as «dialectic», «historicism», and «alienation». An indication of Aguirre’s sympathies for neo-Marxism can be found in his discussion of the term «alienation», for he advocates for a
wider understanding of this concept, one that encompasses the ethical dimension of existentialism, as well as the psychoanalytic implications as explored by Marcuse and Fromm. Aguirre warns his readers that

es, desde luego, mala filología, esto es, fundamentación dañada para el diálogo, empeñarse en proyectar retrospectivamente la interpretación de una expresión de la actual realización marxista sobre las ‘intenciones’ del autor de *El capital* y otras obras escritas después de 1845 (1969: 17-18).

Aguirre is, thus, well aware of the challenges and pitfalls involved in the exercise of interpretation of a text in relation to its terminology and intentionality. As a result, this text functions as an invitation to further the scope of this dialogue, by establishing a socio-historical contextualization of classical Marxism, so that a clear distinction between classical Marxism and, its re-interpretations and revisions can be drawn in the light of the changing symptoms and needs of society. This is also evidence of Aguirre’s own awareness of the evolution of Marxism and of his early awareness of neo-Marxist thought and the work of the Frankfurt School, as
shown by the references he makes in this publication to Marcuse, Fromm, and Adorno.

This essay constitutes for Aguirre an exercise geared towards the reflection and understanding of Christianity and Marxism and their relationship and interaction, but, at the same time, it is also a socio-political meta-analysis; this dialogue and the main issues its brings up are identified as symptoms which may reveal the socio-political inclinations of the society they occur in, as well as the lurking challenges which need addressing. Amongst those challenges, Aguirre stressed the need to readdress the significance and consequences of the Second Vatican Council. He perceived the Second Vatican Council as a key step towards the revision of the role of the Catholic Church in Spain. Two years after his translation and introduction to *La libertad religiosa*, Aguirre considers it crucial for opening the door to religious freedom and, with it, to prepare the Spanish people to deal with the possibilities of other freedoms which may come. According to Aguirre, after the Council, Catholicism should strive for a conception of the Church which accommodates, not excludes, the future, particularly the future which crystallizes in every new present. One of the circumstances
referred to in that present is the lack of faith or atheism, whose increasing expansion constitutes another one of Aguirre’s key concerns and motives for this dialogue.

For Aguirre, atheism is not only as a problem, but, more crucially, a symptom of the socio-economic and, even, political problems which Spain was faced with. According to him, atheism gained importance not because of its association with Marxism, but as a current human reality for which Marxism may just be a suitable vehicle. In «La renovación intelectual del clero español», published as part of the collection of essays in commemoration of Aranguren’s 60th birthday entitled Teoría y Sociedad (1970) – and later re-published in Casi ayer noche (1985: 181-93)–, Aguirre wonders «¿por qué si no los diálogos más frecuentes, los únicos casi, han enfrentado a cristianos y marxistas? El marxismo no cubre hoy el fenómeno general de la increencia, si bien ocupa en él una porción considerable» (1985: 189). Raising these concerns already points to the relevance that faith plays throughout his work, more significantly in his engagement with neo-Marxism. Which yearning are people who turn to Marxist atheism attempting to fulfil? And would a Christian alternative be able to fill that vacuum?
These are the questions that Aguirre regarded important for the individual and the Church to answer or, at the very least, to consider. However, in analysing these questions, another one arises: why is a religious alternative preferable to an atheist one? Despite his obvious concern with atheism, this is not a question to which he provides a satisfactory answer. He does, however, engage more directly with the issue of atheism in «El ateísmo de la realidad», published in Casi ayer noche (1985: 169-80)\textsuperscript{47}. This essay arose of the need to find out why so many Spanish people had turned to atheism, because, as he observes,

en España, hijos de familias en las que se educa cristianamente no pierden la fe, sino que descubren un día que nunca la han tenido. El proceso llega a su término sin dramatismo, con una tranquilidad ni siquiera polémica (1985: 177).

Aguirre spends the first six pages of this essay accusing Catholicism and the Second Vatican Council in particular of not being able to deal appropriately with atheism:

\textsuperscript{47} «El ateísmo de la realidad» is a paper which was originally delivered in the Semana Internacional de Teología in October 1967 and was published a year later by the host institution, the Universidad de Deusto (1968: 15-27).
Aguirre’s contribution preconciliariamente estábamos acostumbrados a explicar el ateísmo por la ceguera o por la mala voluntad de los ateos. Los especialistas católicos del tema –como también sobre protestantismo o comunismo– practicaban una cierta necrofilia, la de la acumulación indiscriminada de errores y puntos débiles de quien no merecía otro nombre que el de adversario. El ateo estaba fuera de nosotros. Dicha actitud pervive aún entre nosotros (1985: 174).

In fact, Aguirre argues that «es, sin duda, en el tema del ateísmo donde al Vaticano II se le transparentan mejor sus limitaciones» (1985: 173). He is critical of the limitations of the perspective adopted by the Second Vatican Council and by the approach of Christian theology to religion and faith. He argues that

la ética de la situación insiste en el sujeto determinado únicamente por sus circunstancias exteriores y no por una serie a priori de objetividades indebidas. [...] La creencia en Dios se explicita como razón de una aceptación de los dogmas. [...] Esta profundización del sujeto prepara a ésta para que sin disolverse puede ser objetivado (Ibidem).

In contrast with the perception of atheism as the absolute other and the enemy, Aguirre argues that «nuestra deformada expresión,
sobre todo práctica, del cristianismo hace que el ateísmo cobre hoy su avanzada magnitud social. El cristiano tiene razones y su historia somos nosotros, cristianos insíncero» (1985: 174-75). This is one of the chief reasons why he considered it was necessary to reflect upon atheism, because, as he puts it, «hablar de ateísmo es también hablar de nuestra equivocaciones» (1985: 175).

With this argument, Aguirre is very nearly refusing to acknowledge the existence of atheism in its own right. He argues that atheism is a reaction –which he patronisingly considers understandable– to the shortcomings of Christianity. This argument, however, seems to be more the fruit of Aguirre’s keenness to get through to those Christians who may feel threatened by atheism than Aguirre’s own understanding of the nature of atheism. It is evidence of Aguirre’s investment on the discussion, for he chose to sacrifice logical and theoretical coherence in favour of gaining closeness to those his essay is addressed to –Christians who are intolerant towards atheism–. Nevertheless, one page later, Aguirre explicitly goes even beyond the subordination of atheism to Christian values: «el ateísmo no es algo que hoy suceda en una sociedad cristiana. El ateo no lo es porque no sea cristiano, sino
porque es ateo simplemente. Para ser increyente no es necesario apearse de la fe; basta con no adentrarse nunca en ella» (1985: 176). He insists on this point: «el ateísmo tiene una razón, que es positiva porque no consiste en una negación de la fe, sino en una afirmación de sí mismo» (1985: 178). Furthermore, Aguirre argues that the refusal to acknowledge an atheism whose roots are independent from Christianity only reveals the self-centred disposition of Christianity: «explicar el ateísmo presente como secuela de nuestras deficiencias es seguirnos sintiendo el centro del mundo» (1985: 179).

Aguirre equalled the ontological reality of atheism to the ontological reality of faith by comparing the origin of both of them: «la increencia del ateo arranca de una realidad antecedente a su ateísmo, la misma que sustenta nuestra fe» (1985: 180). What is interesting about Aguirre’s account of the atheist’s or the believer’s position is Aguirre’s perspective. He chose not to defend or attack either or these positions on the basis of their truthfulness. Aguirre did not base his argument in the inherent and self-evident existence –or non-existence– of God. Instead, his argument is based on the primary concept of human freedom. Aguirre argued
that whatever process drives a human being to either believe or disbelieve in God’s existence constitutes an exercise of such freedom, that is, a choice. That is why, in reference to atheism, he says: «no me refiero a una realidad en la que no intervenga, conformadoramente, el destino y la libertad del hombre» (Ibidem). In other words, human freedom does play a role in atheism. However, Aguirre argues from a patently religious position and the result is that he gets entangled with the role played by God in this issue. That is why he includes a reference to destiny in the argument above and that is also why he continues the statement by saying that

es una realidad en la que, como su fundamento y finalidad, existe operativamente la libertad de Dios. [...] Desde luego que la referencia a la libertad divina es de orden trascendental. [...] No es una referencia que “sirva”. Imposible habilitar la libertad de Dios como causa del ateísmo (Ibid.).

Consequently, and despite having argued that the existence of atheism is an independent phenomenon from religion, Aguirre’s own beliefs seem to taint his argument which, in the last instance,
reserves a place for God in the gestation process of atheism, even if his role is not at all clear. It is because of this lack of clarity that Aguirre concludes that «la explicación de la fe y la explicación del ateísmo serían siempre inadecuadas» (Ibid.). It is perhaps because of Aguirre’s own ambivalence towards the nature of atheism that he does not fully address the question of why a religious position is preferable to an atheist one. It is only tangentially that Aguirre points to the comforting and guiding role that faith may play in contemporary society, thus drawing an unspoken comparison with the discomfort, loneliness, or even emptiness that atheists may supposedly feel.

In conclusion, the exercise of this debate, the scope of its content and of people’s engagement –intellectuals and laypeople– provide an indication of its relevance and impact, which is not just religious, but also socio-political. By insisting on the need to offer a worldly contextualization of religious practices, Aguirre criticizes what he considers to be inconsistencies and inadequacies in the way that Christianity has played its social role, often by lacking a sufficient involvement in social issues, while at the same time criticizing the excessive role it played in politics. Nonetheless,
he avoided advocating the well-known formula of a depoliticised religion, for he considered political implications to be inescapable and that ignoring such implications would result in a dangerous naivety. He expressed this idea forcefully when discussing the motives for the dialogue: «Dios ha dejado ya de ser pretexto que se invoca para no hacer una política, esto es, para hacer otra» (1969: 33). This awareness of the almost ubiquitous nature of politics is visible throughout his work, for he played an active role in the development of the Spanish political panorama.

Moreover, by means of the encouragement of the rapprochement and tolerance –if not understanding– of the initially diametrically opposed views that entails this debate, it proved to be a valuable exercise in the path towards democracy. Consequently, these discussions have had a decisive impact on the process of Transition that would develop soon afterwards. David R. Ringrose explains how «where such [peaceful] transitions have been relatively smooth the historian invariably finds that essential elements of the new polity and economy actually took shape over several generations» (1996: 4). Similarly, this exercise of acceptance, tolerance, and dialogue can be interpreted as the preamble to the
events yet to come; these are elements and attitudes which, Aguirre consciously and explicitly hoped that they would help in preparing people to deal with an increase in their freedom, first religious and then political and which ultimately contributed to making the peaceful Transition into democracy possible.
5.2.5 Aguirre the editor

Aguirre’s path is one of increasing awareness; an awareness of the lamentable situation Spain found itself in, as well as an awareness of his own position and his possibilities. By means of his experiences as a priest, where he came into contact not only with his parishioners, but also with a considerable number of young people whom he challenged and taught, he soon became painfully aware of the difficulties Spain was facing and he felt he could reasonably venture their sources and solutions. By this time, Aguirre had already discovered the powerful potential of cultural transmission, and he was determined to disseminate that content which he considered would further the cause he first championed when he became a priest. Thus, his work with Taurus constitutes a crucial part of his career because of the contribution he made, but also because it served him as a trampoline to the positions and intellectual endeavours he would later commit to.

Taurus was founded in 1954 by Francisco Pérez González, Rafael Gutiérrez Girardot, and Miguel Sánchez López. As Antonio Lago Carballo recalls, Pérez González, its first director, published
books which, although not directly opposed to the regime, were critical towards it (2004: 16). During the first few years, a number of collections which were continued by successive editors were launched. The collection «Ensayistas de hoy» includes Aranguren’s *Crítica y Meditación* (1957) and a wide range of other essays which deal with, in the first instance, spiritual concerns and, later, with essays of a socio-political nature. It is under this collection that Aguirre translated and/or published works by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, Max Weber, Ernest Bloch, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno to mention but a few 48.

Still as a clergyman, Aguirre joined Taurus in the early sixties (1962) as director of religious publications, although his collaboration with Taurus dates from 1959, which is when his first translation – *El cristianismo de Goethe* by Söhngen – was published. It was not until 1969 that he became editor-in-chief 49. Aguirre’s roles as priest and editor overlapped for a short while; however,  

48 For more details of the collections launched by Taurus during this period, please see Lago Carballo’s essay, «Los primeros veintitrés años (1954-1977)» which is part of the commemorative book published by Taurus itself entitled *Cincuenta años de una editorial* (2004: 11-31).

49 Although Lago Carballo points to 1967 as the year Aguirre became editor-in-chief at Taurus (2004: 26), all other sources indicate that he became editor-in-chief the same year he left the clergy, that is, 1969.
they would not co-exist for long. As Gullón points out, «su disentimiento se explica por el trasfondo de insatisfacción cada vez más perceptible en su comportamiento y en sus escritos» (1989: 16).

In the prologue to the collection of sermons pronounced while preaching at Madrid’s *Ciudad Universitaria* significantly entitled *Sermones en España* (1971)\(^5\), Aguirre already confessed that «me siento ahora lejos, más en sensibilidad que en fechas, de la trama de hechos e ideas desde la cual actuaba entonces» (1985: 217). This early distancing, along with his later decision to leave the clergy (1969), reflects an intellectual and personal progression which is by no means unique in the Spain of that period. As argued in the previous chapter, a similar development in relation to faith and the Church is found in Aranguren.

It is possible to identify in the earlier Aguirre an idealist young man who, influenced by his conservative upbringing and religious education, saw in priesthood the best way to bring to life these ideals. He was soon fascinated by German liberal theologians as

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50 Please note that although the date of publication of this collection of Aguirre’s sermons is 1971, Aguirre arranged to publish this book the same year he left the clergy, however, censorship prevented its publication for two years, because, as Vicent indicates, it is dedicated to the memory of Enrique Ruano—a student, friend of Aguirre’s, who was killed by Francoist police while in custody—(2011: 29-30).
well as by neo-Marxist thinkers. This fuelled his sense of mission which is reflected in his immense capacity for crystallizing and transmitting these high hopes, which he did in the form sermons, and of carefully chosen translations and publications. Aguirre was, thus, a man who lived by his convictions. The problem was, however, that convictions do not always live up to expectations. Disillusioned by the limitations of the Vatican Council and by the distance between the core of his religious beliefs and a society which, to a great extent, made a showcase of Catholicism, Aguirre stopped preaching in 1969, and was officially secularized in 1977. In fact, during the 1960s, unprecedented numbers of priests sought laicization, with many abandoning religion altogether. According to Lannon, «five priests were secularized in 1962/3, but 85 in 1966 and 125 in 1968; in the years 1975-7 no fewer than 845 left the priesthood» (1987: 90). In the case of Aguirre, however, this does not respond to a crisis of faith; far from it, faith is present throughout his life. Aguirre explicitly confirms this in his interview with Umbral:

U: -Teología y filosofía. ¿Cómo se desprende uno de la teología?
A: -Yo no me he desprendido, yo no comparto la famosa máxima
The importance of his use of the adjective *fluctuante* should not be overlooked, for it indicates that Aguirre has experienced his faith dramatically, that is, not as a godly gift, but as a human endeavour and pursuit. That is why, in «No confesión, sino desmaquillaje», he explains that «y para mí, sobre todo en cuanto a hombre que lucha por poder ser creyente (y no sólo por poder seguir siéndolo), cuenta el presente como el lugar menos equívoco de acción y de pasión, de salvación y de condena» (1985: 218). Thus, far from losing his faith, Aguirre professed himself a Christian throughout his life. Hence, this progression is testimony to his faith, but also to his social commitment, a commitment which, once again, Aguirre expressed in different forms throughout his life.

The birth of Taurus provided an outlet for the expression of discrepancies and intellectual traditions which were not in consonance with the regime. Aguirre’s links and progression within Taurus is not only a testimony to his personal evolution, but it also provides evidence of the expansion of his interests. His duties soon were extended so that he also took charge of
the «Cuadernos Taurus», including foreign authors, particularly those of the Frankfurt School in the collection «Ensayistas»\textsuperscript{51}. The success of his translations of Benjamin and Adorno, as well as the publication of Cioran, translated by Fernando Savater was such that they were re-edited on several occasions after Aguirre left Taurus, on account of their popularity, not only amongst students, but also amongst the greater public. This collection also reflects the significance and influential nature of the existing friendship between Aguirre and Aranguren, because as Jean Bécarud suggests,

\begin{quote}
Jesús Aguirre debió de verse orientado por Aranguren a la hora de decidirse a dar a conocer en España determinados autores: algo que tiene que ver en particular con la prestigiosa colección «Ensayistas», en la que figuran por lo demás seis de los propios títulos de don José Luis (2004: 287).
\end{quote}

The nature of the collections he encouraged and developed reflects some of the ongoing interests throughout his life which, although ever present, varied in intensity at different stages of his existence. During his period as editor-in-chief of Taurus, Aguirre

\textsuperscript{51} For a comprehensive list of Aguirre’s publications, including his work as translator and editor, please see Appendix Three.
continued with the collections which were already being published, showing special interest in the collections «Ensayistas» and «Cuadernos». He also launched other influential collections such as «Publicaciones Religiosas», which includes the work of renowned theologians such as Ratzinger and Rahner, and «Biblioteca Política» which, as Lago Carballo explains, was partly inspired and directed by Enrique Tierno Galván (2004: 29). As Mesa indicates, Aguirre –and with him Taurus– endeavoured to expand the horizons of a present which he felt to be distant and isolated from the rest of European thought (2002: 303). It is in this context that Aguirre translated and published the works of the Frankfurt School.

Despite the pressure to make the publishing house a profitable enterprise –it belonged primarily to the bank Banco Ibérico–, the orientation of Taurus’s publications during this period clearly obeys more a cultural and socio-political agenda, than an economic one. Aguirre explicitly reflects upon this and explains that his editorial work was not primarily guided by economic interests: «nunca saqué de prensas un best-seller o, según tartamudeaba un colega que ahora suda la academia, un west-seller. Precisamente por ser miembro entusiasta de la Muy Noble y Muy Desleal Cofradía del
Despilfarro, les puse con frecuencia cara de perro a los agentes literarios, ballenas blancas, tigres apaisados» (1985: 45). It should also be noted that although –unlike Aranguren– Aguirre does not explicitly focus on the analysis or critique of the consumerist society and the workings of neo-capitalism, it is possible to discern his negative attitude towards consumerism indirectly in his choice of vocabulary and some of his passing remarks, such as «Cofradía del Despilfarro». Another example of this can be found in the following comment: «a través de su enfática lacrimogenia la Constitución Gaudium et Spes cifra la llegada de la Iglesia católica a un mundo moderno, que de facto, aunque la Constitución no lo sepa del todo, es más un mundo de producción que de progreso» (1985: 227). Here, although Aguirre is discussing the Catholic Church, he seizes the opportunity to contrapose progress to production, thus, infusing production with negative connotations which he does not elaborate on.
5.3 The dynamics of the written word

In Aguirre’s varied and multifaceted existence there is one role, that of the transmitter, which he played time and again under different guises; the priest, the editor, the translator, the writer, and the cultural ambassador. This endeavour is underlined by the belief that a process of enlightenment or awareness would result in the empowerment of those who become committed to genuine communication, which would in turn have an objective social impact. It can be said that he made communication the endeavour of his life, from a very active perspective, a perspective which has always, to some degree, been influenced by his rapprochement to the Frankfurt School, to such an extent that this influence, as Aguirre himself acknowledged, can be felt in the later part of his career when he opted to distance himself from some of his earlier positions.
5.3.1 Translation

The role of his written word is crucial to understanding Aguirre’s thought. In this context, the expression «written word» refers to the totality of his written production, including prologues, translations, articles, conferences, and essays. In light of the variety in the nature of his publications, Aguirre himself uses a similar expression, as observed in this quotation from Crónica de una Dirección General, where looking back he says: «durante más de diez años me había ocupado de la letra impresa» (1988: 13).

The overarching assumption underpinning Aguirre’s work is that texts may contain a powerful element of self-liberation. This possibility is determined by the nature of the text, but also by the involvement of the reader –as agent– with the text. Bearing this in mind, the process of translation has important implications. It must be noted, however, that although the enumeration of Aguirre’s different professional roles may give the appearance of linearity, this is not the case. His role as a translator illustrates his progression, for the evolution of his thought can be perceived in the choice of the titles he translates; at the same time, his activities
as translator co-exist with his roles as a priest, editor, writer, and, even, duke, for his involvement in translation expands from 1959 until 1994.

Looking back at Aguirre’s overall intellectual and cultural behaviour, the coherent –although erratic– development of an initial yearning can be observed. A creative and, above all, a communicative streak have always been present in Aguirre’s public persona. These two elements are first expressed in the form of sermons; however, it is not unreasonable to surmise that the socio-political atmosphere of that time, along with his own dissent must have made it difficult for Aguirre to find his own voice. In this context, translation provided a safer outlet for expression, which may come under the heading of what Gracia refers to as resistencia silenciosa. As Gracia indicates, «el incorformismo se ha diversificado y la única manera de oponerse al franquismo no es ya la militancia política o la pedagogía social porque puede serlo también la edición literaria, la poesía, la traducción, las artes plásticas o la crítica literaria» (2004: 370).

Aguirre first became published as a translator with Taurus in 1959 with Söhngen’s El cristianismo de Goethe. His second
translation, also a book by Söhngen, is *El camino de la teología occidental* (1961), which constitutes one of Aguirre’s few translations for a publishing house other than Taurus, in this case, Castilla. From this point onwards, as religious editor, Aguirre continued to translate and revise publications until 1969, when he became editor-in-chief and, as a result, he translated only occasionally, presumably only works to which he felt particularly close, as is the case with Benjamin’s.

It is crucial to emphasize that the exercise of translation is more than the mere transportation of meaning from one language to another; it is also a form of expression for the translator, even if only indirectly. This is even more so in an oppressive regime, where alternative —safer— forms of self-expression must be found. This conclusion has important consequences for the methodology of this research, which once again, follows Skinner’s footsteps. Skinner succinctly says: «the essence of my method consists in trying to place such texts within such contexts as enable us in turn to identify what their authors were doing in writing them» (1996: 7). Following his methodology, therefore, not only allows analysing an author’s translations in terms of what they «were doing
in writing them», but it also suggests that ignoring the role that these translations perform in an author’s oeuvre would constitute a gross oversight in any attempt for a comprehensive analysis.

Bearing this mind, Aguirre’s choice of authors and texts reveals his preferences, as well as his assessment of the situation and needs of the country. There is a certain paternalism guiding Aguirre’s translation, as according to his own testimony, he translated to a large extent for pedagogical motives (1968: 13; see also 1985: 47; 1971: 14). The significance of his role as a translator rests, therefore, on the socio-political impact of his translations, but also on their informative value in relation to Aguirre’s character.

Contrary to popular belief, which often defines translation in terms of transfer or transposition, Benjamin argues that translation requires a degree of involvement on the part of the translator that results in a necessary interpretation of the text to be translated (2001: 17). Aguirre was aware of the task of interpretation and mediation involved in translation, which led him to affirm that translation is in itself a prologue:
¿los traductores son también prologuistas? Desde luego sí que son, cuando no merecen acabar en sujetos de juzgado de guardia, lo que los rapsodas, según el Platón que prefería Heidegger, respecto de los poetas: llevan a conocimiento las palabras de los autores que traducen. Resultan, pues, si atinan en su libro, discretísimos prologuistas no antes, sino dentro del texto (1989: 109).

The culmination of the processes of reading and writing materialized for Aguirre in his role as a translator, for translating requires, first, to read, necessarily interpreting the given content, which is then rendered into the target language. Thus, the translated text is no longer identical to the original. The difference stems not only from the language it is expressed in, but more importantly from the fact that the resulting text is an interpretation of its original, hence it is no longer, not even as text itself, the fruit of its author, but the fruit of the author tainted with the fruit of the translator. Aguirre is aware of the deception that translations may imply; temporal, but also of authorship, and the pretensions of its content, which is often viewed as the original disregarding the mediation process (see Aguirre, 1985: 47; 1989: 23). As with other types of writings, Aguirre advocated transparency, for the packaging of an unitarian
finished product –be this a translation, a review, an essay or any other text– is no more than an illusion obscuring the complexity, fragmentation, and multiplicity which conform any text and reality itself. Aguirre –like Venuti– became increasingly concerned with the visibility of the translator –making frequent references to and comments about the process of translations and its results– possibly as one more step to unmasking the deliberate appearance of objectivity portrayed in the discourse of instrumental rationality. This visibility is enhanced by the inclusion of prologues, which become more extensive in his later work\textsuperscript{52}.

The process of translation requires an intense level of engagement of the translator with the text, often resulting in the transformation of the translator as a result of the influence of and interaction with such text. During this process of translation, a journey through one’s own mind takes place, for the translator’s views are challenged and stretched to meet with those of the source text. A series of psychoanalytical processes takes place: a process of idealization, transference, analysis, and, finally, verbalisation. Psychoanalytical processes are, in fact, an integral

\textsuperscript{52} On the role and relevance of prologues see Aguirre, 1989: 107-09.
part of the process of translation, just as translation is inherent in the process of psychoanalysis\textsuperscript{53}. The fact that translation can be described in terms of psychoanalytic processes also means that it may have a cathartic effect in the author. In fact, in the case of Aguirre, it is possible to see how, influenced through the exercise of translation, he finally rebelled against his source texts which are of religious and political nature, and although incorporating these influences, moved away from these sources to explore his own creativity.

All in all, translation itself is an activity which is in harmony with the principles of Critical Theory, for as Edwin Gentzler puts it, «one needs to return to the present and try to create new relations, derived from the old, which reveal the logic of the other» (2001: 20). Translation, in this sense, can be described as the crystallization of having overcome perceived duality; that of theory and practice, translator and author, writer and reader, the solitary and the social, the self and the other, source language and target language, source text and target text, old and new.

\textsuperscript{53} For further discussion on the relationship between translation and psychoanalysis, see Derrida, 1979: 3-12; see also Berman, 2001: 286-87; for the relationship between translation, puns, pain, and psychology see Levine, 1991: 13-14, 17-18, 20.
Therefore, engagement with the process of translation, insofar as it means integration, can be exercised as an element of experiential rationality.
After his period as editor (1969-1977), Aguirre became a writer in his own right, although his publications have not been the object of academic research despite or, perhaps, because of the public attention other facets of his life and work have enjoyed. Nevertheless, there are numerous appearances of his name in reference to his work at Taurus and his intellectual activity; his translations, his conferences, his role as General Director of Music, as Chief of the Pavilion of Seville for the 1992 Universal Exposition, and his membership of the various Royal Academies. There are, of course, also frequent references to his activity as a socialite, which range from the prensa rosa, gossip magazines, to mentions in academic publications, such as Ángel Díaz Arenas’ Quién es quién en la obra narrativa de Manuel Vázquez Montalbán,
which details the appearances of various public figures, including Aguirre, in the literature written by Vázquez Montalbán (1997: 72-74). Nevertheless, the profile conveyed in this book is focused on Aguirre the Duke and socialite, even, the intellectual, but not on his intellectual production. Thus, Aguirre’s work as a writer in his own right deserves more attention.

Self-awareness is another defining aspect of his writings, which is expressed in the semi-autobiographical character of his work as well as in the elements of meta-analysis it incorporates. This self-awareness is of particular significance in that it highlights the element of intentionality. In fact, he affirms that «sólo soy capaz de escribir sobre aquello que amo» (1985: 168). This statement confirms the intellectual affinity discussed in relation to Benjamin, which, in fact, extends –in varying degrees– to all the authors and themes he deals with.

Self-awareness, however, is not solely directed to the act of writing, but because it involves intentionality, the intended effect of the written product must also be considered. In this context, Aguirre draws attention to the contradictory position of books in consumerist society (1985: 105). On the one hand, books are
products, commodities, like any other; they have an exchange value, they are bought and sold, and abide by the general laws of the market. On the other hand, some books are subversive in nature. Their contents may be subversive. An even more effective subversive and destabilizing strategy consists of demanding readers’ engagement to the point when the reader becomes a subversive agent of his own. This is Aguirre’s strategy. He is not so concerned with what could be called the element of reception –which may carry misleading passive implications– as with the act of reading itself. The reader plays a decisively active role by, first, interpreting and conferring meaning to the text and, second, by the process of self-actualization that s/he undertakes when actively involved with the process of the creation of meaning in reference to a text. Thus, for Aguirre, writing and reading are two ends of the same process of communication.

Aguirre analysed the nature and consequences of the reading process. In Casi ayer noche, he reflects on the loneliness that comes as a consequence not of the act of writing but of reading. Aguirre explains how «estas lecturas [novelas francesas e inglesas] sí que distanciaban de la casa, de sus ruidos y olores, de
In his view, the reader becomes isolated from his surroundings precisely because of being a reader and as a result of his choice of text; the reader may become engrossed in the story, being transported to the world that is depicted and consequently being separated from the world where s/he is physically located. More importantly, because reading is a process in which the reader must become unavoidably involved to different degrees, the reader undergoes a process of transformation as a result of his contact with the text which is proportionate to the degree of his involvement. It is this change that comes as a result of whichever knowledge or experience is acquired through a particular reading that also separates the reader from the world that surrounds him/her insofar as this reading experience is not shared by the surrounding individuals. In addition, reading is, in many cases, an activity which has to be carried out alone. Alone, not only in the sense of reading individually or not sharing the experience, but also, depending on what is being read, reading in hiding, reading in the occultation that solitude provides.

This multiple isolation of the reader is not expressed
negatively by Aguirre. Well aware of this mechanism, he uses it to consciously distance himself from the outside world. During his early years, he read, at least partly, as a rebellious act; an act which allowed him to break with the patterns established by his family, as can be observed from the information he volunteered on reading Goethe: «mi encuentro con Goethe pasó, pues, por las estaciones, sin parada ni fonda, de una modesta heterodoxia. Aquellos libros eran de un ‘descarriado’ entre los otros miembros de la familia que habían seguido senderos trillados» (1985: 20). By the stealthy subversion of reading, he felt connected to the one man who broke the patterns dictated by habit and family expectations, at the same time as he was influenced by the contents of what he read, preparing him to also break the patterns of his family the possibilities opened to him also widened.

Aguirre suggests that it is possible to explore different *egos* through the act of reading. He points out that «hay lecturas que nos permiten vivir por poder, el del autor, otros personajes, implicarnos por procuración en acciones ajenas a nuestras propias capacidades» (1985: 24). Hence Aguirre, although probably unaware, explored the practical side of the horizon of possibility
opened up by literature. However, Aguirre once again focused on how this may affect the reader rather than the writer. This is even more so in the act of re-reading:

This statement suggests that Aguirre resisted developing a unilineal argument. Instead, he often highlighted the complexity and richness contained in any given issue. In this case, he contrasts the experience of the reading of novels with their re-reading. He insists on the personal nature of these reflections and, in an almost dialectic fashion, he links reading to solitude, and re-reading to its opposite, without revealing what that is: company? A sense of belonging? Of complicity? Aguirre suggests that re-reading is a social act in as much as it requires entering the story temporarily leaving behind one’s own identity; that is, to become
the other. As he explains, «releer no es sólo volver a oocuparse, por azar o por moda, de un libro, sino leer en él» (1985: 59). He concludes this brief reflection by linking both experiences to the concept of adventure and exploration, reminding the reader that embarking on such adventure requires leaving someone’s own baggage behind; thus, effectively linking the process of reading and re-reading to personal development. As Derek Attridge argues, «creatively responding to the other [...] involves the shifting of ingrained modes of understanding in order to take account of that which was systematically excluded by them» (2004: 123). Hence, after developing the solitary aspect brought about by reading, he is compelled to explore the different possibilities opened up by a re-reading.

This leaving behind one’s own identity has important socio-political consequences for, as Adorno points out in his *Negative Dialectics*, «identity is the primal form of ideology» (1981: 148). Hence, freeing oneself from one’s own identity, possibly by adopting that of another, is a step towards understanding other socio-political perspectives. Thus, it may open the door to the development of a political standpoint which may consider not
only the interests of the self, but his/her own interests as part of a group. As Attridge puts it, «the other –whether the other I struggle to create or the other I encounter in the shape of a person or a work– arouses in me a sense of responsibility» (2004: 123). Two pages later, Attridge elaborates on the relationship between responsiveness to the other –which is even more present in the act of re-reading– and responsibility: «responsiveness to the other must involve something like responsibility because the other cannot come into existence unless it is affirmed, welcome, trusted, nurtured» (2004: 125). Thus, is precisely this empathetic exercise which enables the individual to develop a true political proposal which reflects his awareness of being-in-the-world.
5.4 The Transition. Cultural activist

Díaz explains how «viewed with hindsight, the close links between opposition culture under Franco and the progressive culture of the democratic transition are evident» (1995: 283). He is not alone, as Hermida del Llano also makes a powerful argument in this regard in reference to the thought of Aranguren and Tierno Galván (2008: 29-41). This is also in the case of Aguirre, not only because of his ties with the Frankfurt School, but because of the extent of his impact on the process of Transition –both in the sense of the cultural transition and the political transition–, due to his influence as a cultural activist both before and after Franco’s death. He largely succeeded in blurring the boundaries between the personal and the political, continuously moving back and forth between the theoretical and the practical, so much so, that his personal and intellectual evolution can be considered as an accurate reflection of the changes that Spain underwent during his lifespan. Moreover, given the influence he exerted on Spanish society, the elucidation of the role he played during the Transition is imperative in order to add one more piece to the incomplete
puzzle of recent Spanish history, particularly considering that very little attention has been devoted to Aguirre’s role as an intellectual in his own right.

Aguirre performed a crucial role as a cultural activist. Gutiérrez Girardot explains that «el padre Jesús Aguirre y Ortiz de Zárate reanudó la apertura a la cultura europea moderna» (2004: 282). The adoption of this role first took place when he was a priest at Ciudad Universitaria in Madrid, where he delivered famously progressive and daring –although also often incomprehensible by most– sermons. Moreover, in order to gauge the extent of his influence, his congregation must also be taken into account, which according to Vicent included «los hermanos Solana, los hermanos Bustelo, Miguel Boyer, Nicolás Sartorius, toda la familia Maravall, Peces Barba, Tamames, Fernando Morán, Herrero de Miñón, cualquier componente de la burguesía progresista con sus novias respectivas» (2011: 37). Thus, his contacts and influence of the political area must not be underestimated.

Aguirre has been described by José Villa Rodríguez as an «activista cultural» (2002: 286). This can be said of him on several levels. He took upon himself the task of disseminating culture, which is expressed in his work as translator, editor, and later writer.
But he also went beyond the limitations of paper, and became an intellectual and influential public figure with a cultural mission. As Lago Carballo remembers,

el palacete de la plaza del Marqués de Salamanca, [...] cobró con Jesús Aguirre nueva y más brillante vida como escenario de reuniones intelectuales y acontecimientos sociales. Igual sucedió cuando años más tarde se trasladaron las instalaciones de Taurus a un amplio piso de la calle Velázquez 76 (2004: 28).

As this quotation reveals, there is an important awareness of his belonging to a place in time; a place and time with which he engages with on a multitude of levels. As Herralde explains, Aguirre –along with other editors such as Javier Pradera, Pedro Altares, Faustino Lastra, Nacho Quintana, and Javier Abásolo– became un poder fáctico, a powerful agent in the cultural opposition against Francoism and in the socio-cultural scene thereafter (2006: 12). He saw himself as part of a group of intellectuals who had the opportunity and the duty of promoting deep changes in the Spanish panorama. These are far-reaching changes which range from the moral, religious, and social, to the political realms, which
may be observed in the equally wide range of contacts that he cultivated: a powerful and diverse network which includes intellectuals, religious representatives, and political figures, but also a more direct interaction with *la España de a pie*, the wider public, through a series of newspaper articles in *El País*.

In practical terms, this means that he played a very active role in the political process of the Transition. This role includes supporting key figures. An example of this is best expressed in Aguirre’s own words: «Felipe González proclamó por primera vez, ante un público literalmente apiñado en mi despacho de Taurus, que era secretario general de su partido» (1985: 46). Gullón, in his prologue to *Las horas situadas* recreates the atmosphere in which this event took place:

un político joven, todavía con motas de clandestinidad, accedió a presentar el libro de Fermín Solana sobre Besteiro y el socialismo. La preparación del acto había sido meticulosa, y el ambiente, favorecido por la naturaleza: aquella última luz de la Sierra filtrada por nubes ligeras que corrían de Este a Oeste, como impulsando la ceremonia cercana. Jesús se acercaba al mirador, escrutaba la caída de la tarde y traslucía su impaciencia en la sucesión del cigarrillo. Una hora más y el éxito se resolvería en
canapés y cócteles. Llenaban los invitados las habitaciones cuando llegó el esperado, Felipe González, nervioso acaso, confortado por la seguridad de su huésped. El futuro presidente se convirtió en el representante y la representación y las expectativas se cumplieron (1989: 12).

Aguirre contribuye en gran medida a establecer vías de comunicación entre intelectuales, políticos, y, incluso, la Monarquía, como Gullón explica;

el espíritu de mediación y la confianza en las reacciones del Príncipe, con quien se mantenía en excelentes términos, le permitió a Jesús llevar a La Zarzuela a intelectuales de izquierda como José Luis Aranguren y José María Castellet. Serviría el diálogo de puente para el acercamiento, diluyendo en el espíritu de concordia la amenaza de una repetición de los conflictos entre la Corona y los intelectuales de los años de dictadura y de la dictablanda (1989: 12-13).

This exceptional position also gave him the opportunity to make his own political project heard and known, an intention which, as Gullón recalls, he openly voiced (1989: 12). In this respect, the words that Aguirre used regarding Benjamin may well apply to
himself: «¿trató entonces de hacer méritos políticos? Quizá, pero en tal caso ante un único tribunal, el suyo propio» (1975: 10). Aguirre’s project, in consonance with his style, was not elaborated explicitly in any of his writings. Nonetheless, it is possible to observe how he played an important role in the peaceful Transition, bringing closer together the then Prince Juan Carlos –nominated Franco’s heir and future king in 1969–, the politicians of the opposition, and intellectuals:

al día siguiente, o al otro, sentados en su despacho [...] habló Aguirre de su proyecto político, de su modo de participar en la conciliación que llegaba, que inexorablemente llegaría. [...] la conciliación pasaba por el acercamiento del Príncipe a intelectuales y políticos de la oposición (Gullón, 1989: 12).

The king to be, the opposition politicians, and intellectuals seem to be, for Aguirre, the three key forces whose co-operation is required for the advent of a peaceful Transition. He viewed the figure of the king as indispensable in this process since he appeared to be the one candidate whose embodiment of power could be widely accepted as legitimate and conciliatory by most Spaniards.
Politicians are, of course, another indispensable element in any aspiring democracy. Aguirre, however, is sceptical about a democracy led by politicians:

escasean los políticos capaces de continuar la historia de los pueblos; abundan, eso sí, los que por ignorarla la deforman, y son manada quienes se apresuran a cambiarla para que no se sepa qué papel desempeñaron precisamente ayer. ¡Infeliz sociedad aquella en la que los actores políticos sean protagonistas! (1985: 43).

That is why the democratic solution appears to him as doubtful: «no es honesta una democracia reducida a las formas, pero que la democracia funcione sólo materialmente implica una desonestidad suicida» (1985: 31). Aguirre was concerned with what has been termed by Benjamin Barber as «thin democracy» (1984: 3-25). He also questioned the reach and validity of a system which might surpass the limitations associated with representative democracy, because, to him, democracy is only possible where true choice exists. Aguirre, like Aranguren, and, in line with the Frankfurt School, criticized the extent to which a democracy – as exercised in modern democratic nations – can be considered...
genuine democracy. At the same time, he also questioned the desirability of the latter based on false consciousness or, at the very least, the limited scope of the horizon of possibility of the voters. Only freedom and information can make choice possible.

The availability of these two elements, freedom and information, however, largely depends on the organization of the government. Despite his doubts, Aguirre remained hopeful:

By referring to those who imagine themselves as not following orders, Aguirre is making a reference to the existence of false consciousness, while, at the same time, expressing his hope for people to overcome it. The implication is that only a process of spiral evolution can lead to a truly democratic system; by emphasizing the importance of exercising a political engagement, it suggests that personal change in a sufficient number of individuals should
propel a change in the government in the same direction. The change in the individuals, however, cannot be complete because their vision and options are restricted by that government. The change in the government, in turn, may open up the vision and possibilities of the individuals again, so that in time, another change in the government will be demanded, leading to a spiral process which would ideally be repeated until the liberation of the individual and true democracy have been reached.

Given the insufficiency of monarchic, institutional, and political measures, the role of intellectuals in democracy is to provide a critical perspective, and to promote the critical change described above. In order for intellectuals to be able to perform these roles, Aguirre was keen to establish a distinct division between the political and cultural spheres. He affirms that «la política implica una gestión afirmativa, mientras que la cultura es una instancia crítica» (1985: 61). Unlike Aranguren, Aguirre did not insist on the separation of these roles into different people. He was content with a clear separation of tasks, which he initially did not perceive to be conflicting. What is more, the fact that Aguirre himself performed both tasks simultaneously at numerous
points throughout his life suggests that he saw both positions as complementary to each other.

In conclusion, for Aguirre, there is no change without a critical exercise, but with criticism alone there is no progress; a positive political act is required. A well-developed balance between the two in all individuals would make the journey towards genuine democracy possible and desirable. For him, art holds the key to striking that balance.
5.5 The interrelation between the realm of politics and art

5.5.1 Aguirre the Duke

A more mature and down-to-earth Aguirre, one that by then believed more in action than in utopia, was offered the post of Director General de Música (1977). At the insistence of Pío Cabanillas Gallas –the then Minister of Culture– and the Duquesa de Alba, he accepted the position which he would use as an opportunity to revive and promote the Spanish art scene. In doing so, he resigned as editor-in-chief of Taurus in the autumn of 1977, thus closing an important chapter in his life. It should be noted that although he did not go back to Taurus, he maintained links with it, publishing Altas oportunidades in 1987.

It was after his appointment at the Ministerio de Cultura when, having renounced his priestly vows, he joined Cayetana Fitz-James Stuart, 18th Duchess de Alba, in matrimony thus becoming Duke Consort of Alba on 16 January 1978. At this point, Aguirre carried out the role of modern-day patron of the arts «por sentirse en cierto modo continuador de esa tradición de mecenazgo cultural
de una estirpe nobiliaria», as Rogelio Reyes indicates (2002: 289). Being aware of the long-established tradition of art-patronage established by the House of Alba, Aguirre decided to continue with that role.

This legacy can be observed in numerous instances throughout Spanish history. Álvaro Pablo Ortiz Rodríguez makes reference to the Duke of Alba when discussing a number of proposals and changes in Spanish economy and culture that took place under the rule of Carlos III, between the years 1750-1816 and which he describes as part of a trend of Enlightenment, given their modernizing spirit (2003: 7, 11). Later, in 1824, the then Duke of Alba, Carlos Miguel, formed a society of patronage with the purpose of opening a number of exhibitions, having opened a public gallery and imported several crates with works of art. Although this enterprise soon proved to be unsuccessful, it is evidence of his interest in the arts. The association of the Duke of Alba with patronage and the arts in general is such that even in Goethe’s play, *Egmont*, the character of the Duke of Alba is used to represent culture. In the twentieth century, as Francisco Javier Sánchez Cantón indicates, the Duke of Alba was credited with
having supported the developments and reforms needed by the Prado Museum between the years 1931-1936 (1962: 67, 70). In 1962 an Institution named *Gran Duque de Alba* was inaugurated in Ávila with the purpose of the encouragement and support of art and research. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to conclude, like Reyes, that the dynasty of the Duke of Alba has traditionally been linked to progressive thinking; they can be considered enlightened nobility.

Aguirre himself took an active interest in patronage, even from a historical point of view, as he explains in the speech he delivered on the occasion of becoming part of the *Real Academia Española* (1986: 19). It is, thus, reasonable to surmise, as Reyes indicates, that he may have taken this active role in the promotion of culture as a way of fulfilling what he already was—a champion of culture and a promoter of the arts—through his role as a nobleman (2002: 290-91). Although I am not suggesting that he sought each and everyone of these positions as part of a grand narrative, it is quite possible that this embrace of the arts represents the continuation of a reform project which he first attempted in the moral sphere as a priest, then, as a translator and editor—becoming more involved
in socio-political issues—, and, finally, as a duke, concentrating on the liberating possibilities of art. In any case, this task can be observed in his frequent appearances in public performances, his joining the *Reales Academias* (*Reales Academias de Bellas Artes* 1984, *Sevillana de Buenas Letras* 1985 y *Española* 1986), and in his support for foundations to preserve different aspects of the Spanish cultural heritage, such as *Fundación Casa de Alba*. He also became a member of the Patronato de la *Fundación El Monte* (1992), in addition to his active participation as an influential intellectual figure, who on occasion held political positions as when he became General Director of Music (1977), or Chief of the Pavilion of Seville (1990).

The end of the regime seemed to stimulate his own creativity because his writing activity increased substantially. Several publications in the form of compilations of articles, prologues and short autobiographical essays see the light at this time. The fact that some of the essays collected in *Casi ayer noche* (1985) and *Las horas situadas* (1989a) were first published as newspaper articles is testimony to the public participation of the author in addition to his commitment to cultural transmission and dissemination.
Aguirre also published two volumes of *Memorias de un cumplimiento* (1988c, 1992), relating his autobiographical experiences in public office. This is by no means an isolated occurrence. After Franco’s death, biography, or rather, autobiography, as a genre, bloomed. The freedom of expression granted by the new-born democracy propitiated a proliferation of publications, particularly autobiographical and semi-autobiographical works, such as José María Pemán’s *Mis encuentros con Franco* (1976), Pedro Laín Entralgo’s *Descargo de conciencia* (1930-1960) (1976), and Carmen Martín Gaite’s *El cuarto de atrás* (1978). The end of the dictatorship permitted the reinterpretation of the past, at the same time as the rapid political changes which were turning Spain into a democratic country created the need for self-justification. The significance of this phenomenon lies in the fact that these writings not only constitute an exercise of a new-found freedom, but they also provide a new epistemological stand which challenges the authoritarian and unilateral epistemology encouraged and imposed by the regime. As Fredric Jameson explains in relation to postmodernist narrative fiction, questioning of absolute truths about the past allows the past to be detotalized, and the illusion
of objectivity and truth present in the «grand narratives» crumbles (1984: xii). Similarly, the deliberate introduction of subjectivity in the biographical discourse invites the reader to engage with the writer encouraging a bond between the two. At the same time, the text becomes infused with human-like characteristics. Truth becomes fragmentary; the perception of reality is necessarily limited and partial. These (semi-)autobiographical accounts adopt a shift of perspective which allows a re-evaluation of the past. In contrast, Aguirre’s autobiographical style is not used to shape confessions or memoirs of his actions during the regime; his post-1975 writings focus on post-1975 events.

In addition, a collection of Aguirre’s speeches of admission to the Reales Academias was published under the name of Altas oportunidades (1987). A collection of poems entitled Secreto a voces was also published during this same year, bearing testimony to the modest –in terms of number of publications– but also versatile and wide-ranging scope of Aguirre’s writings. All in all, Aguirre spread culture by bringing awareness towards the work of others and by means of his direct implication in a number of cultural institutions. Moreover, he became a critic of a more social
nature as explained at the beginning of this chapter, a feature which is constantly present at different levels during his *Memorias de un cumplimiento* (1988; 1992).
5.5.2 Art and aesthetics

Art, from the perspective of Critical Theory, plays a crucial role in encouraging the empowerment and emancipation of the individual. Given his relationship to the Frankfurt School, it is likely that Aguirre shared their views regarding the liberation potential for art and that this was precisely one of the reasons why he became heavily involved in the arts community, tirelessly promoting it. The influence of Benjamin’s view can be observed in Aguirre’s attitudes toward art. Benjamin stands in a position contrary to the Kantian conception of art. He rejects the doctrine of l’art pour l’art, which he refers to as a theology of art, because it excludes the possibility of a social function of art (see Benjamin, 1992: 218). In Benjamin’s view, art does serve a purpose, although its purpose is not in art as product, but in art as process. Art opens up the possibilities for liberation and self-development, both for the artist, and for the receiver, broadly understood as the listener of a piece of music, the reader of a novel or poem, the viewer of a sculpture, painting, or play. This is so for the artist insofar as its very creation constitutes an expansion of his horizon of possibility and also for the receiver in as much as art is considered as an unfinished product which
becomes singularly complete with every individual’s reception, and reaction to the work of art, because their combination will engage the receiver in the process of the creation of meaning. It is this unfinished nature and the individually participative mechanism of the work of art which makes it a vehicle for personal and social change.

Some initial discrepancies can be observed in Aguirre; he does not theorize extensively about art, because in his opinion «la mejor lección de arte es siempre el arte mismo, cuyas explicaciones no pasan de ser añadiduras más o menos acertadas» (1989: 86). This is the reason why, from a theoretical standpoint, he seems more interested in aesthetics, particularly in the concept of beauty, than in art per se. Regarding the nature of beauty, he concludes that «la belleza, Señores Académicos, es, desde Kant, una finalidad sin fin» (1987: 53). Having established the purposelessness of beauty, his interest shifts to its perception and its implications. It is at this stage where the Benjaminian resonances can be found;

ya he dicho, en oportunidad también académica, que abrigo la convicción estética, en la cual la razón se pone en vilo, de que nuestros ojos ven las cosas, los valores bellos, los siente nuestro
corazón y les procura nuestra cabeza activa residencia, porque hemos sido, primero, cercados por sus argucias y sorprendidos, luego, por su presencia deslumbradora. Un poeta ciego puede, por tanto, cantar ese acoso, expresar su intensidad innumerable y única. No nos transmite lo que ve, sino que es visto (Aguirre, 1987: 58-59).

Here Aguirre seems to imply that his criterion for identifying the nature of art is based on the concept of beauty. He makes this move by displacing the emphasis from the object to the subject, which is consistent with the experiential rationality which he exercises in other areas of thought. Beauty is for Aguirre, first and foremost, the result of perception. However, he intends to escape the pitfall of relativism that awaits judgement based solely on a subjective account, because this would reduce beauty to a matter of taste. With this in mind, Aguirre refines his assertion and adds that beauty is not solely an emotional reaction to an object; rather, the emotional reaction is the first stage of a more complex process. This initial emotional reaction enables the eventual intellectual appreciation of the beautiful. By virtue of this process, Aguirre concludes that art would be, in the first instance, expression and, then, representation of the beautiful, because in the artist, as in
the receiver, the emphasis is on the subject. The art object is looked at, at the same time as it returns that gaze, becoming, at once, subject and object. Contemplating a work of art establishes a connection with the artist; it is his perception and subsequent expression of the beautiful that the receiver contemplates and reacts to, hence establishing a link between artist and public, between the self and the other. Ultimately, this is a reference to Benjamin’s concept of aura, in which the singularity of the work of art is palpable in the «mirar y ser visto», by which not only the work of art, but also the experience it arouses, are unique.

Aguirre, very much in the same vein as Benjamin, establishes a link between aesthetics and society. As Benjamin does in El origen del drama barroco (1990), Aguirre interprets art as a reconciliatory element, for it may transform chaos into order, extolling the value of singularity; Aguirre explains that «en el bosque, por demás enmarañado, de la sociedad en la cual nos desvivimos, los ojos puros, limpios, que miran la belleza porque por ella son mirados, buscan una frente habitable» (1987: 53). This is reminiscent again of Benjamin’s aura. This connection becomes yet more evident by looking at an explicit reference to this concept. In an introduction
to his translation of the second volume of *Iluminaciones* Aguirre explains that

> las cosas tienen un ‘aura’ cuando son capaces de levantar la vista y devolverle la mirada a quien las mira. La fantasmagoría busca objetividad. La idea de ‘aura’ no distrae hacia terrenos baldíos, sino que ordena el análisis de la mecanización, del automatismo en los procesos de producción del capitalismo industrial (1972: 14).

Those objects which possess an aura, art, have been awarded characteristics generally reserved for the agent; looking back, beside the subjectivity involved in the act of looking also confers the object/subject a sense of uniqueness.

On the other hand, the connection between art and mechanization is finally made explicit. Hence, we are now in a position to derive several implications from the former extract. It communicates Aguirre’s view of society as complicated, having used the adjective «enmarañado», tangled. Furthermore, he enhances the impact of this description by inverting the expected content. Where the reader would have every reason to read «the society in which we live», s/he is surprised to find a play on words
which equally suggests «the society which we barely live in/ we are devoted to». This is no coincidence. With this masterful use of language, Aguirre condenses and criticizes the mechanisms of instrumental reason. Most people live in the expectation, in the hope, in the quest of fulfilling whichever need has been awoken, instead of making life its own finality, possibly suggesting a parallel with art, the art of living; life itself escapes us. In contrast with an ontology where existence has priority over essence, where following Heidegger, Sartre, and Ortega the human being is only as s/he makes himself; this is a society which has awarded essence pre-eminence over existence. This is a society where pre-eminence is given to the essence of the object, not the subject. Thus, Aguirre argues that the unravelling of the subject, its existence, is mistaken with the attainment of the object, that is, the absorption of other into the self.

This presents several problems. First, this act of absorption constitutes an ontological violence which prevents the possibility of the development of a satisfactory ethical apparatus on this basis. Second, the absorption of the other into the self leads to an ever incomplete and unsatisfied self, which cannot gain either
self-recognition or fulfilment. The other, once subsumed into a self which is only aware of a lack which cannot be identified or resolved, cannot provide knowledge or fulfilment precisely because of having been subsumed and having lost its own individuality. «Desvivir» is, thus, this destructive process living-for, in the instrumental sense, which ultimately means «un-live». It is also significant that he would choose to use the metaphor of the forest, echoing Heidegger’s Waldlichtung, forest clearing. Waldlichtung constitutes another reference to the transcendental yearning of the self, a self understood primarily as the process of existence, as expressed in Zambrano’s Claros del bosque (1977). Instead, the genuine acknowledgement of our living in-the-world-with-others would require the consideration of objects not as objects, but as others. It is in this context that Aguirre locates the experience of beauty.

Beauty is understood by Aguirre as an ultimately rational category. Despite this, it is not accessible to everyone. Aguirre makes a number of romantic assumptions which link beauty to purity, which possibly establishes a relationship of identity between the beautiful and the good. What is interesting about
this qualification is that he suggests that beauty –the good– has to be present in some degree in the subject so that it can be perceived in the object. What is more, he points to a relationship of reciprocity, which suggests that rather than a finished process, the perception of beauty is like a circular current whose flux increases proportionally to the regularity of its circulation. Three key elements are then present in this statement: the unsatisfactory dynamics of society, the equation of beauty to good, and the reciprocity in the perception of beauty, therefore, also good. This argument places some degree of hope in the benevolent, even redeeming effects of beauty. Because the capacity of perception of beauty –and good– increases with its praxis, this would, once again, encourage, first, individual and, then, social change.
5.6 The value of a critical perspective. Epistemology

There is sufficient evidence to support the view that Aguirre had a strong interest in the Frankfurt School and that his thought and sensibilities were very much attuned to those of the members of the Institut. His work, however, was not one of mere repetition or transmission. He contributed actively to the debate by becoming a Critical Theorist himself. In addition, Aguirre brought to the fore and re-addressed an issue not generally associated with the Frankfurt School, namely, faith.

Faith shapes Aguirre’s epistemology. The peculiarity of the Critical Theory developed by Aguirre and also Aranguren is that, having stripped materialist and religious standpoints of the possibility of absolute certainty, they advocate faith –now conceptualised as a life-choice in the sense of Pascal’s wager– as the most effective alternative to instrumental reason. Aguirre forcefully summarized this position when he stated that «con éstas [anécdotas utilizadas en la argumentación del hecho religioso], me ocurre un poco como con las argumentaciones profusas, que
enfilan los escolásticos para convencernos de que Dios existe. En unas y otras faltan la apuesta y la ironía» (1989: 78). There is every reason to think that Aguirre –an erudite as well as conscientious writer– weighted his words carefully. Therefore, his choice of the term *apuesta*, wager, is no coincidence, but a clear reference to Pascal’s famous argument, to which he subscribed. In addition, Aguirre’s disapproval of the search for proof of God’s existence also reflects the influence of the theologian Karl Rahner, whose work he translated. Rahner, who attended Heidegger’s lectures and was visibly influenced by his thought, defends natural knowledge of God, that is, that the human being possesses a latent knowledge of God’s existence and that any attempt to provide evidence will necessarily ratify the mystery associated to such existence.

Regarding the Frankfurt School, Aguirre underlines that «todos ellos [los componentes de la Escuela de Frankfurt] se refieren ‘críticamente’ al estado de la cuestión del binomio ‘razón y revelación’ durante la coyuntura existencial» (1985: 238). Despite their Marxist background, the Frankfurt School does not reject religion or transcendentality but, unlike Aguirre, for them, these concepts do not play a central role in the liberation of the
individual. In contrast, Aguirre is interested in the relation between reason and revelation, because— for him— part of the process of overcoming instrumental reason is the integration of revelation into the scope of reason. This issue led to Aguirre’s analysis of the contraposition of religion to consumerist behaviour, which he discusses in an essay entitled «Sociedad de consumo y comportamiento religioso», published in *Casi ayer noche* (1985: 227-39). Here he admits that «lo que me preocupa no es la desaparición de las conductas religiosas en la llamada sociedad de consumo, sino que aquéllas, con todas las mediaciones que se quiera, se acomoden a las leyes de ésta» (1985: 227). He goes on to explain that

> en la sociedad de consumo la fe cristiana no debe resignarse a constituirse en una mercancía más con su precio de impuesto, su frecuencia semanal en la consumición, sus vendedores especializados, que serían sacerdotes y teólogos, incluso con sus diferentes marcas para satisfacer la variedad accidental de un mismo gusto básico. La vuelta a Dios es vislumbrada por Horkheimer como contrapeso de las condiciones oprimentes de la "sociedad totalmente planificada" (1985: 231).
Making reference to Horkheimer’s position, Aguirre emphasizes faith, which is the key element of his response to the new forms of alienation. Highlighting this aspect leads to the development of a response that surpasses the problems posed by foundationalist and anti-foundationalist positions. Whereas foundationalism sustains that there is a foundation, one or several basic assertions which are intrinsically true and cognoscible, upon which all other knowledge is based, Critical Theorists defend that this is not the case.

There are several reasons for this. Adopting a foundationalist approach means accepting the rationality and epistemology it involves. As Keith Parsons explains, the implications are as follows: first, only that belief which is the result of a finite and non-circular chain of reasoning, supported by other beliefs acquired by the same procedure which can be ultimately traced back to the self-evident or indubitable foundation/s, is considered rational; second, there is an absolute truth. Furthermore, this truth is cognoscible (2007: 104). Hence, in this hierarchical epistemological system, knowledge is acquired inductively, in the case of the natural world, or is self-evident, justified without inference, in the case of
mathematical or logical truths, and anything which goes beyond this must be deductively inferred. That is why, according to this approach, theology and metaphysics do not fall into the scope of rationality or even epistemology. This proves to be problematic. Proving the existence of an absolute truth is a difficult enterprise, even more so if the premise is that this absolute truth may be fully cognoscibie by a human being. Defending this position turns out to be a lot more than an epistemological standpoint. It is first and foremost an ideological statement; one which suggests a modernist view of the world, where humans enjoy a privileged position to access and understand reality.

As opposed to this, influenced by Ortega, Aguirre has adopted a perspectivist epistemology. This position—as any epistemological position—is also the result of ideology in the sense of worldview which shapes our perception and our understanding as explained in Chapter One. Ideology and, consequently, politics cannot be detached from epistemology. As Chambers argues, «science and knowledge are political in an analogous way that feminists remind us that the personal is political. Claiming to be apart in a separate private or value-free zone is itself a value-laden move that has
an implication in the political world» (2004: 221). Consequently, from this point of view, the personal and the social, the political and the religious, and existence as a whole are perceived and processed by the individual from a specific ideological, political, and epistemological perspective.

Aguirre’s perspectivist epistemology involves the interconnectedness of the different spheres of reality. According to Aguirre,

> la verdad social es patrimonio de todos, pero no de unos contra otros, sino de todos juntos, y por ello dicha verdad es tan utópica como irrenunciable. Alcanzar la utopía sería igual a quemarse en ella, y suprimirla como astro de cada mañana equivale a vivir en el hielo (1985: 61).

A number of implications stem from this statement: the rejection of totalitarianism, the defence of political equality, and the vindication of the worth of utopia. This theoretical standpoint finds expression in a number of specific instances. Aguirre’s rejection of totalitarianism can be observed in relation to politics, but also religion and, particularly, the connection of the two.
Aguirre opposes the systematisation of religion. He points out that


This statement is a reflection of Aguirre’s rejection of foundationalism. From this perspective, human attempts to dominate God which materialize in the systematization of religion are the expression of an arrogant overconfidence in our own faculties. The presupposition that humankind may know God’s will to such an extent as to systematize it, implies the equation of such a system to the absolute truth, one that is beyond understanding or questioning, one which demands acceptance, one which ultimately leads to totalitarianism. That is why faith, in Aguirre’s view, must incorporate individual and social elements; it must be an individual choice with a social projection. It is possible to see in this rejection of the systematization of religion a global understanding of reality; the
spheres of life and reality are no longer neatly separated; being is thought of in terms of *Dasein*, a Heideggerian concept which means «being-in-the-world». Such a conceptualization of reality brings out the interconnectedness of being in such a way that the existing separation between the private and public spheres is overcome, not because the private sphere is invaded by the public one, as is often the case with instrumental reason, most visibly in the scope of mass media, but because the political significance and weight of the personal is highlighted, thus, empowering the individual. From Aguirre’s point of view, being cannot be mastered from within a system, for liberty is the very grounds of being, and rediscovering being necessarily implies to experience and express it in a creative horizon where liberty can be exercised. That is why the only language that would reflect the reality of being must be an asystematic one. Only by challenging instrumental reason and adopting an experiential rationality instead, does Aguirre see a plausible path to the re-connection of our rationality and experience with our ontological reality.

It is then apparent, how, for Aguirre—and also Aranguren, who also shares this experiential rationality—, there might be such
thing as an absolute truth but, if this were the case, it would be well beyond human grasp. Their position is also ideological; it suggests an alternative to the traditional hierarchical epistemology. This is an epistemology which springs from an understanding of human capabilities and needs because it has developed from them, instead of having been created as an abstract set of principles and rules imposed on human processes often constricting them.

That is not to say that these thinkers can be considered anti-foundationalist either, because the certainty of the non-existence of absolute truth as the starting point for elaborating an epistemology and a rationality leaves no room for doubt. It also reveals a governing principle which is absolute. Foundationalist and anti-foundationalist attitudes are deemed equally insufficient by these authors because they are both based on the parameters and possibilities of certainty. This is concisely summarized by Aguirre who claims that «la explicación del ateísmo y la explicación de la fe serán siempre inadecuadas» (1985: 180). In his view, no satisfactory answers can be achieved by exclusively intellectual means; a fuller conception of the rational, one that leaves room for the existential wager is needed. In order to avoid these
insufficiencies, the focus is shifted from knowledge to perception by defending the impossibility for absolute Knowledge, regardless of the existence of an absolute Truth.

Absolute Knowledge is conceived as a dangerous ideological chimera, one that shares with foundationalist and anti-foundationalist approaches a sense of certainty in their conclusions, a certainty that is more a construct than a reflection of reality or, indeed, of the human epistemological capabilities. What these Spanish Critical Theorists advocate instead is the expansion of Pascal’s theological wager to the realm of epistemology. The emphasis is no longer placed on the possibility of truth or knowledge, because it has shifted to the scope of our capacities. Certainty is no longer sought. The claim for Knowledge is dropped in favour of knowledge; a knowledge that is the result of informed choices, but choices which are ultimately based not on certainty of any kind, but on the acknowledgement of our own fallibility. Hence, this knowledge is not ultimately based on absolute Truth or certainty, but is, above all, a rational choice and an exercise of faith in that choice.

In Aguirre and Aranguren’s view, there is no Knowledge; only
reasonable, functional and experiential knowledge is possible. Theirs is not a relativist position. Not just anything is considered knowledge; there is a requisite for reasonability. This knowledge does not aspire to the status of absolute Truth and for this reason it does not aspire to be fully satisfactorily explicative; although it should be functional for the existing paradigm of reality, not in an instrumental sense, but more from a Kuhnian perspective. Finally, because of their perspectivism, knowledge is experiential. This focus on experience changes the shape of epistemology, which ceases to be hierarchical, it is no longer vertical, it now becomes horizontal, integrating formerly shunned forms of knowledge –at least in Western civilization– such as faith and intuition. Broadening the methods for knowledge acquisition results in the readmission of metaphysics and theology into the realm of epistemology.

That is why their non-foundationalism expands the realms of the cognoscible but, more importantly, by first admitting the limitations of the human capabilities, it liberates reason from the constraints of foundationalist rationality, ultimately expanding the horizon of possibility of the individual who discovers a new kind of freedom, one which when experienced in sufficient number may
even lead to the outcome of a more genuine form of democratic reality. This is in stark contrast with instrumental rationality. As Horkheimer and Adorno argue in *Eclipse of Reason* (1947b) and *Negative Dialectics* (1966) respectively, instrumental rationality, which is supported by arguments traditionally accepted as rational, has developed a social structure in which the individual is subjugated, in the same way as the Enlightenment subjugates nature for instrumental purposes. This subjugation, along with the criteria of self-interest is what ultimately makes instrumental rationality, in fact, irrational. In contrast, this epistemology paves the way for an alternative rationality; one which moves away from the governing principle of instrumentality, favouring the promotion of self-development instead, a development which is hoped will ultimately translate into socio-political change. Hence, from this perspective, rational is that which, having satisfied the criteria of reasonable, functional, and experiential epistemology, constitutes a genuine expression of being, which implies that, at the same time, it encourages future expressions of being, where being is understood as an unravelling project in the Heideggerian sense, that is, as an interdependent being-in-the-world.
In line with Aguirre’s conscious and purposeful decision to express himself in a destabilising and thought-provoking manner by exercising his discourse from the platform of experiential reason, he did not develop a system of thought because any attempt at systematization would have defeated the purpose of the comprehensive and inclusive rationality he was committed to. The option of formal systematisation has to be rejected. Experiential reason, however, still demands a consistent application of supradisciplinarity. Only then does it become meaningful. Used otherwise, applied to individual sections of reality, experiential analysis would turn into no more than a tool for instrumental reason. Hence, Aguirre’s experiential rationality is expressed repeatedly throughout all areas of his thought.
5.7 Aguirre the Critical Theorist

5.7.1 Style and structure

Although many of Aguirre’s positions are progressive, the profoundness and reach of his wager for change can only be fully understood in relation to his writings. The underpinnings of Aguirre’s Critical Theory can be found in the strategies he employed in order to develop his experiential rationality. Only after a close analysis of his works, when not only their extension, topic, and content are considered, but when these are examined holistically in reference to their tone, style, structure, and the rest of his trajectory, does it become clear that the element that conveys unity to his thought as a whole is precisely the struggle against instrumental reason. The rejection of instrumental reason and, indeed, the search for an alternative is a common element in both his practical and literary work, for despite the diversity of the projects he undertook or, rather, precisely because of this diversity, they retain a certain unity as a project of Critical Theory.

Style is, thus, one of the key aspects in which the influence of and parallels with the Frankfurt School, Benjamin in particular,
can be observed. Aguirre explains in reference to Benjamin that «las vías por las que acarrea sus materiales no son doctrinales, sino oblicuas, aquellas que él mismo describiera como propias de los surrealistas» (1971: 8). This is also very true of Aguirre himself. Despite the lack of systematic pretensions, Aguirre’s thought does contain a high degree of coherence as a project.

At the end of Casi ayer noche Aguirre explains that

las reflexiones que anteceden, como algunas otras desperdigadas en prólogos, conferencias y otros textos aparentemente de circunstancias, deben mucho, si no en su contenido material, desde luego que sí en la aprehensión formal, al estudio de la llamada Escuela crítica de Frankfurt. La lectura y la traducción –relectura múltiple– de Horkheimer; del malogrado Benjamin, de Adorno, muerto en olor de teoría, vienen siendo desde hace años tarea reflexiva de cabecera (1985: 237).

Despite having acknowledged his intellectual debt to the Frankfurt School, Aguirre does not confirm whether or not, from his point of view, the content of the Frankfurt School’s thought constitutes his subject matter. However, he readily admits that the way that they
approach writing, presenting, and even structuring their thoughts is central to what he does. There are two important implications to be drawn from this. First, this reluctance to discuss the content of his work is consistent with the conscious tendency to opacity that he maintains, resisting any readymade formulae. Second, Aguirre acknowledges the influence that the form and structure of the Frankfurt School’s writings have had on his work. When asked directly about the Frankfurt School in an interview by Umbral, Aguirre replies: «La Escuela de Francfurt me ha dado, sobre todo, una osatura mental. Su rigor filosófico lo aplico hoy a otros problemas de la cultura y de la vida» (1984: 11). Here, once again he highlights the influence that the methodology, structure, and style of Frankfurt School had on his thought. Aguirre explains that while these are present in his thought, its contents—at the time of the interview—have gone beyond the topics which are the primary concern of the School. Thus, this quotation provides further evidence of his rejection of readymade formulae, although by using the word «hoy» the implication is that the contents of his thought used to be closer to those of the School and that they have expanded in relation to the evolution of his own occupation
and interests.

This is of extreme importance to support the claim that Aguirre is a Critical Theorist, because in Critical Theory form and content are bound together as part of an effort to overcome instrumental reason. Hence, by adopting the form and structure employed by the Frankfurt School, whatever the orientation of each individual piece of work, its focus would still be the destabilization of instrumental reason. An array of de-stabilizing strategies, such as interdisciplinarity, perspectivism, fragmentation, but also integration, and contradiction are all key characteristics of Aguirre’s holistic approach which aims to overcome the dualism of instrumental reason, by fostering experiential reason instead.
5.7.2 Know thyself

Aguirre’s style is insistently autobiographical. Although he does not elaborate on this topic by way of explanation, he has provided enough comments and indications to reasonably surmise that he has developed this style of personal analysis as a consequence of the conviction that the oeuvre of a person cannot be separated from his biography and can, consequently, only be understood in the light of it, echoing Ortega’s razón vital, vital reason.

Every text is autobiographical to a certain extent. In addition to this, there are other texts which are purposefully autobiographical, not only as a descriptive attribute, but more so in terms of genre. As Georges Gusdorf explains in relation to autobiography as a genre, it «requires a man to take a distance with regard to himself in order to reconstitute himself in the focus of his special unity and identity across time» (1980: 35). This distance, focus, and desire for unity and identity, however, are not present in Aguirre’s writings. Although these features constitute the ideal co-ordinates which shape the genre of autobiography, in reality, autobiography
may sometimes be expressed in a serial or, even, fragmentary manner, effectively raising questions regarding the nature and characteristics of personal identity.

In the case of Aguirre, he was not so concerned with providing a clear, lineal, coherent, cohesive, and comprehensive portrait of his own life, as he was with sharing with the reader some of his experiences, interests, and views, from a deeply personal, but also scattered, sometimes even chaotic and –at least initially– incoherent manner. Hence, his writings cannot be considered to belong to the genre of autobiography sensu strict, although he does consider some of his writings as autobiographies, namely, he describes his essay «El aprendiz de Goethe» as «las primeras autobiografías que publico» (1985: 27)\textsuperscript{54}. The other two publications which he regards as autobiographies are the only two published volumes of his Memorias de un cumplimiento, that is, Crónica de una Dirección General (1988) and Crónica en la Comisaría (1992). The fact that they correspond to the volumes four and six respectively suggests that there are others. It is also possible, however,

\footnote{54 This essay was first published as the presentation to the Spanish translation of Goethe’s La Pasión del Joven Werther (1980); later, it became one of the texts compiled in Casi ayer noche (1985).}
that Aguirre is being playful and may be trying—and succeeding—to deliberately confuse the reader, because in the course of the *Crónica de una Dirección General*, he refers to it as the third volume of his memoirs. Of course, if he has been truthful about having written that book without revising it and in only fifteen days as he claims, it might just be an honest mistake. In contrast, *Crónica en la Comisaría* is catalogued as volume six, whereas he starts the first chapter by referring to it as the second volume of his *Memorias de un cumplimiento*, which suggests that if there are others, they are unpublished (1992: 11). This is confirmed when, towards the end of the book, he says «hasta ahora no he publicado de mis Memorias de un cumplimiento sino dos volúmenes» (1992: 131). In all likelihood, the other volumes he is referring to are those which the Duchess of Alba, according to her autobiography *Yo, Cayetana* (2011), considers were ultimately deliberately destroyed by the Duke. It should also be noted that he refers to his essay «El aprendiz de Goethe» (1980) as his first autobiography, so it may well be that he is counting other publications not included in the *Memorias de un cumplimiento* series, as the different volumes of his autobiography.
Despite these works not fitting the conventions associated with the biographical genre, it is clear that Aguirre fully intended to write in an autobiographical manner, but he to do so. So, even if he did not write a conventional autobiography, he did write autobiographically, in the sense that autobiography may also be described as inwardness, as Laura Marcus puts it, «the inward journey» (1994: 235). It is in this latter sense that Aguirre himself admitted that he is deliberately autobiographical in relation to his attitude and style.

The importance that Aguirre accords memory and, consequently, also to autobiography is expressed in no uncertain terms in Francisco Umbral’s interview:

U: -¿Qué importancia le concedes hoy a la memoria?
A: -Toda, muchísima, absoluta.
U: -Y la cultivas, a lo que veo. Tanto la memoria histórica de los Alba como tu memoria personal (1984: 11).

The value Aguirre awards to biography can be observed in two different facets. On the one hand, he turns to the personal life of whichever figure he is studying whenever possible to
complete his view of the matter discussed, as can be observed in his work on Benjamin. Even more relevant is that his writings—with the exception of his translations— are infused with his own autobiographical perspective; how he first encountered the topic or author discussed, the impact it had on him, and how he remembered those experiences. The most patent example of this can be found in Casi ayer noche (1985) and Las horas situadas (1989). Thus, when Umbral pushes Aguirre to tell him how he would describe the style of his writings, he answers that they are rememorative:

U: -¿En qué estilo escribes?
A: -Depende del género. No se escribe igual un discurso para la Academia que un artículo urgente que le piden a uno de un periódico.
U: -Estás evitando contestarme. ¿Eres rememorativo, crítico, ácido, sentimental?, ¿cómo es la psicología del hombre que saca de ti el escrito¡ [sic]?

As indicated above, his autobiographical writings are far from the straightforward narration of memories and experiences
following a mostly lineal time sequence from a first-person perspective that one may expect from this genre. This autobiographical component also leads to a certain opacity which is manifested in several ways. There is an element of whimsicality to the structure of some of his works. This is particularly so in *Casi ayer noche* (1985) and *Las horas situadas* (1989), where there is no obvious guiding criterion for the choice and inclusion of the essays compiled. His writings seem autobiographical almost despite himself, as many of the titles of the essays which make up his books indicate. In *Casi ayer noche*, these titles include: «El decir y el hacer de José Hierro», «Santander, sitio de los vientos», «Et in Arcadia ego», «Como la turquesa, amargo», «El mismo Julien Green», and «Frankfurt 1971: Leyendo con gafas oscuras», to mention but a few representative titles. Equally varied topics and titles are found in *Las horas situadas* (1989): «Fausto y sus variaciones», «La crueldad del texto», «Lecciones de geografía», «Academia en Sevilla», and «Desconocido por su excelencia» are examples of this. A similar diversity is found—to various extents—in his other books; whereas his two volumes of *Memorias de un cumplimiento* seem to enjoy thematic cohesion, for they recount
his memories in public office, the choice of the focus of their contents may also be described as whimsical, a perception which is emphasized due to the fragmentary and erratic nature of his style.

A look at titles included in his collections of essays quickly reveals that—despite the autobiographical nature of these writings—the topics set out for discussion tend to be an author, a place, or, even, an event, very rarely putting himself at the centre of the discussion from the outset. Despite this tendency to act as a literary critic, or even an intellectual in Aranguren’s sense of the word, whichever views he transmits are very openly filtered through his persona.

This strategy maximizes his visibility within the text. He resorts to a form of experientialism to eliminate the illusion of objectivity; given that any transmission is necessarily mediated and therefore transformed in varying degrees as a necessary result of that mediation, the medium should be a visible part of the resulting transmission, because ignoring this fact or, what is more, taking great pains to erase all traces of such mediation results in the obscurity, not only of the process of transmission, but of
the transmitted content itself. Aguirre, therefore, makes himself visible, perceptible, and at all rates present in his writings, even if they are, as is often the case, a review of another author’s work.

At the same time, the contents of Aguirre’s writings may come across as bursts of disperse reflexions and memories rather than as an effort to elaborate a comprehensive account of his past, resulting in a fragmentary style. In this context, fragmentation should not be confused with lack of coherence or, even, cohesion. It is fragmentary, above all, because it rejects a sense of unity, of totality, which does not necessarily affect the coherence of the text. The *Diccionario de la Real Academia Española (DRAE)* defines «fragmentación» as «acción y efecto de fragmentar» and, in turn, «fragmentar» as «reducir a fragmentos». The term «fragmentos» proves to be more informative, for it is defined as:

1. Parte o porción pequeña de algunas cosas quebradas o partidas.
2. Trozo o resto de una obra escultórica o arquitectónica.
3. Trozo de una obra literaria o musical.
4. Parte conservada de un libro o escrito.
Hence, this fragmentation refers to the lack of unity of Aguirre’s writings; it stresses that, structure-wise, his texts are formed by putting together different parts. In other words, the description of his style as fragmentary is a reflection on the distinctiveness of the fragments or parts which form it. This fragmentation stresses that the binding principles of the text are not always obvious to the reader and many not follow the expected patterns, such as thematic cohesion or temporal progression, or such patterns of cohesion may be applied very loosely. Instead, the guiding principle for structuring different parts seems to respond to the author’s preferences and subjective judgement. In any case, in reference to textual style—and in contrast with the definitions found in the dictionary—in as much as the different fragments form a whole text, this text has a basic degree of cohesion, even if it is only a material cohesion.

An instance of this fragmentation in Aguirre’s text can be observed in his essay «El asesinato del abanico», the first two paragraphs of which have been reproduced here to give the reader of sense of Aguirre’s idiosyncratic style:
No ha muerto el abanico, sino que ha sido asesinado. Por sus despojos nos persiguen como fantasmas que una mano empuña a deshora o que trasluce una vitrina iluminada, subitáneamente, desde un atrás sin fondo. Es como si supiesen, los abanicos, que no hemos encontrado al malhechor y, como sin saberlo, los mantuviese ajados, desasidos largamente, en el tris majestuoso de la penúltima resistencia.

En años en que el peligro era inminente, las fechas de entreguerras, avió alguien del mal color que iban cobrando las figuritas de mazapán. Al buhonero, un mercado ambulante, le habían sustituido los pasajes por los que se deambulaba entre escaparates abigarrados y fijos. ¿Se habían aterido los enseres? No; los había maniatado –abanicos, quimonos, mazapanes o flores de tela y de papel–, convirtiéndolos en objetos, en meras cosas. Los escaparates son la fosa común de la economía de mercado, y la vitrina doméstica, que se instala en las estancias de respeto, alejadas temerariamente de los cuartos en que se vive, un enterramiento de lujo. Constituyen unos y otra el lugar donde empezamos, con memoria borrosa, a reconstruir el crimen (1989: 43).

As can be observed in this sample of his work, Aguirre’s style is not only fragmentary, but also often disperse—even erratic—, erudite, almost cryptic, and, decidedly complex.
Fragmentation is found at different levels. First, there is an almost unavoidable fragmentation of its content as a result of his writing practice: lack of revision, speed, and reliance on memory alone. Second, there is a structural fragmentation, that is, the components of his writings appear as fragmented, for their choice is not always transparent. Again, Casi ayer noche provides a good example of this structural fragmentation, for neither theme nor genre seem to be the guiding principle for the compilation of their contents. As Carlos Funcia states, «se trata de una recopilación de artículos y reportajes publicados entre 1967 y 1984 en Triunfo, Cuadernos para el Diálogo, EL PAIS, Abc y libros colectivos» (1985: n.p.). In addition, it also includes a number of prologues, as it is the case with the essays on Benjamin and «Sermones the España», thus, they are not compiled in relation to the original purpose or function of the texts. Instead, it seems to obey to the criteria of importance and cohesion as perceived by the author, who, as Funcia recalls, describes Casi ayer noche as «toda mi vida anterior» (Ibidem). García Hortelano further confirms this view, by referring to this book in his prologue to it as «el primer capítulo de las memorias de Jesús Aguirre» (1985: 15). Third, the time of
his writings is also fragmented, not only because, as one would expect, the writings appear over an extensive period of time, but also because the criterion and order for the publication and later re-edition and compilation of his prologues, newspaper articles, public speeches, even books, do not correspond to the time-frame in which they are originally written or published. Another aspect in which time is perceived as fragmentary is that his narrative does not necessarily follow a lineal trajectory of time. Finally, Aguirre’s multifaceted life has also led to a generic fragmentation, because his writings have taken so many forms as expressed above and also because this variety has lead to the blending of these genres. This is not a casual feature of his work. It is in fact the result of, on the one hand, his close intellectual relation to Benjamin, whose work is typically fragmentary and, on the other hand, it is one more exercise of resistance against systematisation. It represents the subversion of the traditional patterns of expression—and, indeed, also patterns of living—into a comprehensive and deliberately incomplete discourse. The result is a fully intentional, de-systematised and anthropomorphic discourse.
5.7.3 Contradiction as coherence

The endeavour to produce an anthropomorphic discourse is patent in a number of different features, such as his autobiographical style, his fragmentation and reliance on memory, but also in his taste for contradiction.

The influence of Adorno, whom he refers to as «mi maestro Adorno», can be observed in Aguirre’s rejection of systematic thought (1989: 103). In his prologue to Adorno’s *Dialéctica negativa*, Aguirre explains that dissonances and contradictions must be recognized and accepted, even if not immediately understood, because the admission of this irrationality stirs reason away from domination (1975: 7-9). Thus, Aguirre appreciates the value of contradiction, in fact, cultivating it in his own work. Influenced by perspectivism, he is aware of the multiple aspects of reality and, as a result, at times he may equally defend two opposites without the intention of reaching a harmonizing conclusion. This is mirrored in the multiplicity of roles that Aguirre performed throughout his life. As Mesa explains, «esta diversidad de facetas no encubría un ápice de frivolidad, como más de uno de sus muchos detractores...»
proclamaba. Otra cosa muy distinta era que disfrutase con el juego de las ambigüedades» (2002: 300). These ambiguities and contradictions constituted for him an opportunity to explore and acknowledge a wider concept of reality, refusing to align himself with the established patterns of rationality and encouraging critical thinking.
5.7.4 Getting personal

Other elements, not strictly biographical, also contribute to enhancing the personal in his writings, both as a feature of the text, as well as in the sense of the relationship established with the reader. Aguirre says about Benjamin that «más bien narra procesos de ideas, realizando la propuesta de Schelling de una ‘filosofía narrativa’» (1971: 10). The relevance of this lies in that the analyses which Aguirre makes of Benjamin’s work are often applicable to his own texts as well as a result of the influence that Benjamin had on Aguirre’s thought. Thus, this statement is also true of his own style in the sense that both Benjamin’s and Aguirre’s writings reflect the way they think, more precisely, their trains of thought. As Duque observes, «Aguirre escribía como hablaba» (2002: x). The use of this oral style, not only humanizes his discourse, but it also brings it closer to the reader, who may get the impression of familiarity and of an atemporal exchange or, even, one situated in the present time. The following quotation illustrates this point: «¿no es envoltura el dulce engaño que nos contaban cuando fuimos niños? Los Reyes Magos, el Niño Jesús,
Ratoncito Pérez fueron, a su manera, papeles, lazos que, para acercarla [la ilusión] en seguida, distanciaba nuestra avidez de cualquier cumplimiento» (Aguirre, 1989: 82). Here, Aguirre draws on a bank of shared memories with the reader to make a connection with him at the same time he makes his point. Aguirre uses the first-person plural to bring the reader into this reflection which, by means of the rhetorical question, almost seems like a conversation in which the reader is invited to agree with the writer.

An intriguing and deliberate lack of dates constitutes part of Aguirre’s style. As Duque suggests, «Jesús Aguirre se limitaría a borrar las fechas de acontecimientos tan memorables, insinuando que todo pudo haber sido ‘casi ayer noche’» (2002: xii). These characteristics, the result of his subjectivistic approach, mirror the behaviour of human memory; they alter the chronological order of events letting the individual’s prioritization emerge; they emphasize experiences rather than facts, creating a certain haziness familiar to the readers, who regardless of the nature of the information contained in the text may feel initially drawn to it because the text is experienced as a reflection of the readers, a reflection of what Spain has been through the eyes and experiences of one man,
but also a reverberation of the personal memories of its readers. Aguirre stirs the memory of what was, encouraging a debate of what could be.

This style also includes a strong element of tension; tension between a personal, specific—though hazy—past and an intellectual, abstract content which would be problematic to situate in a finished, closed past. This tension, which is also expressed in his reluctance to provide dates, is intensified by the problematic relationship he develops between the private and public spheres. An instance of this is that he chose to share intimate details which the reader need not know and which are not particularly relevant to the point being made, for example: «en la Casa de Goya, exponía cuadros Cristina Duclos, entre ellos un retrato de mi mujer que es de mi propiedad y que Cayetana había prestado sin mi permiso» (Aguirre, 1992: 77). Another example of this practice can be found in *Crónica de una Dirección General*, where he explains that «[Pío Cabanillas] recibiría a la de Alba, sin rencor porque ésta y sus hijos habían perdido un Baedeker, que les prestó para un viaje memorable por países sometidos a los soviéticos» (1988: 49). Other such comments include observations regarding Cayetana’s
hairdo. Moreover, he often dwells in minutiae, for instance, his housekeeper’s choice of furniture for his office or her dislike of his socks. Circuitous routes, routes filled up with banalities, need not be pointless; these routes are the reflection of an ideological statement. As Ross Chambers argues, they declare that their point is not to achieve a resolution or conclusion, but rather the pursuit itself (1999: 284). Thus, he made his intimacy partly public. Minutiae are discussed in conjunction with other issues of more intellectual weight and public interest, with the result of not only blurring the boundaries between private and public, but also relativizing both in the light of each other, thus questioning the value of what is considered important and on what grounds.

Similarly, he turned the public sphere into a private one. This is particularly true of his two volumes of *Memorias de un cumplimiento*, where he recalls his experiences as General Director of Music and as Chief of the Pavilion of Seville for the Universal Exposition. Both books discuss the situations he encountered himself in when holding these public positions, including his decisions and actions. Given the public nature of the positions, these can be considered to be of public interest; Aguirre seems
to have judged it so, since he decided to publish them; however, he chose to be vague to the point of being uninformative. In these memoirs he often mentioned friendships, anecdotes, fond memories, but also to intrigues, vendettas, and power-struggles. These are generally just alluded to or only briefly discussed, as a result—and given the lack of familiarity of the reader with the events and people portrayed—the text becomes largely inaccessible, sometimes to the point of being incomprehensible to those who did not share these moments and experiences with the author. That is how the public becomes private. The rest of his writings—again with the exception of his translations—also share a certain private style and sometimes an uninformative air. In fact, he openly admits—in reference to Las horas situadas—that «no es mi intención convertir este texto en una erudición acumulada» (1989: 24).

The private and public spheres are interspersed at the level of Aguirre’s expression, but also at the level of reception, where an amount of input from the reader’s own experiences is expected to reconstruct the text. This is best illustrated with an example. Here, Aguirre comments on what he considers to be the overstated
expression of friendship, which he ventures is the result of the troubled consciousness that Spaniards share since the Civil War:

algo queda hoy de aquello, sobre todo entre políticos, que propinan sin ton ni son espaldarazos, abrazos y tuteos, a la postre aspavientos que impregnan a nuestras liturgias democráticas de tintes amarillentos o azulados. Por suerte, los comunistas españoles nos han ahorrado, al menos por ahora, el triple ósculo del Pacto de Varsovia. Y, entre tanto, la comedida reverencia monárquica ofrece, sin prisas ni presiones, su fórmula general para la cortesía de la libertad (1985: 35).

Not only should the Spanish reader have the required general knowledge to understand the allusions made, as in the case of the Warsaw Pact (1955), but s/he should also read between the lines, to grasp what is meant by heavily charged expressions, such as «liturgias democráticas». Because of the density of the discourse, the reader is expected to have a deep understanding of the society he lives in and its mechanisms. If he does not, the complex thread of cultural references and associations will make no sense, thus ultimately missing Aguirre’s argument or grasping it only partially. An example of these associations can be found above in the case
of «de tintes amarillentos o azulados». By making colour references, Aguirre enters the terrain of associations; these colours may have different meanings to different people depending on the association/s that each individual makes, obscuring the meaning of the sentence. Does amarillento, a pale tone of yellow, refer to the old, stale state of what is being described? Does it refer to its unhealthy state? Is blue a direct reference to fascist camisas azules? Or, is it azulado because of the lack of new oxygen, that is, because of the lack of genuine renovation? Or, are these private connotations that the reader cannot hope to understand?

Aguirre often sought to engage the reader with the text by creating a sense of complicity by means of a number of strategies: volunteering some –unimportant– private details, the use of familiar tone, using nicknames, and recalling anecdotes of himself and others. Anecdotes are interspersed throughout Aguirre’s works. The following are just two examples of these:

el director del teatro de San Carlos (¡viva Carlos III!), en Nápoles, me recomendó sobremanera su producción de El duque de Alba, de Donizetti. Le dije, con gran calma, que era esa la única ópera italiana que yo no podía importar a Madrid. ¿No le gusta Donizetti?
Claro que sí, pero es que el duque de Alba soy yo. Atravesó, la criatura, varios rangos protocolarios y gritó a don Dionisio que el español estaba loco de remate. Rougemont le aseguró mi cordura. Ya no le vi en toda la cena (1988: 78-79).

These anecdotes –possibly more often than not– involve others, as is the case here:

[A Eduardo Ballester, director general de difusión cultural] le había pasado su gabinete una antología del 27, que dejó preparada su antecesor en el cargo. Su reacción fue, por desgracia, típica. Hojeó, sin ojearlo apenas, el original, y, no sabiendo qué otra pega ponerle, dijo despectivamente: yo esto no lo publico; la selección es incompleta; los he contado y no están los veintisiete. Rafael Pérez Sierra, director general de teatro, comentó al enterarse aquella misma mañana: ¡menos mal que no se trata de una antología del 98! (Lector benigno: no te escandalices; a un director general del libro del primer gobierno socialista, yo le he oído confundir, sin parpadeos, a Sinclair Lewis, el de Babitt, con el otro Lewis, mucho menos pesado por cierto) (1988: 86-87).

One of the effects of this prolific use of anecdotes is that it creates a sense of intimacy with the reader, who feels that has been made privy to stories previously only known by a select few. Hence, these
anecdotes, despite their obscurity, also serve a democratizing function.

Nicknames are also a common feature of his writings. Aguirre often uses nicknames, which are not always introduced, let alone explained to the reader, such as «pintor de brocha gorda» in reference to Hitler or the allusion to «el señor que supervisó la censura», whose identity he never specifically reveals, although the reader might be able to gather it (see, respectively, 1985: 79, 101; 1988: 48). This predilection for the use of nicknames is also evidence that his written style largely reproduces the way he speaks. This is confirmed by Javier Pradera, who indicates that «Jesús Aguirre, siempre [era] aficionado a utilizar motes para referirse a los ausentes» (2004: 291).

Nicknames are one way in which the familiar –even overfamiliar– tone present in Aguirre’s discourse results in the inability of the reader to follow the reference made. An instance of this can be observed in his essay entitled «Decía Don Pedro», in which he discusses the life of the recently deceased –at the time– Don Pedro as if he were a mutual acquaintance of his and the reader’s (1989: 65-68). Although various anecdotes and reflections on Don
Pedro’s life are made, his surname is never disclosed, so the reader is none the wiser. Similarly, in *Crónica de una Dirección General*, he initially refers to Pío Cabanillas, Minister of Culture, as simply Pío, and it is not until the next page that his surname is revealed (1988: 15-16).

Although Aguirre often adopts a very familiar tone, this – at times– has the paradoxical side-effect of excluding potential readers who lack the *circumstantial* knowledge, thus, effectively becoming a very private discourse. Gullón describes his style as follows:

> lo traslucen el humor intermitente, las alusiones a figuras familiares –que no siempre lo serán para el receptor del texto– y un modo de verbalización inclinada a decir de otro modo lo que pudiera decirse sin recalar en lo semicríptico (1989: 15-16).

The frequent allusions to anecdotes, acquaintances, and an array of personal experiences which the reader cannot possibly share force the reader to do some guesswork based on an informed psychological profile of the author. However, at times the result of this recurrent obscurity in his expression is that Aguirre frustrated
and alienated some of his readers. Aguirre himself freely admitted that his style was overly rich in detail; Umbral recalls that Aguirre used to say «elegí la pedantería como mi levita preferida», which undoubtedly contributes to the inaccessibility of his texts (1997: n.p.).

Aguirre’s semi-coded expression—given that many readers would often lack the contextual knowledge to decipher the references made—presents a parallel with Heidegger, who can be accessed only by those who have deciphered the references made in his particular use of language. So in this respect, he can be considered an elitist writer, for the content of his work is clearly not accessible to everyone. This is in contradiction, however, with his editorial commitment, which presumably aims at the divulgence of knowledge. In fact, it would also be in contradiction with one of his preferred mediums of expression, the newspaper article, which is directed to the wider public. These two aspects can, however, be reconciled when the text is understood as a multilayered discourse. Aguirre does, indeed, reach for the wider public in an effort to provoke, first, a reaction, and, then, the engagement of the reader with the text. Aguirre explicitly affirms his belief in the
powerful effect which books may have on the individual: «cualquier libro en el que nos adentremos atentamente, alterará nuestra manera de mirar, de andar, de soportar la despedida de la tarde» (1989: 108).

This appeal to the wider public does not imply that Aguirre felt the need to compromise in terms of language, quality, or content, since –from his point of view– tailoring his writings for the public would be a self-defeating exercise. By doing so, the subversive element of his writings would disappear, becoming, instead, an instrument for the perpetuation of the existing socio-cultural and political situation. For him, the effective subversion of instrumental reason must be a holistic exercise in order to be effective. That is why, instead of adopting the practice of simplifying the discourse so widely used by the mass media in the hope of creating interest, Aguirre challenges the reader and demands a certain effort from him/her. These strategies serve the purpose of driving the reader away from his/her passive acceptance, forcing him/her to reconstruct the text in order to decode it, hence actively participating in the process of creation of meaning from a critical standpoint. In so doing, it is possible to observe how Aguirre
always addresses individual people, while avoiding any patterns that would address people as a mass, therefore perpetuating such a status.

All of these factors, unsurprisingly, have contributed to Aguirre’s writings being branded as obscure. At the end of *Casi ayer noche*, Aguirre explains that «voluntariamente sigo un proceso de pensamiento, y en consecuencia de lenguaje, del cual no está excluido el hermetismo» (1985: 239). Although there is no evidence to suggest that Aguirre was ever aware of Jameson, they share a similar position on this issue. Jameson poses the question:

what if [...] they [the ideals of clarity and simplicity] are intended to speed the reader across a sentence in such a way that he can salute a readymade idea effortlessly in passing, without suspecting that real thought demands a descent into the materiality of language and a consent to time itself in the form of the sentence? (1974: xiii).

Jameson suggests that the current demands for simplicity and clarity are the result of an ideological standpoint which fosters absorption and repetition while it hinders independent thought. Aguirre, well aware of this mechanism, is critical of its practice and
refuses to partake in it. This position can be explicitly observed in Aguirre’s criticism of writers who, as in the case of Marshall McLuhan, turn their readers into spectators (1988: 13). In contrast with this practice, what Aguirre suggests is that readers engage with the text, rather than read passively. Consequently, he opts for a more labyrinthine and unfinished form of expression which is aimed to express and encourage critical thinking.
5.7.5 Erratic purposefulness

Aguirre’s work can be qualified as disconcerting or as disorienting at the very least. This disorientation is produced by the lack of indicators of time as well as by the unexpected personal nature of his writings. Moreover, his style also shares and increases this feeling of disorientation. Despite the obviously knowledgeable character of the author, his language seems to project an impression of randomness. In fact, he suggests that obscurity and contradiction should be visibly present in writing. By exercising such traits, presumptions of absolute truth disappear, thus mirroring more accurately the human nature of the writer:

también es transacción la palabra escrita. [...] Porque en ella conviven la verdad y los espejos, esto es que desde ella es inviable cualquier destello que no haya sido encandilado por la previa tiniebla. Suele escribirse con la mano derecha; entre tanto, ¿qué humor mantiene a la izquierda? La naturaleza no coincide con el hombre sino para acunarle antes o después de presentar batalla (Aguirre, 1989: 41).

This is particularly so in relation to a number of unexpected
associations evoked by Aguirre in terms of the topics chosen for
discussion, but also in relation to his use of language, which is
abundant with unlikely matches. This is very revealing, because as
Skinner explains, «we should study not the meaning of words, but
their use» (1988: 55). Thus, in order to reconstruct and unveil the
underpinnings of Aguirre’s thought, it is necessary to analyse the
connotations and implications of his use of language.

One of the features of Aguirre’s style is the use of religious
references to qualify political categories, such as «catecismos
marxistas» or «liturgias democráticas» (1985: 47, 35). By so
doing, Aguirre links political concepts, which in the minds of most
Spaniards of that time are filled with great expectations as well
as with prejudices, with complex religious memories which have
far more concrete implications for this population, providing them
with a more attainable reality, hence achieving a more effective,
efficient, and complex level of communication than if longer
sentences with more conventionally suited adjectives had been
used instead. Catecismos evokes a long formulaic, dogmatic style,
largely unrelated to the problem at hand, and liturgias emphasizes
both the quasi-sacred nature of democracy, as well as its ritualistic
format, a format that involves a communion, a communion of the people who participate in the process of government and become equal by doing so. In contrast, we can discern his wager for ironic freedom; the importance that he awards to irony is patent in this statement: «la prueba de la ironía sobre cualquier fenómeno de envergadura histórica equivale, sobre todo si se ejerce desde dentro, a un certificado de vitalidad» (1987: 39). The often erratic and obscure style that Aguirre developed is, therefore, the realization of a purposeful goal.

Another feature of Aguirre’s style is that it often appears casual, largely improvised; a perception which he encouraged, as he admits at the end of Crónica de una Dirección General, «he escrito este libro de un tirón, sin fallos de memoria, en justo quince días, algunos asfixiantes, y otros tibios» (1988: 91). The reader will find that this statement is quickly confirmed upon reading the book in question. A short passage is reproduced here to illustrate this:

Entretanto [mientras que Aguirre y otros esperaban a Fernando Arias Salgado] yo animaba, en voz baja, a García Margallo, director general de la juventud, para que nos regalase con no sé qué líos
horrorosos del barrio de la Uva. Margallo era especialista en interrumpir al ministro, cuando éste dejaba de hablar en puntos suspensivos y se disponía a impartir directrices inteligibles. Luego fue “joven turco”, facción de UCD, apelativo que le sentaba casi tan bien como a Vicki, esposa de Joaquín Rodrigo; Vicki, en una clínica de urgencia, tras un leñazo de automóvil. La cabeza vendada y sin papeles de identidad encima, confundió al galeno de guardia, que inquiría quién era y respondía ella: soy turca. Y lo es. El médico pensaba que el tortazo le había hecho perder la cabeza; pues no señor (1988: 39).

This paragraph exhibits a convoluted discourse which is not only erratic, but also particularly difficult to follow on account of the unusual metaphors used, such as «barrio de la Uva» meaning wine-related, the mention of numerous people who the reader is unlikely to be familiar with, and the mixture of formal and informal registers.

By means of these devices –his hermetism, his erratic discourse, and the tension between the personal and the public spheres–, Aguirre is pushing forward the established linguistic paradigm, opening up our linguistic possibilities and as a result also opening up our conceptualization of reality. His erratic and imaginative language which shares some of the frequent features
of oral expression is by no means random. On the contrary, it could be argued that this errancy seems deliberate; and it is. His style contains a recurrent element of what Ross Chambers names loiterature in reference to the digression and openness of these texts. The relevance of loiterature lies in that it breaks away from from established patterns of thought in as far as it constitutes a destabilizing discourse. As Chamber sexplains, loiterature involves openness in the sense of indeterminate, unfinished, but also in its openness to the other, in what it contains and does not contain of alterity (1999: 37). With this language, Aguirre suggests the interconnection of otherwise distinctly separate realms of reality, inviting the reader to establish supradisciplinary connections, altering the traditional perceptions of boundaries and of hierarchy: «the supposedly secondary comes to occupy the foreground of attention, and the hierarchizing distinction between the relevant and the pointless, on which story depends, begins to lose its own cogency» (Chambers, 1999: 117). Consequently, as Grohmann argues, the erratic discourse favours an egalitarian understanding of any given reality, for all aspects of it are deemed appropriate for inclusion, having abandoned the traditional
patterns that establish relevance (2005: 141-42). What is more, digressive writing destabilizes pre-existing structures. Thus, an alternative to instrumental reason is offered and exercised with the adoption of the erratic discourse, for it represents, responds to, and encourages experiential rationality, while simultaneously undermining the premises and structures of instrumental reason. This resistance to function within the parameters established by instrumental reason, which is crucial to understanding Aguirre’s use of language, is one of the central aspects of the aims and methodology of Critical Theory.

Despite the purposefulness of his erratic writing, his frequent disregard for the reader or, alternatively, the excessive familiarity with him/her—which equally leads to a clueless reader—suggests that his motivations for writing may be multiple and overlap. There is an overt socio-political agenda. However, his style also suggests that his writing may have been an exercise of confession—this need for confession can be seen as an almost side-effect of his previous priesthood—and, as such, an exercise of redemption or catharsis for his political scheming, in the sense that public disclosure may provide a sense of purification or relief. As Aguirre indicates, «la
intimidad se cultiva en el género literario correspondiente: los diarios, muy teñidos de confesión religiosa» (1985: 173). Another factor which may have compelled him to write down some of his autobiographical experiences is his status as Duke of Alba, because as such he might have felt the obligation to record his life—and to research the previous holders of this title—for the sake of historical interest. He seems to make an allusion to this in his speech of entry into the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando, later compiled in Altas oportunidades:

no es añoranza, sino el pulso que debo tomarle responsablemente a mi presente, lo que me exhorta a reparar, sin aspereza alguna en las yemas de la memoria, las cuentas del “collar” académico que, en repetidas oportunidades, ha ennoblecido el pecho de los Duques de Alba (1987: 19).

This urge to record his life is further confirmed by Aguirre’s claim that he is writing his diary, which is supposed to be a very candid account of his own life which includes details of those surrounding him, as he explains in an interview with Umbral:
U: -¿Qué escribes?
A: -Mi Diario.

[...]
U: -[...] Recreo las gentes que pasan por esta casa, qué [sic], como te he dicho, ya sólo son amigos. La cosa no es publicable hasta dentro de años. Hay mucha gente viva implicada (1984: 12).

The existence of a diary with his memories is also mentioned to by García Hortelano and Jorge Herralde. The later recalls that «[Jesús Aguirre] me dijo, entre otras cosas, que desde hacía muchos años llevaba un diario, redactado, al parecer, con espectacular sinceridad. En alguna ocasión intenté publicarlo, naturalmente expurgado, casi sin esperanzas y desde luego sin éxito» (2006: 14; see also García Hortelano, 1985: 15). The Duchess of Alba also alludes to this diary in her memories, Yo, Cayeta (2011); however, there, she explains that after Aguirre’s death, the manuscript was never found and the only possible conclusion is that he must have burnt it in the fireplace.

This diversity of motivations for his writings provides another explanation for the tension between the personal and private on the one hand, and the abstract and public on the other. Needless to say that, the incident of his diary’s disappearance is further evidence of this tension.
5.8 Reconsidering Aguirre’s relationship to the School

In spite of the strong influence that the Frankfurt School had on Aguirre’s intellectual path, and despite the fact that his name will remain linked to theirs, Aguirre –once again– broke with his past. In line with his pattern of reinvention, after his editorial period, he decided to separate his image from the School –perhaps with the sole exception of Benjamin– by pursuing different interests. It is not clear when this decision was taken. In fact, it is rather likely that more than a decision, this distance from the School responded more to his own process of personal development than to a specific purposeful decision to change course and leave the Frankfurt School behind. In any case, his trajectory indicates that this process of separation from the School began with his leaving Taurus. By leaving Taurus, Aguirre not only severed his editorial link to the School, but embarked upon a radically new life, not only accepting the position of General Director of Music but, more crucially, becoming Duke of Alba.

Thus, his thought seems to have moved on in a different direction. It is certainly difficult to reconcile his Marxist and
neo-Marxist sympathies with his later-acquired title of duke. Furthermore, far from being a figure of resistance and subversion, Aguirre became a well-integrated part of the Establishment, contributing to its operation and its development. This can be interpreted simply as a paradox, a contradiction, or, even, a betrayal of his younger self. As J. Ernesto Ayala-Dip elegantly puts it, in his review of *Aguirre, el magnífico*, it is not that Aguirre «maquinara su propia deserción ideológica ni estética. Simplemente un día se encontró con la oportunidad de ser un Grande de España. Y no la desaprovechó» (2011: n.p.).

Breaking with his past, in this case with his relationship to the Frankfurt School, does seem to fit a long-running pattern of *borrón y cuenta nueva*, that is, of making a fresh start. However, although this may remain true, a closer look reveals that although he no longer maintained such a direct relationship with the School’s thought after the translation and edition of their works at Taurus, there is ample evidence to support that, after that period, far from rejecting the School’s work, he underwent a process of internalization of their Critical Theory through its *praxis*.

Aguirre integrated the guiding principles of Critical Theory
into his own thought and used them as a framework of sociological meta-analysis. His continuing close links with the School after his editorial role are readily observable not only in the style of Critical Theory that he cultivates in his own writings, but also in the various essays and allusions to the School that he included in his post-1985 work. Even the nature of his work as a cultural ambassador can also be considered as part of a project of empowerment and liberation of the individual, very much in line with the role of art as seen by the Frankfurt School. Thus, his readers cannot help but wonder what his motivations to distance himself from the School were. Is it a part of the array of contradictions he purposefully cultivates? Possibly. More likely still is the possibility that – based on the evidence of the pattern of regular reinvention developed by Aguirre – after having internalized and integrated some of the key features and methods developed by the Institut, namely, its Critical Theory, Aguirre decided to move on, distancing himself from the most theoretical aspects of the School and of the School as an entity. On the other hand, given his continued fidelity to the spirit of the School, to its aims and methodology, his outspoken distancing from the School may just correspond to a change of
focus and not necessarily to a change of attitude or purpose.

In conclusion, I hope to have provided evidence of Aguirre’s engagement in a multileveled project of transformation; transformation of the self, of his socio-cultural and political reality, and, most importantly and more radically, a transformation of the very framework of thought by providing an alternative to instrumental reason. His proactive commitment towards dialogue, cultural transmission, critical thinking, the use of a complex and rich language, as well as the contents he chose to develop remain a testimony to his efforts and achievements as a Critical Theorist.
There is, I think, no more pressing task for progressive people in the First World than tirelessly to analyse and diagnose the fear and anxiety before Utopia itself: this relatively introspective and self-critical process need not wait on the emergence of new visions of the future, such as are bound to appear when the outlines of the new global order and its postnational class system have become stabilized. There is a collective therapy to be performed on the victims of depoliticization themselves, a rigorous look at everything we fantasize as mutilation, as privative, as oppressive, as mournful and depressing, about all the available visions of a radical transformation in the social order (Jameson, 2000: 388).
6 Is it Critical Theory after all?

Although, as argued throughout this book, Aranguren and Aguirre certainly share a number of key elements with Critical Theory, it would not be accurate to say that their thought conforms exactly to Critical Theory as developed by the Frankfurt School. In order to determine –by way of conclusion– whether their work may reasonably be considered Critical Theory, this final chapter compares, in contrast with Frankfurtian Critical Theory, the specificity of the approach adopted by Aranguren and Aguirre with regards to the role of Marxism, exile, biography, fragmentation, art, the subject, psychoanalysis, and spirituality.
6.1 Aranguren and Aguirre; their specificity

6.1.1 Critical Theorists do not always wear red

Critical Theory was founded upon a strong Marxist background. The work of the Frankfurt School has often been described as neo-Marxist insofar as it re-addresses Marxism and elaborates new patterns of thought and criticism which aim to overcome the inadequacies and insufficiency of classical Marxism in relation to a neo-capitalist society. In contrast with this, neither Aranguren nor Aguirre expressly attempt to recuperate or update Marxist principles. Their relationship with Marxism is one of dialogue and their interest in it is more of a social than a political nature.

Nevertheless, the importance of Marxism in their historical moment and in their work must not be underestimated. Although they are not Marxists, Aranguren and Aguirre do engage with Marxism. It can be said that they do so extensively, to the point that Marxism becomes their main interlocutor, especially between the years 1963-1969, after which point the neo-Marxist discourse occupies an important part of their work. This engagement provides evidence of their questioning existing socio-economic models and
of their quest to find alternative ones. In the course of this book, I hope to have provided sufficient evidence of their knowledge of and interest in Marxism, and how instead of adopting its ideology, it provided them with an awareness of a number of key issues that they later engaged with and developed in their own idiosyncratic ways.

Thus, whereas the Frankfurt School adopts Marxism as their framework, Aranguren and Aguirre, by liberating themselves from such an intellectual constraint, take Critical Theory a step forward. Although adopting the critical stance promoted by neo-Marxism, by refusing to be shaped by Marxist ideology, they avoid the challenges that the Marxist understanding of ideology poses and succeed in effectively freeing themselves from the limitations of a constraining rationality.


6.1.2 Inspirational exile

The existing relationship between exile and intellectual production is highlighted by Faber when he starts his book *Exile and Cultural Hegemony* by asking: «what is it about exile that makes it such a catalyst for cultural production?» (2002: 3). Faber ventures that the fruitful production of the exiles, despite their frequent lack of material, institutional, and, even, personal support is the expression of the fact that they feel wronged, for they have «a cause to defend, an enemy to denounce, or a lost land nostalgically to evoke» (*Ibidem*). It would be, of course, naive to defend exile or, more precisely, injustice as the ultimate recipe for literary inspiration. It is in exile, nonetheless, where –in the light of the challenges faced– the link between biography and intellectual production becomes not only relevant but also evident.

This is true not only of Spanish Republican exiles, but also of Critical Theorists. It is the triumph of Nazism that forces the members of the Frankfurt School into exile. Similarly, despite Aranguren’s initial compliance with the regime, it is as a result of the pressures of Francoism, when –deprived of his chair– he chose to emigrate to the United States. Their exilic condition, in
particular the outsider’s perspective they acquired in reference to their home and host countries, put these thinkers in a privileged position for cultural analysis. Having a first-hand experience of a system they have not been socialized in, puts exiles in an extraordinary position to perceive the internal contradictions and needs of the underlying social system. Equally, it also provides them with a new frame of reference and a certain critical distance to analyse their homeland. Far from fully integrating in American society and its socio-economic and political dynamics, they –both the members of the School and also Aranguren– retained an outsider’s view as is reflected in much of their critique. As Kellner explains, «testimony by members of the Institut themselves indicates the extent to which their experience of exile influenced their choice of language, modes of expression, and development of their social theory» (1989: 81). The experience of exile influenced their views on the evolution from classical capitalism to neo-capitalism; as Kellner explains, neo-capitalism was novel to them, in contrast to those who perceive it as a natural socio-economic evolution (1989: 82). Thus, the familiarity of Aranguren and of the members of the Institut with authoritarian regimes and their
perception of the democratic, neo-capitalist system in the United States, contributed significantly to their analysis.

This can be observed in their fierce critique of consumerism, as well as in the comparison between authoritarian and liberal neo-capitalist societies, particularly, in relation to the methods of control developed by both societies and, especially, in relation to the use and impact of the mass media, as the Institut’s conception of mass culture and communications was first shaped by Hitler’s use of them. This kind of analysis, however, is not exempt from criticism. Eagleton argues that «the Frankfurt School of Marxism, several of whose members were refugees from Nazism, simply projects the ‘extreme’ ideological universe of fascism onto the quite different structures of liberal capitalist regimes» (1991: 127). Hence, their position as outsiders is a double-edged one. Being outsiders, which may become an advantageous intellectual position, may also lead to distortions or oversimplifications. Kellner points out how «they may have missed some of the ideological contradictions within mass culture and the socially critical and potentially progressive possibilities of the new media such as film, radio, and television» (1989: 83). In fact, there are few
suggestions of satisfactory alternatives in the Frankfurtian Critical Theory, which is why it has often been described as pessimistic. As Marcuse concludes in relation to the latent potential for liberation, «‘liberation of inherent possibilities’ no longer adequately expresses the historical alternative» (1964: 255). In contrast, Aranguren and Aguirre do not place their hopes in technology, or political, or even institutional change, but on the individual, perhaps also missing the opportunities these elements may offer.

Although Aguirre’s long stays abroad during his formative years, cannot be qualified as exile, can be labelled of academic migration in as far as Aguirre went to Germany to pursue his academic interests. The significance of the impact of this migration is comparable to Aranguren’s experience in exile, not in terms of the negative features of exile in terms of separation and displacement, but because of the intellectual horizon that this academic migration opened up for Aguirre. Given the socio-political, religious and intellectual climate in Spain during Francoism, Aguirre’s stay in Germany played an essential role in the development of the critical perspective and tone so characteristic in his work.

Thus, it can be said that the influence of Aranguren’s and
Aguirre’s stay abroad, although underestimated, is central to their thought. Aranguren’s experience of exile and even Aguirre’s academic migration are in line with one of the core features of Critical Theory, emigration, for as Kellner puts it, «Critical Theory, like much modern philosophy and contemporary social theory, is exile theory, the product of thinkers forced by adverse circumstances into emigration» (1989: 81).
6.1.3 The vital role of biography

Although the genre of the writings cultivated by Aranguren and Aguirre cannot be considered entirely biographical, their writings have in common a strong, recurring, and deliberate biographical component, whose relevance lies in the subversive significance of biography in the context of Critical Theory.

Biography constitutes a subversive genre because it reclaims the importance of the personal and the individual, both as important for their own sake, but also insofar as the personal and the individual contribute to shaping the public and collective. First, a biography is built from the perception of the self and from the relation between the self and the other. This shows an initial complexity which is resistant to the one-dimensional reductions characteristic of instrumental rationality. In fact, many of the key characteristics of the discourse of Critical Theory can be observed in biographic discourse, such as its concern for human relationships, the exercise of experiential epistemology, and the presence of fragmentation, errancy, interconnectedness, multilayered motivations and interests, and, of course, contradiction.
Biographic content is universal and unique at the same time, in as much as our humanity relates the individual to everyone else, sharing a common nature, sometimes a common historical context and, often, also a number of common challenges, whose specificities may or may not be shared by others, but which make possible relating to each other. Simultaneously, a biography also stresses what is original and unrepeatable in the individual, conferring upon the person –the person whose biography is being told and also, by extension, those who read it– the sense of dignity that is robbed from them when they become part of the instrumental chain of reason and action by diluting their individuality in the mass.

According to Susana Narotzky, «there is a dialectical tension between doing and being that relates to the tension between structure and agency, [sic] in history» (2002: 45). This tension can be perhaps described as internalized and perceived, but not necessary. Such tension functions, in fact, as a mechanism of social control by means of the feeling of powerlessness that derives from it. Only by dissolving this distancing tension can individuals be empowered to become a proactive link between freedom and responsibility. By shifting the emphasis back on to the individual,
this sense of powerlessness can be replaced by one of possibility and responsibility, by an awareness that the existing structures have been created and are, in fact, being perpetuated by either the will or the inaction of the agents of a given society. Only by re-evaluating the role, power, and impact of the individual, of each life history, of biography, can this tension be overcome and freedom exercised, not only as the reclamation of the positive freedom that governments often use as propaganda, but as the complex exercise of each individual taking charge of his/her own actions and their implications.

Biography, therefore, becomes the basic genre of anti-instrumental discourse, as it contains a richness and complexity that resists the processes of oversimplification typical of instrumental reason, and reclaims the epistemological value of experience, as opposed to the illusory impersonality and objectivity of factual data. For this reason, the discourse of experiential rationality is necessarily grounded in biographic expression.
6.1.4 Fragmentation

Fragmentation is a key aspect of Critical Theory. Fragmentation may be considered to be one of the characteristics of the Frankfurt School in terms of their geographical displacement, but also in terms of the diversity of their focus and content, and even of their membership. Instances of this can be found in the works of Fromm, Pollock, Lowenthal, Neumann, and others, who—although initially attuned to the line of research of the School—developed their work in a divergent direction so that, in time, they distanced themselves from the School, partly, due in some cases to financial pressures, and, partly, because of the direction that their own interests take. The most dramatic case is, perhaps, that of Benjamin, whose acceptance by the School was never complete, mainly due to the existence of a number of ideological and personal tensions with its members (refer to Adorno and Benjamin’s correspondence edited by Henri Lonitz, 1999). In some cases, the association to the Institut was more ideological than bureaucratic due to financial limitations. That was the case of Marcuse, who did not enjoy a steady income from the School, which is reflected in his trajectory,
as observed in his acceptance of a number of positions which provided him with an income, ensuring his continuing intellectual involvement with the School. This is precisely what happened when he became senior analyst at the Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information. Despite this fragmentation, a clear consciousness of group exists both in terms of institutional association and in terms of a common purpose and project, however problematic these may be. As Kellner explains, «biographical material shows that Horkheimer, Marcuse, Pollock, Fromm, Lowenthal, and others [...] were all drawn to Marxian ideas, which explained the war in terms of the dynamics of capitalism and imperialism and produced a thoroughgoing critique of capitalist society, as well as an alternative to it» (1989: 9).

In contrast with this, and despite their connections of a personal and intellectual nature, it cannot be said that Aranguren and Aguirre form a group or a school of thought. In fact, they work independently from each other and, not only are they not organized as a group, but there is no conciencia de grupo, that is, no awareness of sharing a common project. This is hardly surprising considering their distance, both geographic and of focus. Far from
the case of the Institute for Social Research, there is no institutional centre for these thinkers. Instead of fostering the development of such associations, their political and historical context oppressed and hindered free expression, free association, and critical thinking. It is partly as a result of this policy that Aranguren and Aguirre spent part of their lives and careers abroad. It is precisely away from Spain where Aranguren and Aguirre started adopting their most critical positions. It is true that they did not share a common focus, for they engaged in different enterprises, having concerned themselves with different aspects of thought. Nevertheless, in their search for social justice, both Aranguren and Aguirre share the same aims as the members of Frankfurt School. They all sought a socio-political organization which, as Marcuse puts it, «would open the possibility of an essentially new human reality, namely, existence in free time on the basis of fulfilled vital needs» (1964: 231). Despite their differences, what links together the work of Aguirre and Aranguren is their intention not only to encourage the readers’ engagement with their texts, but to trigger a process of individual and social change through the development of a critical attitude towards the patterns of instrumental rationality.
6.1.5 Art as authentic experience?

The position of the Frankfurt School in relation to art has been the object of frequent criticism, even by left-wing authors, on the basis of its elitism. As Jameson explains,

what is unsatisfactory about the Frankfurt School’s position is not its negative and critical apparatus, but rather the positive value on which the latter depends, namely the valorization of traditional modernist high art as the locus of some genuinely critical and subversive, ‘autonomous’ aesthetic production (2000: 127).

Jameson objects to its elitism, but also to the reproduction of previous patterns of capitalist society through the acceptance of given cultural forms. These objections are applicable to Aranguren and Aguirre only partially. These thinkers are heirs to the Heideggerian tradition and, thus, they argue for the truth and authenticity of art in reference to high-culture manifestations of the work of art. However, they partly overcome some of the objections attached to this position by their encouragement of the individual’s artistic potential. In this way, art becomes a cathartic process of self-discovery –thus retaining its content of truth and
authenticity—expression, and eventually subversion by a process of spiral (r)evolution.

Jameson, who advocates more radical subversive forms, would still regard this as insufficient and ambiguous:

the ambiguity, in other words, is as much in the revolutionary’s own position as it is in the art object: insofar as he is himself a product of the society he condemns, his revolutionary attitude is bound to presuppose a negation of himself, an initial subjective dissociation that has to precede the objective, political one (2000: 68).

The attempt of the negation of the self, however, seems to suggest a deconstructionist position, a deconstructionist effort that is doomed from the start given the impossibility of entirely freeing oneself from the given cultural heritage. Instead, the position of Aguirre—and to a lesser extent also Aranguren—, constitutes a conciliatory attempt to integrate and overcome this heritage.
6.1.6 Is there such a thing as the subject?

One of the distinctive characteristics of the thought of Aranguren and Aguirre is a strong reliance on the existence of the subject, as opposed to the increasing perception of its fragmentation and fragility.

The changing conceptualizing of human identity, with increasing emphasis on a divided subjectivity in a process of continual formation, has its roots in early modernity and continues to develop throughout Romanticism and the period of classic realism, in contrast with the stable subject interpellated by realist texts (Bretz, 2001: 441).

Different factors have contributed to this, most notoriously Nietzschean theories and psychoanalysis, which forces us to rethink the concept of the self, not only in terms of identity but also of control over the self and access to the inner self. Historical events such as the First and Second World Wars –with the destruction, displacement, exile, and death on a large scale which it entailed, along with the subsequent climate of threat and tension it created– have contributed to emphasizing this atmosphere of fragmentation
which culminated in Foucault’s claim of the death of the subject.

Far from this, influenced by Unamuno and Ortega, Aranguren and Aguirre regard the subject as the keystone which supports their moral and even political positions. Their sense of fragmentation also lies in that they both have a polymathic range of interests which represents, not the fragmentation of the post-modernist individual, but the acceptance of his/her multiplicity, revealing a sense of unity driven by the perceived interconnectedness of reality. From Aranguren and Aguirre’s perspective, although changes in the structures of society and its supporting institutions are considered necessary, the focus of their hopes for qualitative change lies in the individual. So, in contrast to the heirs of the Marxist tradition, who envisage the self as a socio-economic product, these Spanish thinkers understand the self as a reflexive consciousness which enjoys a degree of cohesion. Theirs is not an atomistic and autonomous individual; it is a cohesive, although incomplete subject—still liable for ethical responsibility as a result of his/her freedom—who leads an existence which is intersubjective and interdependent on reality.

According to the Marxist interpretation of the dynamics
of socio-economic change, base-structure and superstructure constantly influence each other, so that a change in one would lead to a change in the other. Although Aranguren and Aguirre take a substantially different position, they share with Marxism the assumption that a change at any one level of the structure will destabilize that structure in such a way that another change is required. These changes may either be interpreted as anomalies which are absorbed in the process of adaptation and survival of the system, or they may spiral into a transformative process of grand-scale change. What is specific about the proposal made by Aranguren and Aguirre is that the change should come from the individual. This is radically different from Marxist projects for liberation. According to Marxism, the development of class-consciousness would lead the proletariat to join forces in order to overthrow the capitalist system, eventually replacing it with a communist one. Neo-Marxists, on the other hand, consider that a more efficient use of the available technology, that is, a socially oriented use, would lead to increased production. In turn, the superstructure could evolve into a more distributive society in terms of production, but also leisure, which would eventually
allow for the liberation of the individual. Neither of these paths, however, has rendered satisfying changes, which poses some questions. Is it still possible to defend the interaction of structure and superstructure? If it is, why have these paths proven insufficient?

Marxist analyses of culture largely rest on constructivist premises. David Bordwell explains how from the perspective of the Frankfurt School «culture is a social construction by its agents; at the same time, social processes construct culture; and social subjects are themselves constructs of culture» (1996a: 13). Although it is true that the pessimistic conclusions of Frankfurtian Critical Theory can be largely traced to the circularity of this argument, Critical Theory itself need not be caught up in this circle. In fact, by interpreting this process as a descriptive analysis rather than as a causative one, Aranguren and Aguirre manage to offer a hopeful outlook that takes a spiral shape, instead of a circular one. Rather than changing the structures of socio-economic and political organisation, or the behaviour of the individual, what Aranguren and Aguirre suggest is that a more profound change at the level of the individual has to take place; a long-lasting and effective change, the kind of qualitative change that would trigger
a spiral process. The agent, although undoubtedly influenced by the process of socialization and culture itself, is not entirely determined by it; there exists some scope for dissent and innovation, without which history would be firmly anchored in a timeless period of stagnation and repetition. Still, the acknowledgement of the role and impact of social processes and culture, and, particularly, the fact that each individual is undeniably embedded in these makes it impossible for social change to follow a linear trajectory. Only a spiral trajectory may account for the complexity and slow progression of a multilayered process that is characterized by periods of apparent forward and backward movement. Thus, the possibilities of qualitative change lie in the uniqueness and unpredictability of the individual. The difficulty, of course, remains how to make such a state of awareness and self-development widespread. The answer for Aranguren and Aguirre is spirituality, art, and an engagement with experiential rationality.
6.1.7 Studying the soul

As Ricoeur puts, «the Frankfurt School claims that the project of liberation which its sociological critique offers for society parallels what psychoanalysis achieves for the individual» (1986: 7). Moreover, Marcuse and Fromm integrate psychoanalysis into the discourse and methodology of their social research, because of the close relationship between psychological and social problems. Such an approach not only constitutes an innovation in relation with established patterns of research, the links it suggests, and the directions it opens, but it also puts into practice the supradisciplinarity that the School strives to achieve.

In a reasoning reminiscent of Marcuse’s application of psychoanalytic principles in *Eros and Civilization*, Aranguren identifies the individual’s inner dissatisfaction as a symptom of the shortcomings of the process of and the result of their socialization. Similarly, Aguirre considers the growing rates of atheism to constitute such a symptom. However, neither Aranguren nor Aguirre embrace psychoanalytic theory. Far from it, Aranguren and Aguirre acknowledge the impact of psychoanalysis, although

The subversive nature of Freud’s findings lies in its value as a Copernican turn of the psyche, in as much as Freud distrusts conscious psychical manifestations, trusting instead in sources traditionally outcast from rationalist epistemology such as dreams and unintentional actions. The Frankfurt School, and also Aranguren and Aguirre, identify this blow to Cartesian rationality and invert the long-established parameters of truth by defending an experiential epistemology. Aranguren and Aguirre differ from the Frankfurt School, however, in that instead of applying the principles of psychoanalysis to their work, they rely on a return to transcendence to bridge the gap between the individual and society, and between the individual and him/herself.

Like in the case of Marxism, Aranguren and Aguirre resist fully committing themselves to a systematized ideology, namely, psychoanalysis. They do, however, revert to psychoanalysis in an etymological sense; insofar as psychoanalysis is the study of the soul, the introduction or recognition of the element of faith and transcendence are crucial to the development and cohesion of
their project.

It is crucial to the understanding of the comparison drawn here between Critical Theory and these two Spanish thinkers that, as a result of not having been able to identify directly political paths towards liberation, the Frankfurt School turns their focus towards psychological and moral aspects of the individual. This move takes place not because they give up the possibility of having a political impact, but because they identify such possibility in the potential of the individual. As James Bohman explains,

> in its initial phases, critical theory developed a clear and radical orientation to democratic theory through the ideal of a self-organized, free society that is an expressive totality. The normative contrast operative here is between the real consensus of democracy and the reifying effects of capitalist rationalization. But since the Frankfurt School theorists saw the spread of instrumental reason as turning modern society into a ‘false’ totality, democracy played less and less a role in their normative thinking; they sought potentials [sic] for non-dominating social relations deeper in the psychological capacities of human beings for solidarity, compassion, and the mimetic identification with others (1996: 210).
Similarly, Aranguren and Aguirre’s proposals exhibit a bottom-up approach according to which a freer and more just society can only be the cumulative result of the education and liberation of the individual, who consequently is expected to engage some degree of political activity in pursue of social justice as a moral duty.
Psychoanalysis exposes the discomfort and affliction which affect the individual in our society. These are interpreted by Critical Theorists as symptomatic of the irrational and counter-productive structures which our culture and society are governed by. Aranguren and Aguirre—who share a common religious background—see the rejection of transcendence at the root of such symptoms. In contrast with the German tradition, Aranguren and Aguirre, turn spirituality into the cornerstone of their thought. As Danièle Hervieu-Léger observes:

> empirical investigations dealing with beliefs within these very societies [Western European and North American societies] attest with the same consistency that individual interest in the spiritual and the religious has not undergone any decline, despite a disenchantment introduced by the pervasive expansion of instrumental reason in all regions of life (2001: 161).

As Hervieu-Léger continues to argue, through faith, individuals construct or affiliate to systems of signification in order to give
meaning to their own experience. Thus, Aranguren and Aguirre integrate the element of faith into their thought. Paradoxically and, perhaps, contrary to the nature of faith itself, Aranguren and Aguirre do not present faith as a leap beyond what can be rationally explained; instead, faith is incorporated as a rational decision, not because of the rationality of its content, but because it is perceived as the best possible choice. By choosing faith, they avoid the traps of foundationalist and anti-foundationalist positions. Thus, as Hervieu-Léger suggests, it is important to distinguish between ritualized religion and inner religion, although in the case of the latter, it would be more accurate to say spirituality rather than religion (2001: 162). The difference lies in that former does not require faith, whereas the latter refers to the spiritual or ethical engagement of the individual through the continuous appropriation of his transcendental reality and its implications. It is in this latter sense that Aranguren and Aguirre propose faith and transcendence as an antidote to the loss of meaning which may result from the instrumental rationality of our socio-cultural and political reality. Their defence of transcendentality and faith must be understood as a response to the unsatisfactory socio-political
situation of Spain, as well as to the religious and moral challenges that came about as a result of the latter.

The question of religion and, more particularly, spirituality has traditionally been central to the evolution of Spanish thought. Following Faber, it is possible to argue that spirituality, as opposed to materialism, is the key feature of Hispanism, which suggests that the role of religion in these authors’s thought is, in fact, part of a long established defining trend of Hispanism (2002: 167, 175, 178-80, 183). Nevertheless, crucial as it may be for Spanish thought, it is not exclusive to it. Their thought links in with the work of other authors, such as Ricoeur and Lévinas, who have also developed a deeply rooted spiritual philosophy. In the case of Lévinas, his strong rejection of Heideggerian thought from a spiritual perspective informs much of his writings, as observed in *Totalité et infini, essai sur l’extériorité* (1961) and *Autrement qu’être, ou, Au-delà de l’essence* (1974). Their interest may be interpreted as the attempt to construct or find a system of signification which may give meaning to our own existence or as an insightful attempt to shed light onto the tension which exists between the self and the other, so that an ethical proposal coherent with those findings
may be put forward. Thus, considering the impact the personal bears on the social, the influence of religious and spiritual issues on socio-political events should not be underestimated. With regards to the role of religion and faith in Aranguren and Aguirre’s thought, this research has provided evidence of its relevance and, more importantly, it has established the firm connection between their spiritual positions and their socio-political critique.
6.2 A question of words

Based on the evidence shown in this chapter and throughout this book, I contend that Aguirre and Aranguren’s attack against instrumental reason is comparable to the critique of reason developed by Critical Theorists; for even if they do not use the same terminology, the essence of their critique shares the core elements which are common to all Critical Theorists. The extent of this influence was such that these leading Spanish thinkers developed their own thought in a manner consistent with the core principles of Critical Theory to the point that it can be said that it constitutes in itself their own brand of Critical Theory. Moreover, I argue that Aranguren and Aguirre are original thinkers who have made a unique contribution to the history of ideas with their work. Having established their idiosyncrasies, another question must be asked: is there still enough common ground for them to be called Critical Theorists?
6.2.1 What is Critical Theory anyway?

The term Critical Theory is made up of two complex concepts. What are their implications? Critical Theory is problematic in its inclusion of the word «Theory» when one of its objectives is precisely to challenge the traditional supremacy reserved for the concept of Theory and the kind of rationality and associations it generally implies⁵⁵. According to Jean-Michel Rabaté’s analysis of Theory, Theory can only be made from a specific historical position; hence, it harbours in its very conception a certain agenda (2002: 2; see also J. Butler, 2004: 121-22)⁵⁶. Theory, almost by definition, is also intrinsically lacking in praxis; Theory is understood as the opposite of practice, experience, life. Rabaté points to two central functions: witnessing and questioning an existing situation, discourse, or practice (2002: 8-9). These functions also imply that there is certain incompleteness about Theory. This, however, is

⁵⁵ «Theory» as a concept per se is capitalized here as opposed to «theory», which is used in reference to particular theories.

⁵⁶ Despite the contemporary nature of this analysis –Rabaté’s book was only published in 2002 and its analysis focuses on the period from 1975 onwards– its conclusions about Theory are still useful and certainly applicable to the theory the present analysis is engaged with.
not at odds with Critical Theory, which cannot be considered one of the Grand Theories which aspired to being all-encompassing.

These features of Theory, not coincidentally, are very close to what Aranguren defended as the task of the critic. Is that because critics ought to be theorists? Are critics, as portrayed by Aranguren, already, and perhaps unknowingly, theorists? Perhaps so. In any event, this brings us to a more fundamental issue, although by no means new: the question of language. It is a matter of terminology, but undoubtedly, it is also a matter of perspective, for whereas Theory is associated with abstract, even impersonal concepts, the term «critical» refers to the individual. It requires an engagement with a specific perspective on socio-political, economic, moral, religious and possibly also other issues. In contrast with the abstraction of Theory, this critical engagement can only take place from a given background and history; one which corresponds to the values and interests defended in its attack.

Although Critical Theory does share the key points of Rabaté’s analysis insofar as it is Theory, it is also primarily critical. Describing Theory as «critical» confers it a distinctive edge that becomes crucial for its understanding. «Critical» makes an unequivocal
reference to the subversive nature of its methodology and aims.
Rabaté, based on Benjamin’s use of the word, offers a succinct reflection on the meaning and implications of the noun «critique», whose adjective, «critical», occupies our attention:

The negative sense of either pointing to the limits of knowledge as with Kant, or of attacking deficiencies in taste or artistic production; the positive one being the wish to make this activity reflexive in a redoubling mirror-image of creation: without criticism understood positively, creation could not know itself as an agency linked to a general process disposing of specific laws (2002: 56).

Critique, therefore, implies a sense of insufficiency, as well as a sense of infinity. Critical Theory is, thus, empowered with a practical and material dimension; practical because it is hoped to exercise an impact beyond books and scholarly discussion, and material in as much as it aspires to move from being a critique to achieving the emancipation of the individuals who would then become critics themselves, as the proponents of Critical Theory can be argued to have been.

It is in this sense that Aranguren and Aguirre can be considered Critical Theorists. Despite their divergences from each other and
from the Frankfurt School, they all strived towards a common aim, namely, the emancipation of the individual and of society; they have in common the critique of instrumental reason; and they share the same core methodological features, most notably the marriage between theory and praxis.

This quest to establish a solid connection between theory and practice is by no means specific to these authors. Moreover, as Kim Kyung-Man says in relation to Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Taylor, and Jonathan Turner, «the relationship of theory to practice occupies the central place in the recent scholarship of social theory» (2004: 362). These approaches have in common the fact that they go beyond the theoretical models and accounts of agents, and of how they relate to each other and the institutions, by paying close attention to their practices, whose critical interpretation will, in turn, inform their theoretical analysis, becoming a meta-analysis and a meta-theory. Two key differences, the scope and the nature of the relationship between theory and practice, distance these approaches from the one adopted by the authors studied here. What is specific about them is that this connection is not limited to social science, but is
part of a wider research exercise that strives for supradisciplinarity. Moreover, their work must be understood in the context of the effort to rethink and redefine rationality in wider terms, and the re-association of theory and practice must be understood as part of such an effort.
6.2.2 Post-modern thinkers?

There is little agreement over the exact meaning and content of the term «postmodernity», which increases the complexity of the debate. Bearing this in mind, and for the purpose of clarity, the present discussion will follow Jordan’s clarifying distinction, which states that postmodernity can be described:

first, as a philosophical approach in which postmodernism questions modernity, understood in terms of rationality, progress, freedom and human emancipation. [...] Second, a cultural approach, by which postmodernism is seen as a form of cultural sensibility or condition, characteristic of late capitalist, consumer society. [...] Third, as an aesthetic or stylistic approach, where postmodernism dissolves the binary division between high and low cultural forms and opens up a whole series of otherwise marginalized, forgotten or discarded cultural resources, thus endorsing a plurality, hybridity and promiscuity of styles (2002: 173).

Based on this, it could be said that Aranguren and Aguirre are post-modern in their philosophical approach, given their questioning of modernity. One of the key elements which runs through their
work is a critical standpoint towards foundationalist positions; they challenge the dominating role allocated to rationality; they question the role and reach of scientific knowledge; they reject the socio-economic and mechanical interpretation of progress as the increased capacity of production and consumption; and they reclaim a space for transcendence. However, although they fit post-modernist criteria in their critique of modernism, they are also critical of some key features of post-modernism.

As regards post-modernity from a cultural approach, one constitutive feature is «a new depthlessness, which finds its prolongation both in contemporary ‘theory’ and in a whole new culture of the image or the simulacrum» (Jameson, 2000: 193). It is precisely such depthlessness, such sense of loss and unfulfilment characteristic of consumerist societies, which these authors identify as symptoms of the insufficiency of such socio-economic organization and of the instrumental reason it originates from and it perpetuates. In this sense, far from being post-modern, Aranguren and Aguirre perceive post-modernity as a crisis, whose manifestations are but symptoms.

Hence, given the wider extent of their critique and the
holistic approach of their work, modern and post-modern descriptors are insufficient to define it. In consonance with Critical Theory’s resistance to the division of knowledge, they can only be understood beyond the modern and post-modern division.
6.2.3 Post-Theory

It is, then, problematic to comfortably locate Critical Theory –both in the Frankfurtian sense and the Critical Theory developed by Aranguren and Aguirre, in one of the much-debated drawers of modernism or post-modernism– for it does not clearly belong to either. In order to fully understand its specificity, attention must be drawn to the change of paradigm this radically different rationality propounds, that is, the re-assessment of the value of Theory itself and the re-introduction of the value of practice –not experimentation, but experience– as a key element to epistemology and heuristics. What is the position of Critical Theory, then, in relation to post-Theory?

Critical Theory cannot be regarded as post-Theory, if post-Theory is understood to be an attempt to obliterate any references to Theory, for the ubiquity of intertextuality means that we are unavoidably building on the texts and theories proposed in the past. What is more, even attempting to leave behind such a legacy would be against the spirit of integration of Critical Theory, which rather than a reinvention of our cultural heritage, propounds
dismantling the existing hegemonic rationality by means of an alternative rationality that would promote a culture primarily based on the values of *eros* rather than on *thanatos* (see Marcuse, 1970a: 50, 56, 78-79, 180). Unlike Derrida’s deconstructionism, Critical Theory is firmly based on the socio-historical and material conditions that propitiate its existence in the first place. Instead of struggling against the presence of this heritage, it strives to understand its causes, sources, interests, agents, reach, and tendencies, so that from an integrating—not totalizing—perspective, it can raise awareness of its dynamics and offer a plausible alternative.

Critical Theory is, however, post-Theory insofar as «post» emphasizes what comes after Theory as a reaction against what Bordwell refers to as Grand Theory, that is, Theory understood as a necessary framework of reference derived from «Lacanian psychoanalysis, Structuralist semiotics, Post-Structuralist literary theory, and variants of Althusserian Marxism» (1996b: xiii). The approach of the Frankfurt School is described as culturalism by Bordwell as a result of the ambitious reach of its scope; the overarching nature of its project would initially seem to indicate
that it qualifies as Grand Theory. However, Critical Theory points in the direction of post-Theory in as much as it integrates, but does not limit itself to Theory; it acknowledges and explores the routes offered by psychoanalysis and spirituality without them becoming overpowering frames of action and research. So, whereas Bordwell explains that «what is coming after Theory is not another Theory but theories and the activity of theorizing», Critical Theory constitutes a bolder proposition in that, despite its name, it does not constitute so much a theory properly speaking, as a methodological path to developing, not yet other theories, but an alternative rationality that would open up new personal and socio-political possibilities (1996b: xiv).
6.3 A hopeful Critical Theory

If there are such key points of contact between these Spanish thinkers and Critical Theory, to the extent that they can be called Critical Theorists themselves, why has the existence of Critical Theory in Spain gone previously unnoticed? There are a number of reasons for this.

It is tempting to point to the relatively late reception of some key Critical Theorists in Spain as one of the causes. However, the late nature of this reception can be called into question. Thanks to Taurus, Ariel and Seix Barral, editions and translations, Spanish readers gained access to key works by the Frankfurt School at a time when Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, or Benjamin were hardly known in other European countries such as France and Italy. As Savater explains,

Jesús fue un poco la figura de proa de la Escuela de Frankfurt aquí, y el causante de que en España fuera conocida mucho antes que en Italia y otros países europeos, y yo creo que también mejor (2006: n.p.).
Another explanation may be found in the clear association between neo-Marxism and Critical Theory, which makes it a very problematic designation to adopt in the context of Francoist Spain given the rich and often negative connotations associated with Marxism. However, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the adoption or at least tolerance of Marxist views became popular amongst members of the opposition to the regime.

Thus, neither of these two factors provides a satisfactory explanation. Instead, the key factor may be found in the specificity of Spanish discourse; that is, that although many of the problems raised, such as the new forms of alienation brought about by the consumer society, mass culture, manipulation of the mass media, false consciousness, and mass art were discussed at length by Spanish authors –as is the case in Aranguren and Aguirre themselves– their essentially different discourse in terms of style, vocabulary, and form may have obscured their relationship and inherent similarities to Critical Theory as developed by the Frankfurt School.

In any case, the problems posed, the most notable example being that of instrumental reasoning, are addressed in line with
Critical Theory, that is, in a manner which is thought to destabilize instrumental reason. In addition, specific elements not present in the Frankfurtian Critical Theory are introduced. The Frankfurt School, but also the legacy of existentialism and a deep-rooted spiritual tradition, have led these Spanish thinkers to a brand of Critical Theory that is concerned with the mechanisms of neocapitalism and the consequences of instrumental reason, but which, contrary to the pessimistic tone of the School, finds hope in the self rather than in institutional, social, or political changes; a «bottom-up» approach is developed.

From this perspective, the latter changes, although necessary, would only be gradually possible insofar as they are the result of a qualitative and widespread change of the self. Aguirre and also, to a lesser extent, Aranguren conceive of this change as based on the conceptualisation of a transcendental self. The insufficiency of instrumental reason is diagnosed as an inherent yearning for transcendence, which –conscious or unconscious– masquerades as the continuous quest for the unattainable, frequently directed at material consumption. As a result of this transcendentality, the self and the other regain a fundamental equality that makes
qualitative change possible. Art and (political) education are identified as desirable and effective routes towards personal self-development. As a result, a more hopeful critique is provided; in contrast with the Frankfurt School, who are uncertain as to where the agents for change may lie, Aranguren and Aguirre find the agent for change in the self who has been equipped with a vital need of transcendentalism. By introducing the elements of spirituality, faith, and the role of choice, transcendentalism becomes a key aspect of their alternative to instrumental reason. With this, not only do they establish the singularity of their approach, but they also bypass the limitations associated with the Frankfurt School.

In conclusion, I hope to have provided enough evidence throughout this book to support the argument that Aranguren and Aguirre can both be considered Critical Theorists based on their theoretical work, their *praxis*, and, more importantly, their efforts at unveiling the shortcomings and unsatisfactory outcomes of instrumental reason. Their project can be considered as part of an integral and coherent effort to destabilize instrumental reason, as well as to create, provide, and exercise an alternative, subversive, and, ultimately, liberating rationality.

There is still much, however, which has not been covered in
this book. I would particularly like to draw attention to the actuality of the debate of the problem of reason. This can be observed in Bourdieu’s *Acts of Resistance. Against the Tyranny of the Market* (1998), where he includes an intervention, which coincidentally took place in Frankfurt, entitled «Abuse of Power by advocates of Reason» (1995). From this short intervention, it quickly becomes evident that, although the term «instrumental reason» may be in disuse, the issues and concerns it raises are far from obsolete or exhausted. Bourdieu criticizes the attempt of the West to impose a whole range of values, structures, and behaviours which have led some cultures to «a very profound revolt against the reason which cannot be separated from the abuses of power which are armed or justified by reason (economic, scientific or any other)» (1998: 20). It is, therefore, visible how now, as before, the issue of reason remains a very problematic one, one that in the form of continuing crises, tensions, and dissatisfactions urgently demands our attention.
Appendix 1. Aguirre’s Chronology

This appendix lists key events and dates which marked Aguirre’s life. The process of compilation for such dates varies; some of these dates are common knowledge, such as the date of his wedding or the date of his passing. Others have been provided by Aguirre himself, although this information cannot be taken at face value and, where possible, has been contrasted with other sources. Finally, some have been arrived at by reference to other sources and by a process of deduction, based on the contextual information available surrounding the event in question.

1934. Official documents record Aguirre’s birth in Madrid (Manuel Vicent suggests his birth may well have taken place in 1930).

1934. Soon after his birth, Aguirre moved to Santander.

July 1951. He was awarded the extraordinary prize at the national exams.

1952. He started his theological education in the seminary school of Comillas.

1955. He studied in Munich with a grant awarded by the Foundation Humbolt.
1957. He studied theology in the University of Innsbruck, Austria.

1958. Aguirre was one of the founders of the Frente de Liberación Popular (los FELIPES).

1961. He was ordained priest in Munich, Germany.

1962. He returned to Spain from Germany.

1962. He joined the chapel of Ciudad Universitaria, Madrid.

1962. He participated in the IV Congress of the European Movement held in Munich.

1962. He joined Taurus as Director of Religious publications.

1969. He left the clergy.

1969. He became editor-in-chief at Taurus.

1976. He hosted the act in which Felipe Gónzalez announced his position as leader of the PSOE.

Autumn 1977. He resigned from Taurus.

1977. He became General Director of Music (after having resigned from Taurus).

Late 1977. He started his relationship with Cayetana de Alba.


March 1978. He married Cayetana Fitz-James Stuart, 18th Duchess
of Alba, becoming Duke of Alba.

1980. He resigned as General Director of Music.

1984. He joined the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando.

1985. He joined the Real Academia Sevillana de Buenas Letras.

1986. He joined the Real Academia de la Lengua Española.


1991. He resigned as Chief of the Pavilion of Seville.

1992. Member of the Patronato de la Fundación El Monte.


A list of the first editions of the translations into Spanish and in Spain of books written by members of the Frankfurt School—including Benjamin—has been compiled below. The period covered expands since the first appearance of any such books in 1962 until what is often considered the end of the Transition in 1981, although no books of this nature were actually published in 1981, making 1980 the de facto cut off date. It should be noted that other translations of some these and other works have taken place earlier in Latin America. However, such texts have not been included here, for they are beyond the scope of this book.


______ 1962b. *Prismas; La crítica de la cultura y la sociedad*, M. Sacristán (tr.), Ariel, Barcelona.


Mexico.


_____ 1972. *Iluminaciones II: Baudelaire: Un poeta en el esplendor del capitalismo*, vol.2, J. Aguirre (pról. & tr.), Taurus,

57 This book was first reprinted in 1980, although with a slightly different title: *Imaginación y sociedad. Iluminaciones II: Poesía y capitalismo*. Further reprints were published in the following years.


58 That same year another book was published, identical in content, although slightly different in title: *Iluminaciones II: Poesía y capitalismo*. This one indicates that the first edition dates from May 1972, thus we can surmise that it is the second edition of *Iluminaciones II: Baudelaire; Un poeta en el esplendor del capitalismo*.

59 Well after Aguirre left Taurus, in 1991, this series was continued with the publication of the fourth volume of *Iluminaciones*, entitled *Para una crítica de la violencia y otros ensayos* (introduction written by Eduardo Subirats and translated by Roberto Blatt).


____ 1970b. *Ontología de Hegel y teoría de la historicidad*, M. Sacristán (tr.), Martínez Roca, Barcelona.

____ 1971a. *La agresividad en la sociedad industrial avanzada y
otros ensayos, J.I. Saenz-Díez (tr.), Alianza, Madrid.


_____ Serge MALLETT, Dieter ULLÉ, André GORZ. 1975. Marcuse ante sus críticos, Grijalbo, Barcelona.


_____ 1978. La dimensión estética, J.F. Ivars (tr.), Materiales, Barcelona.


Appendix 3. Works by Aguirre

Unfortunately, no records of Aguirre’s work for Taurus have survived the successive removals that the publishing house has experienced throughout the years. Therefore, no exhaustive list of works translated, edited and written by Aguirre has been produced.

In addition to the publications recorded here, Aguirre also publishes numerous newspaper articles, mostly in *El País*, but occasionally also in *ABC* and in *Triunfo*. Most of these articles have been collected in later works. Aguirre is also listed in the publication of various music recordings, even before he became *General Director of Music* in 1977. Thus, although the present bibliography offers an extensive account of Aguirre’s publications, more work needs to be done in order to produce a comprehensive record which includes all of his diverse publications.

Books


60 Although admittedly the topic of this book is thematically unusual for


_____, DUQUE DE ALBA. 1985. La casa de Alba y la poesía sevillana de los siglos XVI y XVII. Discursos leídos ante la Real Academia Sevillana de Buenas Letras el día 8 de diciembre: En la recepción pública del excelentísimo señor don Jesús Aguirre y Ortiz de Zárate, Duque de Alba: De la Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando, Sevilla, S.L.

_____, DUQUE DE ALBA. 1986. El Conde de Aranda y la reforma de espectáculos en el siglo XVIII. Discurso leído por el Excmo. Sr. Don Jesús Aguirre y Ortiz de Zárate, Duque de Alba, ante la Real Academia Española, el día 11 de diciembre y contestación del Excmo. Sr. Don Fernando Aguirre, the catalogue of the Biblioteca Nacional de España any identity doubts by including Aguirre's full name followed by his title of Duke.
Lázaro Carreter, Imp. Aguirre, Madrid.


_____ 1992. Memorias del cumplimiento. Crónica en la comisaría,
vol.6, Plaza & Janés, Barcelona.

_____ , PÉREZ, F. 1995. La religión como sistema establecido, Movimiento Cultural Cristiano, Madrid.


Book Chapters


Book sections, including prologues, and introductions


_____ 1969. «Presentación española. La libertad religiosa y su


61 That same year another book was published, identical in content, although slightly different in title: *Iluminaciones II: Poesía y capitalismo*, so we can only conclude that they are two editions of the same work.


_____, 1980. «El aprendiz de Goethe», in La Pasión del Joven Werther; Goetz de Berlichingen; Fausto. Goethe, J.W. von., Alfonso Arús (estudio preliminar), and Joan Leita (tr.), Barcelona: Carroggio.


62 This book collects the contributions to a discussion which took place in honour of Arturo Uslar Pietri during the Semana del autor in Madrid in December 1986. Jesús Aguirre participated in a round table entitled «El intelectual y la política». 


Works translated, revised, or edited by J. Aguirre


——— 1964b. Justificación de la filosofía, P. J. Aguirre (tr.), Taurus,

63 Considering that Aguirre was editor-in-chief at Taurus between 1969 and 1977, and given his stated interest and involvement in the publication of works by members of the Frankfurt School, it is reasonable to surmise that Aguirre was the editor for the books by them published at Taurus during this interval, particularly, in light of the fact that no editor is named. Similarly, Aguirre was Director of Religious Publications from 1962-1969. As such, he selected the religious titles to be translated and took care of many of the translations himself. Given this context, it is possible to conclude that he was the editor of such publications when no other editor was specifically credited.
Madrid.


historia, J. Aguirre (tr.), Taurus, Madrid.


DILTHEY, W. 1963. La gran música de Bach, P. J. Aguirre (tr.), Taurus, Madrid.


MITSCHERLICH, A. 1971. La idea de la paz y la agresividad humana, J. Aguirre (tr.), Taurus, Madrid.


_____ 2003. «Education after Auschwitz» in R. Tiedemann (ed.)


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DE_CENTRO_DEMOCRATICO/Sansuena/juega/ojala/cultura/elpepiopi/19790315elpepiopi_7/Tes/> [accessed 14/05/08].


_____ 1970. La revolución del espíritu: Tres pensamientos de
libertad, Siglo Veintiuno, Madrid.


Beatriz Caballero Rodríguez


BONETE PERALES, E. 1989. Aranguren: La ética entre la religión y la política, Tecnos, Madrid.


2012. «El exilio como requisito para el oficio de
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Verlag, Amsterdam.


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Frankfurt y el Instituto de Investigación Social (1923-1950), Taurus, Madrid.


Amell y S. García Castañeda (eds), La cultura española en el posfranquismo, Playor, Madrid, pp.11-26.


_____ 1970b. «The End of Utopia» in Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis,


PARÍS, C. 1977. «Nuestra situación filosófica tras la era franquista»,
in *La cultura bajo el franquismo*, Anagrama, Barcelona, pp.49-63.


TORRENS, R. 1956. En torno a Aranguren y la autocrítica, Publicaciones Cristiandad, Barcelona.


WILLIAMS, R. 1983. Keywords; A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Fontana, London.
